A critique of aspects of Louis Althusser's epistemology as employed by Manuel Castells by Marais, Linda Jean
A CRITIQUE OF ASPECTS OF 
LOUIS ALTHUSSER'S EPISTEMOLOGY 
AS EMPLOYED BY MANUEL CASTELLS 
by 
LINDA JEAN MARAIS 
A thesis submitted in fulfilmeni of the 
requirements for the Degree of Master of 
Social Science, DeparJ:.ment of Sociology, 
. .,.,,_ ........ -" 
Faculty of Social Science, 
University of Cape Town, 
South Africa. 
OCTOBER 1983 
The University of Cape Town has beef! given 
the right to reproduce this thesis In wh:>le 
or In part. Copyright. ls held by the author. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
A Brief History of Urban Sociology 
Castells 
Althusser 
Conclusions 
THE SOCIAL FORMATION 
Castells and Relative Autonomy 
THEORY AND REALITY 
Castells: Theory and Reality 
Problems in the Althusserian System 
THEORY 
Theory as a Practice 
The Epistemological Break 
The Problematic 
The Posing of Problems 
Vision 
The Autonomy of Theory 
HISTORICIST HUMANISM 
Hegel 
Althusser's Opposition to Hegelian Marxism 
Criticisms of Althusser's Position 
Castells and Historicist Humanism 
IDEOLOGY, SOCIAL CLASSES AND THE ROLE OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL 
Criticisms of Althusser's Position 
Castells and Ideology, Social Classes and the 
Individual 
Criticisms of Castells' Position 
CONCLUSION 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PAGE 
1 
2 
10 
1 5 
20 
23 
34 
56 
60 
77 
81 
91 
102 
107 
11 0 
114 
131 
132 
136 
141 
143 
153 
157 
161 
169 
175 
189 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank Dr K Jubber for his helpful super-
vision of this thesis, and my parents for their moral support 
and financial assistance. 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an assessment of Castells' claim to have 
used Al~husserian epistemology both as a theoretical basis for 
a critique of empiricist urban sociology, and in the establishment 
of a Marxist scientific alternative. To this end, Castells 
employed the Althusserian concep~ion of the social totality, 
which was characterized by a complex structured unity of 
relatively autonomous instances with their own laws of develop-
ment, This was intended to establish the last-instance deter-
mination by the economy, and to avoid the empiricist portrayal 
of the relationship between base and superstructure as one of 
essence and phenomena, According to Althusser, theory, like the 
other relative!~ butonomou~ practices, has its own specific 
raw material, labour and product, and was thus separate from 
and irreducible to any of the other practices. 
Each chapter of this thesis outlines an aspect of Althusser's 
work that can explicitly or implicitly be identified in Castells' 
writings. The critical responses to Althusserianism are then 
examined in order to disclose the unresolved and contradictory 
elements of his position, and the extent to which these have 
led to problems in Castells' work, More importantly, it is 
argued that Castells' theoretical allegiance to Althusser is 
deliberately inconsistent: he has significantly altered every 
I 
controversial tenet of the latter, while neglecting to acknow-
1 
ledge that these ch~nges are in fact distortions ~hich directly 
I 
oppose the character of Althusserianism, Castells wavers between 
contradictory epistemologies, and this results in his analyses 
lV 
I 
being stranded between Althusserian theoreticism and empiri-
cism. 
It is my contention that Castells wished to use the ready-
made Althusserian system without falling prey to its unpala-
table implications, especially Althusser's conclusion that 
Marxism is a science that produces ideology for the masses, 
who are never able to achieve a genuine cognitive appropriation 
of reality, and are thus unable to participate in the 
development of theory. This reduction of individual conscious-
ness to ideology undermined the significance of class conscious-
ness and political practice, which are commonly regarded as 
the fundamental principles of revolutionary Marxist practice. 
v 
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INTRODUCTION 
I It was in 1977, as a student of City and Regional Planning 
that I first encountered the work of Manuel Castells. While 
I found it dense and abstruse, I was impressed by the copious 
use of Marxist terminology~ and the claims that it possessed . 
a theoretical basis for the analysis of urban issues; unlike 
the prolific but conceptually barren studies in urban sociology 
that I had encountered. Certainly, his dismissal of these 
'theories' as ideological was an appealing argument, but the 
unfamiliarity of the terminology and the impenetrability of 
his style of writing at that time dampened by enthusiasm for 
further investigation of his work. 
Intrigued by the acclaim with which The Urban: Question 
was met, when faced with the'choice of a topic for my Master's 
thesis in Sociology, I decided to undertake an analysis of 
Castells' work. After having read, and re-read it, my confu-
- sion only increased; and, seeing that Castells acknowledged 
Louis Althusser as his theoretical source, I decided to read 
the latter in the original. It was then that I noticed that 
Castells was far from consistent in his application of Al-
thusserian concepts; and, after reading critical analyses 
of Althusser's work, I became ~ware how significant Castells' 
(frequently unacknowledged) departures were, and how they 
invariably occurred in the areas in which Althusser was being 
heavily criticized, This thesis, then, sets out to isolate 
the epistemological dimension of Castells' work, to compare 
it with Althusserian epistemology, and to suggest possible 
reasons for and the theoretical implications of these episte-
mological shifts, 
A Brief History of Urban Sociology 
The interwar period saw the beginning of urban sociology 
in a cross-fertilitation between Social Darwinism and 
pragmatism, and the sociology of Tennies, Simmel, Weber and 
Durkheim. These ideas took root in Chicago, where Burgess, 
Park and Wirth, amongst others, were responsible for the 
establishment of a prolific school of urban sociology. The 
Chicago School, as it came to be known, regarded urbanization 
as an independent process and source of social change, while 
urbanism was seen as the manifestation of modern culture. 
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The Chicago School considered urban and rural life as entirely 
dissimilar, and posited a rural-urban dichotomy. Furthermore, 
the conceptualization of the city was as an externally organized 
unit in space produced by laws of its own. In effect, changes 
in the urban environment~ a context so governing individual 
experience as to set the pace and direction of change in 
society, were explained by the process of urbanization 
its elf~ 
Park and Burgess employed the term 'natural community' to 
describe the way in which the growth of the city's residential 
areas is based on independent personal decisions concerning 
morality, politics, ecology and economics, (Suttles, 1972:13), 
Gradually, 'natural community' came to denote a universal 
solidarity which could not be attributed to culture or ad-
ministration, a view that did not take into account the fact 
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that this type of 'natural community' was not a universal· 
phenomenon, and ignored the relationship between residential 
groups and society as a whole: "the word natural seems to 
have left the impression of a primordial social solidarity 
which existed apart from social convention in somewhat the same 
way as the social categories of male and female, young and old, 
are presented in popular discussion" (Ibid,: 8). The natural 
community was also seen in terms of the sentimental ties of 
its inhabitants. This led to a focus on mutual social 
characteristics as the foundation of shared emotions and 
values, and a failure to consider those public housing pro-
jects where shared social attributes did not lead to a strong 
sense of interpersonal loyalty and identification. 
The fundamental tenets of the Chicago School have been 
revealed to possess very limited predictive capacity~ the 
lessening of ethnic differentiation did not inevitably cul-
~ 
minate in the disappearance of the community concerned, and 
the sense of community was not always negatively affected by 
increasing heterogeneity. The autonomous suburb did not 
precipitate an abundance of local social networks, and was 
frequently unable to establish local representation and 
identity (Ibid.: 15). 
It is widely agieed that urban sociology has not done 
much to justify its existence since its inception a half-
century ago. As Harlee points out, if it was not for the 
obvious presence of social problems in urban areas, public 
concern about them, and the demand for policies to ameliorate 
them, urban sociology might not have endured as a specific 
branch of sociology (Harloe, 1977: 1). It must not, however, 
be thought that during this period urban sociology languished 
in a state of decline: indeed the accelerating crises were 
occurring globally, and the intervention required precipitated 
a massive increase in research concerned with 'urban issues', 
financed by governments of diverse political inclin~tions, 
Cities had to accommodate the economic requirements of mass 
consumption, the influence of immigration and the immense 
influx from the countryside, and the resultant competition 
for increasingly scarce resources, 
Public concern with the urban crisis led to its pivotal 
significance on the political platform, and urban sociology 
responded by relinquishing general sociological concerns and 
concentrating on urban policy and administration, community 
planning and the intricate statistical description of urban 
areas_ (Mellor, 1975: 278), "Urban sociologists have been 
frequent1y turned into the handmaidens of those practical 
professions concerned with making physical changes to the 
built environment, As a result many urban sociologists have 
become more concerned with the human relations of the city 
rather than the sociology of the city: it is as if industrial 
sociologists had turned themselves into personnel officers" 
(Harlo~, 1977~ 2). Harloe goes on to remark that the level 
of urban sociology has sunk to the banal level of attempting 
to predict the room in which members of a particular socio~ 
economic group like to eat their dinner, and that in many 
instances the discipline is no more than market research 
(Ibid,), The perspective of conventional urban sociology was 
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imbued with ideological implications that were unacceptable 
above all to Marxist sociologists. Part of its ideological 
load derived from the empiricism of classical sociology, 
which gave rise to Small's concentration on definitely bounded 
units of experience and Simmel's study of the city as the 
immediately observable site of individual association, the 
context for the examination of 'the actuality of concrete 
life' (Mellor, l975:.. 281). These seemingly innocuous concerns 
implied, however, that cities themselves were a sufficient 
object of study, and that the process of urbanization could be 
understood without reference to capitalism as a productive 
system. 
As early as 1955, Glass pointed to the necessity of urban 
sociology taking into account the fact that the city showed 
evidence of the abstract forces of history, class structure 
s 
and culture, As 'the handmaidens of the practical professions', 
urban soci,,ologists failed to do so, and their studies were 
therefore regarded as particularly suspect, This re-evaluation 
was part of a widespread rejection of positivism which occurred 
when sociologists began to question the scientific status of 
the knowledge they produced. It became generally accepted 
that inductivism and the positivist postulate of phenomenalism 
do not guarantee scientificity, that knowledge is not the 
inevitable product of immediate experience, and that theory 
is essential in the determination of 'facts' (Saunders, 
1981b: 38). 
The publication in 1967 of Rex and Moore's book 
Race, Community and Conflict was seen as the first significant 
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move away from the theoretically unfruitful state of urban 
sociology in Britain (Harloe, 1978: 12; and Mellor, 1975: 282). 
Their characterization of housing classes had been influenced 
by the differential provision of housing and educational 
resources to immigrant and local workers, While the labour 
status of these two groups were identical, housing policies 
discriminated against immigrants in favour of established and 
local households, This induced Rex and Moore to distinguish 
between the class struggle generated by relations in the 
workplace, and that created by the conflict over urban housing 
resources, It was found that the local working class had 
access to housing of a standard incompatible with their 
control over the means of production, whereas the immigrants 
were largely denied access to community resources, This study 
made the politically controversial claim that the class 
struggle over housing constituted a fundamental urban process 
(Harloe, 1977: 4). 
Rex and Moore's themes of the distribution of scarce 
urban resources and the constraints operating in this context, 
were taken up by Pahl, for whom the fundamental framework of 
urban sociology was the pattern of constraints at work in 
different_ localities (Pahl, 1970a; 1970b). Pahl was concerned 
with the way in which unequal claims over investment into 
community resources resulted in unevenness of resource dis-
tribution; a differential access to facilities that was 
exacerbated by factors such as distance and low incomes. 
Pahl illustrated the significance in this situation of the 
behaviour and decisions of the 'urban managers', the local 
technocrats and 'social gatekeepers' who mediate in the 
distribution of urban resources, Pahl's work achieved greater 
importance when he later altered his managerialist position 
and acknowledged that these urban managers were themselves 
imprisoned in general political and economic circumstances 
(Harloe, 1978: 12). 
1n France, a major impetus for urban study was provided 
by the government's concern over the events of 1968. The 
French urban sociologists were not satisfied merely to concern 
themselves with pragmatic issues, and their theoretical 
orientation was due primarily to the prolific philosophical 
tradition in French sociology. This school of urban sociology 
attempted to establish urban sociology's epistemological 
status, as well as a theoretical method of situating urban 
issues within a general historical materialist context. The 
journal "Espaces et Societe" and the group of researchers 
associated with it became of primary importance in the appli-
cation of Marxist theory to the analysis of the city (Lambert, 
1979: 241). 
The most celebrated of these writers was Manuel Castells, 
who set out to provide an extensive critique of the bourgeois 
ideological assumptions at the base of urban sociology, and 
a Marxist alternative, These .themes were first discussed in 
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"Y a-t-il une Sociologie Urbaine" (Castells, 1968), in which he 
asked whether urban sociology had a spcifically 'urban' 
scientific object, In his next article "Theorie et Ideologie 
en Sociologie Urbaine" (Idem, 1969), Castells inquired 
whether it is possible for urban sociology to study urban 
real objects, These concerns were elaborated in La Question 
Urbaine (Idem, 1972), which attempted to apply them in the 
analysis of empirical situations, 
While Castells' work had a wide influence on urban socio-
logy in France and a number of francophone Third World coun-
tries, it had only a small following in Britain, consisting 
of a few radical geographers who established the journal 
"Antipode", and C G Pickvance, who provided the initial 
translations of Castells' early articles into English. Their 
information on Castells and French urban sociology was res-
tricted to mimeographed versions of working tranilations of 
individual chapters, articles and conference papers (Lambert, 
1979: 243). 
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The 1975 Conference on Urban Change and Conflict, organized 
by the Centre for Environmental Studies in London, was the 
first major meeting ground for English and French sociology, 
and this rapprochement was facilitated by the publication in 
1976 of Pickvance's Urban Sociology: Critical Essays (1976), 
Harloe's Captive Cities (1977), and the English translation 
of The Urban Question (1977a). 
At first, the reaction to Castells' writings was largely 
favourable due to a widespread disenchantment with the ideo-
logical focus of urban sociology and the paucity of its 
theoretical content. Alongside the government-sponsored 
research which was intended to solve urban problems during 
the 1960s, there occurred in French and American universities 
a growth of radical social theory, Here, the most significant 
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development was the 'renaissance' of Marxism as an approach 
to the study of society (Clarke, 1977:1; and Duncan, 1981: 231). 
In the radical political and intellectual context of black 
power movements and student unrest, the basic assu~ptions and 
I 
modes of explanation of many areas of sociology were reinterro-
1 
gated. "Perhaps in no other subfield of sotiologyjwas this 
questioning s~ imperative as in urban sociology, w~ere a deep 
chasm had developed between the theoretical premisis laid 
down by the Chicago School (and the empirical focus that 
followed from these premises) and their impotence to explain 
the deepening urban 'crisis' which seemingly grew worse with 
every attempt to ameliorate it . (Abu-Lughod, 19 79: 19 2-3) . 
Urban sociologists were criticized for "fruitless attempts to 
get theoretical yields from the now overworked ground of the 
Chicago ecologists" (Pahl,,, 19 78,. 309) , while. the' Chicago School 
was rejected on the grounds that it studied cities without 
reference to capitalism. 
While traditional urban sociology was regarded as "provi-
ding at best questionable answers to relatively trivial 
questions" (Dickens, 1978, cited by .. Duncan, 1971, 231), ·it was 
thought that Marxist urban sociology would do away with the 
myopic concentration on superficial appearances. The Marxist 
approach held that it was necessary for science to· go beyond 
mere appearances in order to reveal the essential relations 
underlying them. It became widely accepted that "any theory 
that remains at the level of appearances •.. and attempts 
to explain reality in terms of the categories of everyday 
. .. 
experience •.. will inevitably fail to provide scientific 
explanations •.• ,but will simply formalize and legitimate 
existing ideological modes of thought" (Saunders, 1979: · 112). 
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Marxism's offer of a scientific analysis of the totality, 
and its insistence on the necessity of relating parts to the 
whole, seemed very appealing after the dispersed, untheoretical 
studies of empiricist urban sociology, which had separated the 
study of the city from its political and economic context, 
Structuralist Marxism in particular appeared to provide 
answers to some of the questions that traditional sociology 
did not even ask: ~It promised rigorous and systematic theory, 
which we found lacking in modern sociology, and offered an 
interdisciplinary outlook, which did not carve up the social 
world into preconceived areas and corresponding academic 
disciplines or hypostatise the 'social' as an autonomous 
and reified level of reality. More importantly, it was 
anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist ••. and seemed to provide 
a potential link between theory and practice - which contemporary 
structural-functionalism certainly did not - by enabling a 
strategy for transforming society to be based on a scientific 
analysis of the ongoing social formation'' (M, Glucksmann, 
1974a: 230). 
Castells 
At first glance, Castells appeared to provide both a cogent 
appraisal of the deficiencies of urban sociology ·and an acceptable 
redirection; on closer inspection, however, a growing number 
1 1 
of critics saw through the emperor's new suit, Castells' 
claims were found to be extravagant, his observations unoriginal 
and his contradictions abundant, 
Pahl stated it would be wrong to suggest that< Castells' 
writing is"clear and straightforward'' (Pahl, 1978:~3), and 
I for Lambert The Urban Question will win no prizes for reada-
bility, cogency and clarity due to its mystificatibn, length 
I 
and pretentiousness (Lambert, 1979: 243), Elliott~in turn 
' 
describes The Urban Question as profoundly irritating, and 
dismisses the 'new theoretical tools' as "a box of blunt 
~ 
instruments'' (Elliott, 1980: 153). One of the most scathing-
attacks came from Glass, who systematically castigated 
Castells' magnum opus as a slovenly, fatty concoction, inten~ 
tionally written in "cryptic hideous verbiage", and "obscuran-
tist lingo" (Glass, 1977:667). Glass concedes that many of 
Castells' criticisms of urban sociology are correct, but 
denies that these observations are startling new discoveries, 
or that his work resolves these difficulties (Ibid,: 667), 
Elliott agrees: "Castells, in the early articles, was attacking 
some real weaknesses, but these were not new targets, and 
indeed in some of its particulars - the aitack on the Chicagci 
School, for example - it seemed crude and unappealing" (Elliott, 
1980: 151). Glass illustrates the absurdity of Castells' 
rejection of the terms 'tirban', city, 'region' and 'space' 
as ideological, in the face of his continued use of them in 
the same 'ideological' manner that he denounced (Glass, 1977: 
667). This view is corroborated by Elliott: "Just as we 
1 2 
think we have grasped his argument and temporarily at least 
are willing to foreswear their use, Castells throws us into 
confusion by employing these same terms in gay disregard 
of his own conventions" (Elliott, 1980: 152). Glass attributes 
Castells' theoretical 'lapses' to a deliberate muddle, serving 
as an effective camouflage for the lack of proper theory: 
"The 'new urban sociology' has a special line of 'double-
speak': non-questions are put forward in the name of a new 
'problematic', fogginess is called 'precision'; gibberish is 
presented as profundity; obtuse phrasemongering is less 
trouble than the humdrum jobs which research and/or political 
activities entail" (Glass, 1977: p. 667). While Lebas states 
.. 
that "in a sense it is left up to the individual reader to 
formulate a working shorthand of it in order to have a full 
understanding of. the implications of the processes described" 
(Lebas, 1977: 164); Glass denies this possibility: "And indeed 
his soliloquy cannot be translated into, or paraphrased in, 
ordinary language ••• Such a translation would be bound to 
endow it with a clarity which it does not possess" (Glass, 
1977: 669). In response to Castells admission that some of 
his conceptions were confused, but that rectifications must 
not take the form of a rewriting of the text, Glass asks 
"Why not ?H (Ibid.) ; while Le bas mordantly suggests that, as 
an exercise in theoretical practice, Castells' text "can 
become the object of its own transformation" (Lebas, 1977:163). 
Thus, Castells' assertion that he has taken care to 
achieve clarity and avoid ambiguity, and that this aspect of 
his work is in contrast to "the vague rhetoric sometimes 
deliberately employed in epistemology" (Castells, 1976d:113), 
has been found to be particularly ironic in the light of his 
own obscure style. Glass concludes that The Urban Question 
should be dismissed as "a load of humbug" (Glass, 19 7 7 .: . 669) ; 
while Elliott cynically remarks that it should be left to 
moulder on the shelf rather than brin~ing profit to the pub-
lishers and very little to the readers (Eliott, 1980: 158). 
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In my own reading of his works, I do not feel that Castells' 
subject matter is so inherently complex that it can not be 
more accessibly presented, A full explanation of the problems 
of his work, however, must go beyond the view that it is a 
deliberate exercise in obfuscation, It is my contention that 
Castells' attempt to use Althusser as his theoretical base 
is largely responsible for the impenetrability and contradictions 
of his writings. 
Castells has explicitly acknowledged his affiliation with 
Althusserian philosophy. In the Preface to The Urban Question, 
he states that hi~ work derives from the intellectual context 
of Althusser's reading of Marx (Castells, 1977a: ix). A.:year 
and a half after starting this thesis, I had been unable to 
find a single reviewer who did not take for granted this 
claim by Castells that his work is based on Althusser's 
structuralism. Their relationship has been assumed to be 
one of direct theoretical derivation: Pickvance claims 
that Castells follows Althusser's interpretation of Marx 
(Pickvance, 1974: 203), ·as does Abu-Lughod (1979: 193) 
14 
and Harloe (1977: 12). The difference in emphasis between 
Castells and Althusser in their use of the terms 'science' 
and 'ideology' was noted by Pickvance (1976a: 2 03) ' but he 
I 
I does not spell out the full extent of the divergences, nor 
t 
they occurred, I does he give any indication of why I 
I 
Elliott observes that Castells' critique of urban sociology 
"came in elaborate Althusserian wrappings", and argues that 
the mentor's flaws are responsible for Castells' theoretical 
inaaequacies (Elliott, 19&0: 152). This assertion is, in my 
view, at least partly accurate, and the extent to which 
Castells' confusion is attributable to inconsistencies within 
the Althusserian system will be examined in this thesis, 
The chief problem in Castells' work, however, lies elsewhere, 
and is implicitly recognized in Elliott's observation that 
Castells' "analysis floats very freely above its empirical 
moorings", and that there is a frequent "gap between empirical 
base and general argument" (Ibid,: 153); and in Duncan's 
remark that Castells' analysis "remains stranded between ab-
stract and concrete" (Duncan, 1981: 247). 
I believe that Lebas is correct when she attributes 
Castells' confusion to his "extremely innovative and at times 
very selective use of a variety of theoretical origins" 
(Lebas, 1977: 164). The precise demarcation of the cause of 
theoretical inconsistency is offered by Garnier: "Castells 
oscillates between Althusserian theoreticism and concrete 
studies which depart considerably from this framework" (Garnier, 
1973, cited by Harloe, 1977: 19). 
1 s 
Determined to transcend the ideologically unsavoury aspects 
of urban sociology, Castells attempted to use Althusserian 
philosophy as a ready-made theoretical structure with which ~ 
to purge from urban sociology its ideological misrepresentations. 
Althusser 
Louis Althusser was, at the time that Castells wrote The 
Urban Question, the most eminent Marxist philosopher in France, 
and he achieved his renown through an extensive theoretical 
clarification and reformulation of Marx's works, In Anderson's 
description of the advent of Western Marxism (Anderson, 1976), 
he discusses the complex relationship that major leftist 
theorists such as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Lefebvre had with 
the PCF. In many instances, the latter conflicted openly 
with the ideas of the former, to the extent that theorists 
frequently broke with the party or were expelled from it, 
The 1960s, however, saw a gradual d!minuitio;a....of the repression ;<... · 
--
of intellectual Marxism, and it was Louis Althusser who ini-
tiated and was largely responsible for the rise of intellectual 
debate within the PCF, Nevertheless, Althusser did not simply 
toe the party line: "the paradox of this ascendency has been 
its development against the grain of the political evolution 
of the PCF itself ..• , Althusser's work O I • defined itself as 
explicitly anti-humanist at a time when the official French 
party doctrine extolled the virtues of humanism as a common 
bond.~. in the building of an advanced democracy (Ibid,: 39). 
By the late 1970s, there was already a growing resistance 
16 
to his ideas. Persuasive criticisms involving every facet 
of his work were levelled by critics from various currents of 
Marxism, as well as from positions outside this theoretical 
domain. A. Glucksmann, unlike most of Althusser's critics, 
does not approach his· work from ~ithin the bounds of the classical 
position on revolutionary Marxism, but is located instead within 
the tradition of European philosophy that pre-dates Marx. This 
enabled him "to show how close Althusser's affinities are with 
his pre-Marxist predecessors, and how intimately his system 
is related to the 'high' tradition of philosophical discourse" 
(Anon., New Left Review~ 72: 62) . 
. 
Within the Marxist tradition, Althusser's commentators 
take up a variety of positions, from structuralism (Collier, 
Hindess and Hirst) to overt humanism (Keat and Urry, Sayer, 
McDonnel and Robins, and Seidler); while other are ranged at 
various points along this continuum (Geras, Saunders and 
Callinicos) • 
It is not the aim of this thesis to pronounce a conclusive 
judgement on the ultimate validity of either Althusser's 
work or that of his critics. The latter are dealt with 
primarily in order to uncover those criticisms that Castells 
was attempting to deflect by changes in his approach. It 
is these changes which will be subjected to detailed evaluation, 
in terms of their degree of consistency with and correspondence 
to the Althusserian system that Castells supposedly espoused. 
Nevertheless, it is essential to remember that the debate 
concerning Althusser's epistemology has a multitude of levels, 
and that his. opponents did not always have a common epistemological 
approach, neither did they suspend these differences in order 
to dispatch Althusser into theoretical disrepute, 
Althusser's repudiation was also far from absolute and 
universal. He had, and still has, a number of distinguished 
and scholarly apologists who have frequently and effectively 
impugned certain accusations made against him; and often 
1.7 
levelled countercharges against the critics, Not only did 
Althusser's opponents have to defend their statements from his 
protagonists, but even when unified in the desire to discredit 
him, theoretical divergences led them to break ranks and assail 
each other. 
Perhaps the loneliest voice in the melee was Thompson's, 
/ 
for the vitriol of /his rejection of Althusser led even a 
number of Althusser's critics to temper his grandiose and 
peremptory accusations by acknowledging aspects of Althusserian 
epistemology that were positive and should be retained, 
While it is hard not to admire the glittering virtuosity 
of Thompson's acerbic turn of phrase, the wordy warfare he 
conducts against Althusser does not always work to his own 
advantage. Nield and Seed, who are sympathetic to the gist 
of Thompson's critique, nevertheless find it necessary to 
qualify their support (Nield and Seed, 1979), For them, 
Thompson has neglected the "essential provisionality" of 
any debate: "This has the effect of inflating the 'exchange' 
beyond its proper sphere, of transforming sharply articulated 
and contrary polemics into a final, absolute struggle for the 
same space - possession of the Marxist tradition" (Ibid,: 386). 
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They also point to Thompson's omission to outline the debili-. 
tated nature of pre-Althusserian leftist theoretical discourse, 
which made it particularly 'susceptible to Althusser's episte-
mological assertions. The desire to rout Althusserian trends 
once and for all inclines Thompson to replace dialectical 
critique with an attack redolent of religious and moral fervour. 
More specifically, Thompson "remains too much at a distance for 
a close analytical distinction among various Althusserian 
positions and refuses analytically to disarticulate the 
Althusserian system .•. Yet, paradoxically, in this as in 
other ways, this uncompromising stance reproduced the very 
technique of closure which Thompson so rightly resents in 
Althusser's method. (Ibid.: 397). 
Many of Nield and Seed's criticisms have been supported 
by Anderson (1980). He too discusses Thompson's neglect of 
the historical and conjunctural circumstances in which Althusser 
wrote, and the influence these had on the nature and impact 
of his work (Ibid.: 105). Like Nield and Seed, Anderson 
bbjects to the polemical style of Thompson's work, claiming 
that the latter was so incensed by the imagined conclusions 
of Reading Capital that he failed to "engage intellectually" 
with it: "Defeating his own intention, his pages remain more 
abstract and declaratory than those he is attacking~ ·crbid,: 66). 
Anderson also finds fa~lt with the way in which Thompson 
has misread Althusser, and exemplifies this by referring to 
Thompson's claim that Althusser has incorrectly identified the 
mode of production with the social formation. Here, Anderson 
provides a timely reminder that it was Althusser and Balibar 
who invented this very distinction (Ibid.: 67). Another 
misreading, according to Anderson, is Thompson's equation of 
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Althusser and Stalin, which occurs "at the most generic levels 
of abstraction: mechanism, dogmatism, anti-humanism, elitism, 
irrationalism'' (Ibid.: 105). Thompson, he says, has failed 
to back up this allegation; in fact, the only quotation of Stalin 
that Thompson examines is one with which Al thusser clea,rly 
does not concur (Ibid.). 
Thompson's attempt to restore validity to human experience 
/ 
after the Althusserian 'onslaught', is itself far from unproble-
matic: . he overlooks the fact that agency/knowledge is 
subject to the limitation that it does not frequently uncover 
social relations as such (Ibid,:27); and further does not 
provide the means to distinguish between valid and invalid 
experience, for he identifies experience with wisdom and 
perception. (Ibjd,) 
In implicit support of Althusser, Collier discusses 
problems involved in the wholesale rejection of epistemology 
evident in recent critiques of Althusser. For Collier, Calli-
nicos exemplifies this trend, by "unwittingly appealing to the 
attractiveness of •.• historicist confusion" and thereby 
"opening the floodgates of idealism" (Collier, 1979:57). 
Collier emphasizes that the mere fact that a political practice 
may spawn theory is not in itself a sufficient validation of 
the latter: It may be necessary to challenge spontaneous 
theorization with a scientific theory, in order to transform 
--... -~ 
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practice from a mystified to a clearsighted one'' (Ibid.:. 56). 
While Collier charges that Callinicos has misinterpreted aspects 
of Althusser's epistemology, or read into it elements which 
it does not in fact contain, Collier's criticism of Callinicos 
is itself open to the allegation that, in his defence of 
Althusser, his interpretation of the latter is particularly 
forgiving, and has glossed over some of the more unpalatable 
·and unequivocal statements by Althusser concerning theoretical 
autonomy and the role of the class struggle. 
Conclusions 
The criticisms directed at Althusser left Castells with three 
alternatives: abandon the attempt to elevate urban sociology 
from an ideology to the status of a science (as defined by 
Althusser); accept the criticisms of the implications of 
Althusser's position; or develop a stance that does not have 
the disadvantages of either of these approaches. Castells 
doesn't maRe the choice, he expediently affiliates himself 
both with the critics and with Althusser, embracing principles 
and then repudiating them, in an attempt to cream off the 
theoretical advantages and then decamp before the price of 
-that position becomes too high. 
I shall further argue that Castells' use of Althusserian 
concepts is far from consistent: he has significantly altered 
almost every controversial tenet of the latter, while neg-
lecting to acknowledge that these changes are in.fact dis-
tortions which are in direct opposition to the character and 
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theoretical intentions of Althusserianism, 
Thus it is not, as Castells suggests, the epistemological 
dimension which makes his writings difficult to grasp (Castells, 
1977a: vii), it is rather the way in which he wavers between 
contradictory epistemological worlds: if he wishes to retain 
anthropological, humanistic and empiricist assumptions, he 
will have to dispense with far more of the Althusserian posi-
tion than he appears willing to. 
He attempts to qualify his allegiance to Althusser, but 
only in the most tentative manner, for to dismiss Althusserianism 
in any significant way would be tantamount to stripping his 
own work of any theoretical status. He concedes only that 
"certain discussions" around the concepts employed by Althusser 
were superfluous, and corrects himself as to the "degree" of 
formalism in his own construction. Even this qualification is 
qualified: "The excesses of the Althusserian language do not 
undermine the relevance of the concepts advanced (Ibid.: ix). 
Couched in such a vague and generalistic fashion, these con-
cessions are hardly helpful. Castells does not elaborate on 
which conceptual discussions were superfluous, nor does he 
identify the locations of "excess" in the Althusserian language. 
In order to determine the extent to which criticisms of the 
Althusserian schema apply to Castells, it would be useful to 
know precisely which concepts Castells has dispensed with, 
which he retained, the criteria on which these choices were 
made, and the implications of these for theoretical consistency. 
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Thus, this thesis sets out to: 
1. identify those aspects of Castells' work which are based 
on Althusser's writings; 
2. outline Althusser's position on each of these aspects, 
and determine whether Castells was able to employ Althusser's 
epistemological concepts - in other words, whether Castells' 
work achieves scientificity in Althusserian terms; 
3. assess the theoretical compatibility between the Althusserian 
method and Castells' frequent emphasis on empirical 
research; 
4. determine the extent to which Castells contradicts both 
5 • 
himself and Althusser, and evaluate the way in which this 
undermines his claim to have provided a theoretical 
alternative to the ideology of urban sociology; 
describe certain unresolved and theoretically inconsistent 
aspects of the original Althusserian texts, which may 
provide at least partial justification for Castells' 
i 
difficulties; and 
6. examine Castells' subsequent epistemological amendments 
in order to ascertain the theoretical implications of these 
for the validity of his early work. 
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THE SOCIAL FORMATION 
Castells has explicitly chosen as his analytical framework 
the set of concepts formulated by Althusser concerning the 
nature of the social totality: "We shall take as our point 
of departure, at a very general level, the set of concepts 
developed by Louis Althusser •.• The central concept is that 
of mode of production. By mode of production· is meant not the 
economic but a specific form of articulation of the funda-
mental elements (instances) of the social structure, namely 
the economic, political-legal, ideological and possibly other 
'systems'. In every mode of pro~uction one system, which 
varies in identity, is dominant, and the place of .this system 
in the structure characterizes the mode of production in 
question. In every mode of production one system is deter-
minant in the last instance. This system is invariant; it 
is always the economic. It is the type of economic system 
which explains which system is dominant in each mode of production 
... A particular historical society (social formation) is 
the particular mix of several modes of production, one of 
which is dominant" (Castells, 1976: 149-50). 
Althusser's concept of the mode of production attempts 
to establish both the significance of the superstructure and 
the primacy of the economy. The social totality cannot be 
seen in terms of the base/superstructure image which implies 
the idea of a determinant base; nor as an expressive totality, 
which is the expression of a single element; nor as composed 
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of interacting and more or less equal factors. 
He describes the specific structure of the Marxist whole 
as a complex structured unity of distinct, relatively autonomous 
instances with distinct types of development. While the hierarchy 
of these instances is determined by the economy, the economy 
is never 'pure', it has to be examined in conjunction with 
the political and ideological superstructures. Similarly, 
ideology and politics are not mere expressions of the economy, 
for they possess their own laws of development (Althusser.& Balibar 
1970: 99-100). Relative autonomy enables all the instances 
to develop in different ways, thus they are not part of a 
homogeneous sequence in which all instances simultaneously have 
identical forms. The unity of the Althusserian totality is 
the unity of a complex of instan~es at uneven levels of develop-
ment. He uses the term 'conjuncture' to describe the fact that 
an analysis of a social formation at any point in time will 
show a specific complex unity - the necessary co-existence of 
of necessarily uneven instances (Ibid.) 
Althusser's conception of the social formation was intended 
to oppose the assertion that Marx had simply inverted Heg~l's 
dialectic. While Hegel and Marx had in common the idea of 
history as a process motored by its internal contradictions, 
they did not share the same view on the nature of these 
contradictions. For Hegel, the totality was an expressive 
one: each of the parts expressed all the others as well as 
the social totality: the totality was thus present and could 
be discerned in each of its components. The unity of the 
Hegelian whole is determined by the identity of opposites, 
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The structure of the dialectic in this system is determined by 
its function: the resumption of material existence into the 
ideal. Hegel's dialectic is a theodicy, setting out to explain 
the unity of God and the world. The Althusserian dialectic, 
however, insists on the materiality of the world, the dis-
tinctiveness of its elements, and their unity in the necessary 
relations of subordination and dominance. Marxist history 
develops according to the relations of its distinct instances, 
none of which are reducible to any of the others. That the 
social whole is composed of a complex set of structures, 
partly autonomous, partly conditions of existence for each 
other, does not mean that the social whole consists of any 
combination of elements in any order: it has a 'structure-
in-dominance' (Ibid.~ 98~99), The contradiction between the 
social relations of production and the forces of production 
within the economic instance gives rise to the character of 
the social totality, for it establishes which of all the 
instances is to be dominant, However, this does not mean that 
Althbsser underestimates the influence of the'super~tructure: 
"in'History, these ihstances, 'the superstructures, are never 
seen to step respectfully aside when their work is done or 
when the time comes" (Althusser, 1969: 113). 
Althusser's social totality attempted to establish the 
last-instance determination of the economy without reverting 
to crude material reductionism, while simultaneously avoiding 
the empiricist version of the social formation which portrays 
the relationship between base and superstructure as one of 
essence and phenomena. 
Structural causality is based on Marx's concept of the 
'Darstellung' which described the structure as nothing but 
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its effects (Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 188-9). It refers to 
the determination of the regional structures by the global 
structure, and the determination of the regional structures 
by the constituent elements, The structure is a specific 
combination bf its elements, and its unity consists of a 
specific complexity of levels or instances which are arti-
culated with each other according to fixed determinations 
while possessing a degree of relative autonom~ from each other 
(lbid.: p, 97). In this sense, the superstructure has a 
relative autonomy with respect to the base: it has a certain 
independence, the extent of which is nevertheless fixed, The 
unity of the structured whole is thus to be found in the specific 
complexity of levels or instances such as the economic, the 
poli~ical er the_ ideological~ These;· level~ are'not empirically 
determined, they are not visible entities, but are sites within 
the structure of a mode of production. An instance must be 
seen in terms of its articulation with other instances, and 
the internal articulation of the elements of which it is 
comprised. It is this which characterizes the structuralist 
approach. 
Causation cannot be understood outside of process: this 
type of causation is described by Althusser as an '·'immense 
machine'·', or ''play without an:.auth:Or"~ .· since the structure 
and process of the social formation are not contingent upon 
human volition. It is thus the internal relations of produc-
tion which must be analyzed, rather than any external struc-
tural determination, It is in this sense that Althusser 
talks of an "absent cause", or the existence of a structure 
through its effects, which he refers to as "metonyrilic 
causality" (Ibid,: 188), 
The superstructure is separate from the economic struc-
ture although they are mutually dependent on each other, 
They both have specific effectivity (they are determined as 
well as determining), and every instance has its own part 
to play in determining the characteristics of the whole as 
well as being determined by it (Ibid,: 99-100), In the 
Althusserian system, the superstructure consists of two 
practices: politics and ideology, Theoretical practice, ·it 
should be noted, is separate from and irreducible to the 
superstructural instances of the social formation. Science 
is not regarded as a practice in simply a descriptive sense: 
its homology with the other practices is the basis with which 
to differentiate it from them, in spite of the similarity 
of the elements of their respective problematics (Ibid,: 
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58-9). As a practice, science transforms, by means of labour, 
a raw material into a product, As with the other practices, 
this is a genuine transformation, and can be exemplified by 
28 
science's break from ideology, which entails the creation of 
a new product from ideological raw materials, 
While science, politics and ideology have the same struc-
ture, Althusser maintains that science's object is the super-
• 
structural practices. By making the distinction in this way, 
Althusser is separating science from society, and giving it 
a history separate from social history. According to Althus-
ser, each mode of production has its.own time and history, 
influenced in a particular way by the development of the 
productive forces (Ibid.: 108.,.9). While science may be genera-
ted by an ideology, it breaks away from it in order to attain 
its status as a science, and thus has a relatively autonomous 
history, a peculiar form of temporality which marks it off 
from the history of the ideological, politico-legal and 
economic superstructures (Ibid.: 99), 
As the social totality is comprised of relatively autono-
mous instances, each with its own historical time, it follows 
that the superstructure has a different time and history from 
scientific formations, and it would thus be impossible for 
theoretical answers to emerge from political practice. 
The term 'overdetermination' was originally employed by 
Freud to describe how one dream image consists of various 
dream thoughts or unconscious desires, or how various 
phenomena or symptoms can be combined into one (M. Glucksmann, 
1974a: 237). Althusser adapts its usage to express the social 
formations's intricate structure of contradictions, unlike 
the expressive totality in which contradictions necessarily 
occur at all levels of the social formation at the same time, 
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or permeate all the lev~ls simultaneously from some 'principal 
contradiction' to be found in the economic base (Althusser 
and Balibar, 1970: 111). Althusser's theory of overdetermina-
tion is in opposition to the Hegelian totality which expresses 
itself through all the spheres of life as the 'spirit of the 
time' or the spiritual essence organizing the historical 
moment. 
For Althusser there is never an original or single cause: 
there is inevitably a complex of determinations and levels. 
He uses the concept of overdetermination to deny that the 
relationship between the e~onomic base and the political and 
ideological superstructure is a simple relation between an-
/ 
essence and its phenomena: economic production exists within 
a regional complex of instances which are the conditions 
of existence of the economic base just as that base is itself 
the condition of existence of the other instances (Ibid,: 188), 
Non-economic instances have their own effectivity:, they are 
determining as we11 as determined, and each contributes to the 
shaping of the overall mode of production of which they are 
constituent elements, There is no single contradiction 
which determines everything: instead determination is complex, 
and involves a multiplicity of contradictions, each with 
differential effectivities within the social formation. The 
existence of a number of relatively autonomous levels results 
in an accumulation of effective determinations in what is 
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termed an overdetermined contradiction: at each stage of the 
historical process there is one primary overdetermining con-
., 
tradiction which fuses all the contradictions into a structure-
in-dominance (Ibid. :108). Here Althusser is rejecting the 
identification of the last instance contradiction with the 
dominant contradiction. Determination in the last instance 
by the economy is exercised precisely in the permutations 
of the principal role between the economy and the superstruc-
tural instances. The economic instance is only determinant 
in that it assigns the dominant role from one instance to 
another (Ibid.: 58). 
Thus, a distinction is made between determinance in the 
last instance by the economy, and the dominant role which 
may be taken by any level in the social formation, That the 
existence of a social formation need not necessarily be 
economic, is illustrated by the case of Ancient social for-
mations, where the dominant level was the political one. As 
opposed to an expressive totality, then, there is no simple 
primacy of the economic level~ a social formation always 
exists as a structured complex whole whose elements and con-
tradictions are maintained in determinate relations of 
domination and subordination, The levels of the social 
formation are different not only because they refer to separate 
practices, but also because each of them differs in its 
'index of effectivity', or its ability to determine the 
others. Their unity is based on a hierarchical relationship 
between the levels; in which the economic determines, in 
the last instance, the political and ideological levels, 
but is simultaneously overdetermined by each of them (Ibid.: 
106-7). 
The Althusserian conception of overdetermined contra-
dictions can be seen in Castells' work: "Every fundamental 
contradiction which is not regulated by the system results 
in an overdetermined contradiction within the political 
system ... contradictions become organized among the places 
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of the different syste~s according to a content defined by the 
relation(s) which characterize the function of the system in 
the social structure (Castells, l976c~ 167), He also claims 
that the terms of a Marxist analysis must not confine itself 
to a simple contradiction between capital and labour (Idem, 
1977a:2). 
This structuralist conception of the contradictory 
nature of the social formation does away with the explanation 
of social change in terms of individuals, for their actions 
are thought to be determined by their specific place in the 
structure. Structural effects are not generated by individual 
consciousness but by a particular combination of the practices 
as determined by the structure, Furthermore, the relations 
between the social classes of a particular society are the 
effect on social relations of the complex combination of 
modes of production articulated within it (Idem, 1976c: 150). 
Thus the capacity for societal modification exists only within 
structural bounds. 
Unlike many aspects of Althusser's work which Castells 
has merely interpolated in his own writings without any 
thematic consistency or integration, Althusser's conception 
of the social formation has been directly applied in Castells' 
formulation of the urban. 
For Castells, the urban structure is the territorial 
expression of the capitalist mode of production, hence "the 
rules of the urban system are easy to determine since they 
are simply specifications of the general rules of the mode 
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of production" (Ibid.:. J68). He further states that "Each 
system is made up of interrelated elements. The way in which 
these structural elements are articulated in certain types of 
relation~ defined by the state of the ~ystem, itself dependent 
on the general matrix of the mode of production'' (Ibid.: 150), 
All society and therefore all social forms such as space 
are based on the historical articulation of a number of modes 
of production. Space expresses the social structure and is 
arranged by elements of the economic, political and ideological 
instances, by their combination and by the social practices 
from which they proceed. The real forces of urbanization are 
therefore located in the economic, political and ideological 
levels of the historically specific mode of production. 
Castells' complexly articulated structure is divided 
into three instances, which are in turn divided into a number 
of sub-elements. The empirical objects, institutions and 
processes of the urban system can be classified in terms of 
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this matrix. The urban system is a means of conceptualizing 
the relations of production and of consumption which sustain 
the mode of production; hence each agglomeration will possess 
economic structures (e.g. housing, transport and the organization 
of space for production); politico-juridi~al structures 
(institutions of law and government) which reflect and sustain 
the economic relations; and ideological structures which 
legitimize those relations, 
The economic instance is divided into production, consump-
tion and exchange; and production, for example, comprises 
elements internal to the work progess (e.g. factories and 
raw materials), relations between the work process and the 
econbmic instance as a whole (e.g. the industrial environment), 
and relations between the work process and the other instances 
(e.g. administration~ information) (Castells, 1977a: 235, 238-9; 
1976c~ 154-5), Thus Castells claims.that space can be analyzed 
in terms of "the structural and conjunctural laws that govern 
its existence and transformation, and the specificity of 
its articul~tion with the other elements of historical 
reality" (Idem, 1977a: 1l5). 
There is, however, a serious problem with Castells' 
application of the Althusserian social totality, He concen-
trates solely on the 'pure' capitalist mode of production, 
while ignoring the Althusserian insistence that any social 
formation contains a number of different modes of production 
in complex combination. Harlee points out that "the lack of 
an answer by Castells to this problem casts doubt on the 
validity and usefulness of the elaboration of the urban 
system as it is presented, in his work, as a preliminary 
stage for the examination of urban practices'' (Harlee, 1977·: 
20). For Garnier too, the separation of the capitalist mode 
of production from its structural determinations, renders 
Castells' analysis incapable of comprehending the complex 
nature of reality (Ibid,: 21). 
Further problems involved in Castells' intetpretation 
of the social totality will be discussed in terms of the 
concept of relative autonomy, 
Castells and Rel~tive Autonomy 
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It has been seen that Althusser's conception of the social 
totality was intended to recognize the last-instance deter~ 
mination by the economy, without reverting to either material 
reductionism or the empiricist version of the social formation 
which portrays the relationship between base and superstruc-
ture as one of essence and phenomena. His solution is largely 
based on the notion of relative autonomy. While the instances 
of the social formation are complexly ordered into a hierarchy 
whose levels of subordination are determined, in the last 
instance, by the chief contradiction in the economic level, 
each instance possesses a degree of relative autonomy; which 
means that instances do not, at any time, find themselves at 
the same level of development, The complex whole of reci-
procally dependent and yet diversely developed instances 
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exhibits a concrete state of relationships at every moment 
in history (Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 98-100). 
The unity of the social formation is not an homogeneous 
one, it is the unity of essentially uneven instances, and 
manifests the relative autonomy of the different instances 
and the differential historical time scales according to which 
they develop. The degree of autonomy should always be seen 
as relative: while the mode of production consists of structures 
which are partly independent, they are also inextricably 
related; for example, there is never a time when the economy 
~ 
is 'pure', for it has to be seen in conjunction with the 
political and ideological structures (Ibid,). 
Althusser's concept of relative autonomy is a departure 
from the idea of a determinant base which is fundamental to 
the base/superstructure metaphor, The political implications 
of economic reductionism became apparent in the Marxism of 
the Second International. In this interpretation, natural 
laws governed the economy and the superstructure~ social 
change took place according to fixed principlest and the 
capitalist mode of production would inevitably culminate in 
socialism. There was thus no need to intervene in the class 
struggle, and reformist practices were justified. What this 
approach failed to consider was that Marxism was not simply 
or even at all an economic theory, but set out to theorize 
the social totality, and the relations between the economy 
and the other instances of the whole. The Marxist 
depiction of the economy is as a social and historical entity, 
unified by the social relations of production and the produc-
tive forces, rather than by the technological conditions of 
material production. Marx did not regard the technological 
development of the productive forces as the motor for the 
development of capitalism, which was seen instead as a result 
of the emergence of capitalist social relations of production 
(Callinicos, 1976~ 41), 
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Another view of the totality that Althusser wishes to 
avoid is that it is composed of interacting and equal elements, 
The concept of relative autonomy also disputed the historicist 
interpretation which stripped theoretical practice of its 
specificity, assimilated it to the other practices, and grouped 
them all under a solitary notion of practice in general: 
historical practice or, simply, praxis~ In this approach, 
theory relinquishes its relative autonomy in order to merge 
with the unique real history of the social totality, and Marxism 
can no longer by seen as a specific scientific practice 
developing on its own site, for it is produced by the ex~ 
perience and activity of the proletariat. The history of 
science would be evaluated only by the criterion of class, 
Althusser's conception of the social totality rejects 
the historicity of the conditions and processes of knowledge, 
which becomes absolutely autonomous. This ambiguity in the 
concept of relative autonomy has resulted in confusion concerning 
the relationship between the base and the superstructure, and 
the role of consciousness in political practice, This problem 
of politics is specific to a dehistoricized totality like 
Althusser's, because for many.others there is no rupture 
between theory and politics, and thus no problem of th~ir 
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fusion in a revolutionary situation (M. Glucksmann, 1974b: 131), 
While Althusser has argued that science is relatively inde--
pendent, organically related to the other social practices, 
he does not elaborate the nature of this relationship, and 
we are left with a gesture rather than a substantive theory 
(Geras, 1972a: 8f.)-1). 
Fraser maintains that in Althusser's conception of 
relative autonomy, the productive structure ceased to have 
a primary causal, and hence explanatory role for the capi-
talist mode of production. Thus, the structures of society, 
thought to be propelled by material production in the last 
instance, are primarily self-explanatory and self~moving. 
In repudiating the notion of society as an expressive totality, 
Althusser does not take into account the fact that capitalism 
is a contradictory totality whose contradictions develop 
historically~ Capitalist production is thus replaced by an 
interplay of structural functions, and structure ultimately 
replaces Marx's distinction of structure from superstructure. 
The economic becomes an 'instance', a logical moment, not real and 
ever and co-present: !'The solidity and material character 
of the mode of production is lost in the play of relatively 
autonomous elements (Fraser, 1976: 449). Althusser's vague 
statement about determination in the last instance has no 
meaning as long as we are not able to define the limits of 
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the relative autonomy granted to other domains of social life, 
especially those of the superstructure (Ibid.). 
Castells saw in the concept of relative autonomy the 
potential for resolving the two primary problems he faced 
in his development of urban theory: the dichotomies between 
determinism/voluntarism, and political autonomy/economism. 
Firstly, he wished to go beyond the Althusserian limitation 
on the role of the individual as that of 'bearer' of the 
social structure, but he did not want to replace this with 
the Weberian notion of the effectivity of individual action, 
Furthermore, while he did not want to attribute total autonomy 
to the political instance, he also wished to refrain from 
the view that the state, or the political instance, is 
determined in some simple way by the economic instance 
(Saunders, 1979: 200). 
Another problem that Castells had to overcome was 
urban sociology's overemphasis on spatial determinants of 
social behaviour, to the exclusion of social determinants 
such as class. Examining mainstream urban sociology• Castells 
finds this uurban ideology'' in Wirth's assumption that the 
city gives rise to urbanism; and in Lefebvre's argument that 
urban density has the potential of generating a new utopian 
urban society; and in the empirical studies which posit a 
causal link between city form and modes of urban existence. 
The concept of relative autonomy that Castells employed 
' 
to counter the urban ideology had its explicity origin in the 
Althusserian conception of the social formation, which was 
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' divided into instanccis or levels~ ·each with·their 6wn specific 
f .l: • '• .• e .... ect1v1ty. 
The application of the concept of relative autonomy in. 
the critique of urban sociology is exemplified by Castells' 
rebuttal of Wirth's stress on the effects of 'settl~~ent 
I 
chaiacterisiics such a~ size ~nd density on urb~ni~m as a 
way of life. 
' 
' Castells·arkues that urbanism is culturally 
I 
determined: it is a cultural system.charac~eristic· of capi-
talist 'industrial society· (Castells, 1977a:. 77). By failing 
to acknowledge the influenc~ ·of the capitalist mod~ of pro-
' duct ion on spatial· forms, Wirth is granting spatia1 forms 
total autonomy with regard to the production of th~ urb~~ 
way of, life~ It has be.en suggest·ed. in this. regard! that 
. J . 
Castells is substituting an· autonomous emphasis oni societal 
I 
characteristics (e.g. the capitalist mode. of produ.f:tion) for 
Wirth's the~is concerning the effects of settlement characteris~. 
ti'cs, but Pickvance points out that Castells' stat;ement that l .. . . 
both spati~l f6rms ind ~rbanism depend on the capif alist mod~ 
of productitin does not exclude a. relationshi.p between spatial l . . 
form and urbanism, for the theory of relative autonomy would 
·not permit the total determination of spatial formls by the 
capitalist mode of production: spati~l ~o~m~ wo~l~ have their 
own relative autonomy and specific e£fect1v1ty in·.r~rms of 
both the mode of productioh and urbanism (Pickvance,. 1974a~ I . 
213}. I 
1· 
articulated structure. On the basis of a convoluted and 
problematic process of elimination (which will be discussed 
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in the section on collective consumption), Castells argues 
that the urban is not to be defined in the politico-juridi~al 
instance, nor in the economic instance, because neither of 
them adequately contain recognized urban phenomena. He then 
concludes that the urban system is to be defined as the parti-
cular way in which the elements of the economic system are 
articulated within a unit of co1lective consumption. 
The social structure on which social processes in units 
of collective consumption are based, is defined by the set 
of relations between the two fundamental elements of the 
economic system and the two elements which derive from them. 
The economic instance is comprised of four elements~ production, 
consumption, exchange and management. Taking the structuralist 
line, Castells argues that it is through the combinatiop and 
interrelationships between these elements tha~ space is 
structured (Ibid.: 442). The urban unity, he says, h·as· to 
define the city i~ economic terms, and the role of p~oduction 
is concerned with reproducing the means of production~ and 
this concerns regional issues. The 'urban', then, is held 
to refer to the processes relating to labour power, and the 
study of the urban is thus the study of the reproduction of 
labour power. The concept of relative autono~y is incorporated 
in this definition of the urban by an acknowledgement that 
while urban problems are partly structurally defined by their 
43 
places in the conjuncture of a particular urban system, they 
are also defined by their places in the general social 
structure, in the systems and elements of the overall ideologi-
cal and politico-legal instances (Idem, 1976c: 154-5). 
The relative autonomy of the political instance is used 
by Castells as the means of subscribing to the notion of 
effective.class struggle while maintaining the Althusserian 
conception of the social totality. Castells here employs the 
concepts developed by Poulantzas (1973), who was a~tempting to 
go beyond the functionalist aspect of the Althusserian system, 
in which class struggle is relegated to the ideological 
instance rather than being permitted any political effectivity. 
Poulantzas set out to incorporate the idea that the class 
struggle is the motor of history, with Althusser's structural-
functionalist conception of society: ''The theory of class is 
inserted between the structure and the state, so that the 
state is subject to a double determination. In the first 
place, it is determined directly by the structure as a specific 
functional level of that structure. Secondly, its functioning 
in practice, within limits determined by its place in the 
structure, is subject to the conditions of the class struggle, 
which are in turn determined, at least partially, by the 
structure (Clarke, 1977: 11). 
Poulantzas attributed to the political instance (equated 
with the state) a relative autonomy, which means in this con-
text that there is no simple relation of causation between 
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the economic instance and the actions of the state (Poulantzas, 
1973: 29). The relative autonomy of the state from the econo-
mic instance enables the state to pursue certain policies 
which run counter to the economic interests of the dominant-
class in order to ensure its political stability (Ibid.: 282). 
For Poulantzas, the primary role of the state is political, 
It functions to organize the political interests of the 
dominant class (the different fractions of capital under the 
hegemony of monopoly capital) and fragments the interests of 
the dominated classes (Ibid~:. 130-7). State power has to 
achieve relative autonomy in order that it is not immediately 
identifiable with a single fraction of the conjuncture. This 
-· formulation also discounts any long..-term action simply to the 
benefit of a single fraction of capital, and allows an explana-
tion of situations in which state power is even employed 
against dominant classes (Ibid.: 191-4). 
Castells applies this notion of relative autonomy to 
develop a conception of the role df .the state as that of 
system regulator: while the state can exercise its relative 
autonomy by making economic concessions to the dominated 
classes, its autonomy is confined to fulfilling the 
eventual interests of wonopoly capital (Castells, 1976c: 
166, and 1977a: Ch. 13). The class struggle is employed by 
the state in its regulative function, in that its intervention, 
exhibiting as it does the conjuncture's balance of class 
forces, diminishes the class struggle in the interests of 
monopoly capital, Castells refers to this role of the state 
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as "bi-polar", by which he means that the state ap11aratus 
not only exercises class domination, but also attempts to 
regulate the crises of the system in order to preserve it, 
State reforms "aim to preserve and extend the existing context, 
thus consolidating the long-term irtterests of the dominant 
classes, even if it involves invoking their privileges to some 
extent in a partitulat conjuncture'' (Ibid.~ 208). 
The concept of relative autonomy can also be seen in 
the second regulative function of the state, which is the 
undermining of any possible unity between the dominated 
classes. This goal is accomplished in two ways. Firstly, by 
supporting the notion of individual volition, the state 
encourages members of classes to exist as separate individuals 
rather than as agents of classes (Ibid.: 250-1). Secondly, 
because the state is relatively autonomous, it is able to 
give concessions to dominated classes at the economic level, 
provided this does not endanger the domination of capital 
at the poliiical level (Ibid.~ 209). 
This interpretation of relative autonomy is used by 
Castells to explain how the state can meet the demands of the 
working class to finance social items that are not in the 
short-term interests of the dominartt class (since, for example, 
it raises taxation), and yet continue to fulfil the lonp~term 
interests of the capitalist classes by fostering social 
cohesion. 
In this conception of the role of the state, Castells is 
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drawing heavily on Poulantzas' theoretical approach, which 
was intended to counter the view of the state as the neutral 
agent of political administration, as well as the economistic 
Marxist portrayal of the state as the instrument of a parti-
cular class (Poulantzas, 1973). In Poulantzas' schema, class 
struggles are precipitated by contradictions within the social 
totality, and these class struggles determine the way in which 
the state deals with these contradictions. Although the 
generai role of the state is to preserve dominant class in-
terests (Castells, 1977a~ t37-4l), its type of response 
inevitably takes into account the politicai equilibrium of 
class forces at that particular conjuncture. Thus, the 
state's actions are determined by the demands of the working 
as well as the ruling classes (Ibid.~ 256~7P 282~8). 
For Poulantzas, state power is a function of class re-
lations, and can be discerned through tlass practices~ the 
state manifests the distribution of power between the 
various classes it th~t time (Poulantzas, 1973: 51,54, 115), 
In opposition to the traditional Marxist distinction between 
classes in and for themselves,' Poulantzas holds that classes 
are constituted by their practices, which develop simultaneously 
through economic, politic~l afid ideological struggles. Classes 
are not mere economic groupings which get involved with 
political struggles as a setondary activity~ they are the 
result of an ensemble of structures and of their relations 
(Ibid.~ 63). Political struggJ.es are an integral part of 
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class practices, and these practices occur in all three levels 
of the social formation. Due to the relative autonomy between 
the levels, political groupings are not mere expressions of 
economic categories. 
For Castells, it is possible to approach the study of 
politics in two ways: through the study of urban planning 
(the intervention of the political instance on the urban system 
to ensure the reproduction of the dominant mode of production), 
or through the study of urban social movements (Castells, 
1976c: 149i 1977a~ 260~1). Castells defines urban planning 
with reference to the relatively autonomous role of the state~ 
urban planning consists of state intervention in the field 
of consumption (reproduction of labour power) with the aim 
of ensuring the continued reproduction of capitalism. An 
urban social movement is defined as an organization of the 
system of actors (conjuncture of class relations) leading to 
the production of a qualitatively new effect on the social 
structure. The ne~ effect can refer to either of two 
situations~ a change, at the structural level, in the law 
of the dominant system (~hich in the capitalist mode of pro-
duction is the economic system) ~ or a change at the level 
of practices, which involves a modification in the balance of 
forces in a direction counter to institutionalized social 
domination. The most characteristic index of the latter 
change is a substantial transformation in the system of 
authority (i.e. in the political-legal apparatus) or in the 
strengthening of class organisations (Idem, 1976c: 151) 
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The relative roles of the state, urban planning and urban 
social movements in the production of urban effects are s~elled 
out by Castells in the following way: nif it is true that the 
State expresses, in the last instance and through the necessary 
mediations, the overall interests of the dominant classes, 
then urban planning cannot b~ an instrument of social change, 
but only one of domination) integration and re~ulation of 
contradictions'' (Castells, 1973, cited by Pickvance, 1975: 
203). In urban social movements, however, widespread mobili-
zation occurs; social requirements are provided with political 
expression; and different forms,··of organization of collective 
consumption, in opposition to capitalism, are established. 
Thus, Castells argues, it is urban social movements and not 
planning institutions which are the genuine sources of urbap 
transformation. 
The concept of relative autonomy is appli.ec}" to urban 
social movements to contradict the Althusserian li~itatiop 
ori the role of the class struggle. Castells claims that it is 
the urban system that one must examine in order to detect the 
basic contradictions of capital accumulation~ These appear 
to be contested by an urban base, which, in certain circum-
stances, can transform itself into movements of resistance 
and struggle, Castells does not only employ relative autonomy 
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to establish the relative autonomy of the political from the 
economic, but also posits a relative autonomy between the 
levels of the structure and the corresponding practices. 
Structural changes take place according to the "mediation of 
social practices": human actions, while determined by the 
location of human actors within the structure, are nevertheless 
inherently contradictory, and inevitably give rise to "dislo-
cations", which have the capacity of effecting structural 
changes (Idem: 1977a: 125). Thus, while structural contra-
dictions generate practices, these practices create new 
effects within the system in terms of how they articulate the 
contradictions. Following ~oulantzas, Castells says that 
political practice ''is not simply a vehicle of structured 
effects: it produces new effects'' (Ibid,), and argues that any 
concrete situation consists of systems of practices, defined 
by their position in the structure, but whose secondary 
effects express a relative autonomy, capable of redefining 
the situation beyond their structural charge (Ibid.: 126). 
While the state mediates in the realm of collective consumption 
in a way that functionally assists the dominant class, 
Castells claims that it also gives rise to a new set of system 
contradictions. Briefly, he asserts that the concentration 
of capital in advanced monopoly capitalism depends on a 
concentration of the.workforce in urban units (residential 
units, geared to consumption practices) t and so the worker's 
consumption becomes prone to increasing socialization. 
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Castells maintains that this entails means of consumption 
which need large-scale provision which cannot or will not 
be provided by private enterprise, and that this leads to 
growing state intervention. In terms of his earlier definition 
of urban politics as referring to state intervention and urban 
social movements, its specific subject matter is collective 
consumption. 
Castells' use of the concept of relative autonomy appears 
to create more problems than it dispells, For SaundersP it 
has been unable to explain the relationship between structures 
and practices on the one hand, and economics and politics on 
the other; for the tension it is supposed to remove is in fact 
merely reproduced within the concept itself (Saunders. 1979: 
201) • 
Castells has tried ·to sho~ that structural contradictions 
(urban crises) give rise to urban social movements, but the 
development of the latter and their consequences for system 
change is influenced by political practice: "Since the struc-
tures exist only in practices; the speci£ic organization of 
these practices produces autonomous (thought determined) 
effects that are not all contained simply in the 4eployment 
of structural laws" (Castells l9'Z7a :.244). Sau:p.ders sugg-ests 
that if structural contradictions do not in themselves deter-
mine class practices, then there must be another causal 
agency at work. If the same structural contradictions can 
give rise to differe~t forms of political struggle, and 
if these in turn result in different political effects, 
then the theory of structures has not been able to account 
for class practices (Saunders, 1979, 201). Castells appears 
to be unaware of the f~ct that Althusserian structuralism is 
limited to a deterministic interpretation of class practices. 
While Castells wishes to connect class struggle to contra-
dictions in the system, this interrelationship is expressly 
excluded by his chos~n theoretical system~ This point is 
taken up by Garnier, who objects to Castells' ~structuralism' 
on the grounds that it is unable to relate the contradictions 
of social practice with the urban structure: ''The dynamics 
of urban transformation are not explained by the a posteriori 
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int~6duction of social relations and political class practices, 
as these latter embody the -relations between certain structural 
effects, The social contradictions which define the class 
struggle are not therefore exterior to the structural logic~­
(Garnier, 1973~ cited by Harlee, 1977~ 18~19), While Castells 
insists that structures and practices are not separable, his 
inability to relate the two can be seen in his analytical 
treatment of them. This consists of an "abstract seTies 
of taxonomies" (Harlee, 1977: 18) of the urban structure and 
urban politics. The latter is then divided into urban planning 
and urban social movements, and although he stresses that these 
-
are inextricably related, he does not relate his structural 
analyses of urban planning polities to his analyses of practices 
in the form of urban social movements (Idem: 1979: 130). 
Furthermore, "his claim that one can analyze urban politics 
from two perspectives, depending on whether 'the analysis 
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bears on a modification of the relations between the instances 
of the logic of the social formation or the processes of its 
transformation' shows that he does indeed again operationalize 
the structures/practices distinction" (Ibid.: 131). This 
problem in Castells' work leads Lojkine to comment,that 
class practices are tacked on to Castells' anaysis in an 
attempt to provide an explanation for social transformation 
in what is really a £unctionalist, self~regulatory system 
(Lojkine, 1976, tited by Harlee, t9Z7: 132). Structures and 
practices cannot be combined in the way Castells wants to, 
without bringing in the idea of the effectivity of individual 
action, which would of course fly in the face of Althusser's 
conception of the individual as a mere 'bearer' of the social 
structure, and as such incapable of emerging from ideological 
mystification. The connection between structures and practices 
can only be explained by showing how class practices mediate 
structural contradictions~ and how members of different 
classes come to grasp their objective situations. Thus it is 
essential to incorporate the idea of human actors, with their 
own goals, beliefs and values, in order to elucidate the way 
in which particular groups generate different types of politi-
cal practices. "The theory, in other words~ necessarily 
entails a notion of conscious human subjects who act, for 
while the system is apparently riven with contradictions, 
these count for nothing unless people act upon them. Castells, 
~ '. 
however, remains implacably opposed to the 'ideological' 
analysis of 'actors', and as a result his theory stops at the 
crucial point regarding the explanation of class 'practices'. 
By attempting to avoid both structural determinism and an 
action frame of reference, Castells' theory falls between 
the two" (Saunders. 1979 :. 202). Thus, for many of Castells' 
critics, his application of the methodology of relatively 
autonomous levels has resulted in a deadlock in his work, and 
has preveftted an analysis of the interdependent interaction 
of political and class relations (Duncan, 198l: 248), and 
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this has resulted in the accusation that he has been unable to 
overcome the problems he was trying to correct in Althusser's 
work. 
Castells' insistence that the class struggle is the motor 
of state regulation diminishes the capability of the former to 
precipitate any substantial system modification, This· portrayal 
of the class struggle is a functionalist one, and does nQt 
tie in with Castells' description of urban social movements 
as capable of effecting social change. For Saunders, this 
problem in Castells' work explains why he found so little 
evidence for urban social movements in his study of punkerque~ 
for his theory of the state leads him to dismiss most kinds 
of political protest as being ineffective and employed by the 
state in its role as system·regulator (Saunders, 1979~ 205). 
This problem also occurs in Castells' examination of urban 
renewal in Paris, grassroots movements for urban reform in 
Montreal, and squatter settlements in Chile before and during 
the Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende, "His 
evidence shows that neither the Canadian nor the Parisian 
movements achieved the qualitative changes that Castells 
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uses as the basis of the definition of an urban social 
movement, although he claims that in Chile some of the squatter 
settlements, by linking up with the broader conflict between 
labour and capital then occurring, did help to achieve such 
a change. But it is unclear from the evidence that he 
presents that this urban movement really had any major effect; 
rather it looks as if the revolutionary nature of the squatter 
settlement derived from the fact that they were dominated by 
Popular Unity" (Harloe, 1_979:. 134-:'5). 
An additional problem with Castells! application of 
relative autonomy concerns the relatipn of the economy to 
the state, or how the interests of the dominant class become 
manifested in the political regulation of the system. Bis 
depiction of the role of the state in this regard is said to 
be tautologous. Fot Elliott, Castells' theory has the ch~racter 
of a double-headed coin: "Where the public officials caµ be 
shown to act in support of big business then the classic 
Marxist views about the role of the state are confirmed, 
where they act counter to the interests of capital, they do 
so because they enjoy 'relative autonomy' " (Elliott, 1980:. 
155). Saunders echoes this allegation, arguing that reforms 
on behalf of the working class are explained in terms of 
relative autonomy, while policies in support of capitalist 
interests are explained by the fact that this autonomy is 
only relative: "In other words, whether we collect evidence 
of the state acting in the interests of capital or against 
the interests of capital, the result is always the same: 
the theory stands" (Saunders, 1981h:_ 206). In summing up 
Castells' application of the concept of relativ~ autonomy, 
Saunders argues that it is necessary to dismiss Castells' 
earlier structural th~ory of the relative autonomy of the 
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state and the structurally imposed limits on its intervention, 
in favour of an approach that takes into account the historical 
nature of state intervention:_ "While there are signs in his 
later work of his willingness to ~ove in this direction ••. 
it is clear that he has yet to develop a theoretical perspec-
tive consistent with his new political strategy'' (Idem; 
1979: 206). 
THEORY AND REALITY 
One of Althusser's fundamental principles is a distinction 
between theory and reality. This position arises from Marx's 
statement in the Grundrisse that the real "survives in its 
independence, after as before, outside the head"'; and that 
"The whole, as it appears in the mind as a thought-whole, is 
a product of the thinking mind" (Marx, 1953: 22). 
Marx allegedly developed this distinction in his mature 
writings~ in his earlier work he attempted to deal directly 
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with the real, to abstract knowledge from its concrete exis-
tence. For Althusser, Marx's subsequent assertion that knowledge 
deals with the real concrete is a demonstration that he had 
broken with empiricism and its assumptions, Althusser develops 
this into an attack on empiricism, arguing that scientificity 
can only be achieved onee one dispenses with any pretence 
that science deals with reality itself. 
The question ari~es a~ to why Althusser made such a sharp 
distinction between theory and reality, between the object 
of knowledge and the real object, After all, as will become 
apparent in the criticisms of this distinction, Marx's position 
on this issue was at best ambiguous: many of his statements, even 
within his 'mature' writings, qualified and often contradicted' 
this interpretation of the relation between theory and reality, 
The answer can be seen in the context of Althusser's 
rebuttal of empiricism, which, it is held, gives the real 
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object, the concrete, as the starting point of knowledge. 
In this interpretation of empiricism, the process of knowledge 
production lies in an operation of the subject called ab-
straction. To know consists of abstracting from the real 
object its essence, the possession of which by the subject 
is then referred to as knowledge, Empiricism, with its 
opposition of subject and object, abstract and concrete, 
suggests that reality can be directly apprehended, This, in 
Althusser's view, entails ~ specific characterization of both 
the real and the knowledge.of it, The real object is held to 
consist of two distinct partsP the essential and the inessential 
(the inessential is the visible exterior of the real object, 
while the essential is its invisible kernel), Thus both 
knowledge and the operation of kpowledge (abstraction) are 
regarded as part of the essential/inessential structure of 
the real o~ject (Althusser and Balibar: 36). 
Althusser maintains that when empiricism appoints the 
essence as the object of knowledge, it concedes that the 
object of knowledge is not identical to the real object~ for 
it is only one of the two parts of the real object, The 
difference between the object of knowledge ap~ the real qbject 
is reduced to a simple distinction between the parts of the 
real object. By claiming that it is dealing with realityP 
knowle¢ge is made dependant on the concrete living original. 
This model relies on the myth of the origin, an original unity 
between subject and object, between the real and the knowledge 
of it. Althusser counters that "we are never dealing with 
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a 'pure' sensuous intuition or representation, but with an 
ever-already complex raw material .. therefore knowledge never, 
as empiricism desperately demands that it should, confronts a 
pure object which is then identical to the real object" 
(Ibid.: 43). · For Althusser, the theoretical object 
is completely separate from reality, and comprises the pre-
existing concepts and theories which are transformed by 
science in its development of kriowledge. Althusser is differen-
tiating between ~ur conceptual grasp of the real, and reality 
itself; between the thought process and the process of the 
real. For him, the object of knowledge is a product of thought 
which produce~ it in itself as a thought-concrete, a thought 
~bject; distinct from the real object, the real-concrete . 
. Thought, like production in general, has a specific type of 
raw material on which it works with the theoretical means 
of production available (its theory, method and its technique, 
experimental or otterwise) in order to produce a theoretical 
product (Ibid.~ 41). Althusser is also here distinguishing 
between reality and the scientific description of it, Facts 
do not present themselves accurately, thus observation of 
reality does not result in knowledge. The theoretical object 
does not corresporid to the basic structural elements of reality 
(Ibid.; 42-3). 
The distinction between real ·the theoretical objects is 
theoretically underpinned by Althusser's conception of practice 
(production). Economic practice, in which a raw material is 
transformed by labour into a product, is analogically extended to 
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politics, ideology and science. Each of these, while similar 
in structure, deals with its own particular raw material or 
object.· This supposedly warrants the assertion that theory 
applies itself to a theoretical object, and is also held to 
provide the basis for the subsequent distinction between theory 
and metatheory~ the 'society effect' is the object of hi~to­
rical materialism, while for dialectical materialism is 
reserved the object of the 'knowledge effect' (Ibid~: 65-7). 
Most importantly for this discussion, the existence of separate 
objects or raw materials enables Althusser to separate 
'genuine' theory from empiricism, which he places in the 
sphere of ideological practice because of its illusion that 
it is processing reality itself. 
Althusser argues against any supposed connection between 
thought and the real, even if it is suggested that knowledge 
does not deal directly with the real object, but indirectly 
through an infinite series ·of mediations, In Althusser's 
opinion, mediation represents an ineffectual endeavour to fill 
the empty space between theoretical principles and reality. 
"These concepts, which have even flourished in the works of 
Marxist specialists, are tailor-made for the ideological func~ 
tions expected of them ... In every case, the functions are 
those of masks and theoretical impostures - functions which 
may witness both to a real embarrassment and a real good will, 
but even in the best of cases, these functions are more or 
less dangerous theoretical fictions" (Ibid,, 63), 
Castells on Theory and Reality 
This criticism can be directly applied to Castells, who 
displays confusion and inconsistency in his reluctan~e to 
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make the absolute distinction between theory and reality; while 
attempting, nevertheless, to retain the phraseology of the 
Althusserian theoretical approach. 
In the 'Epistemological Introduction' to The Urban Question, 
Castells voices his desire to repudiate the urban ideology and 
to replace it with a Marxist theoretical analysis. The manner 
in which he proposes to accomplish this, although unreferenced, 
is manifestly Althusserian: "Such an undertaking requires the 
use of certain theoretical tools in order to transform, through 
a process of labour, a raw material, both theoretical and 
ideological, and to obtain a product'' (Castells, 1977a: 2). 
This definition of raw material is identical to Althusser's, but 
Castells abruptly accomplishes a theoretical volte-face by 
maintaining that knowledge is produced only by analyzing a 
concrete situation, and that the raw material of theoretical 
work consists of theory, ideology, and the specificity of 
concrete situations (Ibid.: 3, my italics). He further 
dismisses as redundant any theoretical position that is not 
based on concrete analysis (Ibid.). 
In the first view, theoretical raw material consists of 
theory and ideology, with no mention of concrete reality; 
in the last two, the inclusion of reality as part of theory 
defeats the purpose of Althusser's portrayal of theory as a 
practice, which was developed precisely to dismiss re~lity 
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from the production of theory. Here, Castells is portraying 
concrete reality as the raw material on which theory works: a 
conception that is part of the empiricist claim that the 
scientificity of a theory depends on a supposed homology between 
theory and reality. Scientific knowledge is thus thought 
to be the result of a pre-existing harmony between thought 
and its real object. This position is impossible to align with 
the one Castells expressed when he stated that truth has no 
prior existence in the order of reality (Idem, 1976c: 121). 
It appears that Castells is ineffectually attempting to 
paper over the rift between these two mutually exclusive 
epistemological traditions. If he wishes theory to deal 
directly with reality, he will have to dispense with any 
adherence to Althusser's entire system, for the latter is 
unequivocal in its attack on this conception of theoretical 
raw material, which he refers to as "The perpetual play 
on the words 'real' and 'concrete' on which is based a whole 
series of ambiguities whose delayed effects we are suffering 
from today" (Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 39), 
Castells has claimed that a discipline may achieve scien-
tificity if it possesses either a real or a theoretical object. 
It will be remembered that Althusser has characterized as 
empiricist the belief that a science applies itself to the 
study of a real object: in a genuine scientific process, 
theory is produced through the operation of the problematic 
on theoretical raw material, from which reality is explicitly 
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excluded. Puzzled by the flagrant departure from the Althusserian 
system, Saunders discusses the possibility that Castells was 
in fact referring to Generalities I (the theoretical raw 
materials); in which case, Castells' 'real object' would not 
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refer to concrete reality itself, but to the existing repre-
sentations of the imaginary relation to the concrete. A 
consequence of this argument would be that the spatial units 
of collective consumption delineated by Castells are merely 
categories by means of which urban sociologists have con-
ceptualized the real world, and that science will 
supersede these categories. "Clearly this is not what Castells 
intends, for he claims to have identified both a theoretical 
and a real object for his new scientific approach. His aim 
is not to transcend the real object but to study it'' (Saunders, 
t981a~ 172). Castells' use of the existence of a specific 
teal object as a criterion of scientificity has no foundation 
in Althusserian philosophy, which rejects as empiricist any 
claim that a science deals (directly or indirectly) with reality. 
His criticism of urban sociology for its failure to establish 
an urban real object is thus itself subject to the empiricist 
preconceptions he disclaims; while his subsequent attempt to 
find a correspondence between theory and the real object of 
collective consumption tomes in line frir the'same criticism. 
The suggestion that units of collective consumption coincide 
and can be identified with spatial units is in fact an assertion 
that there must be a correspondence between some aspect of 
reality termed 'urban' and the theory that relates to it. 
By depicting science in terms of the relation between theory 
and reality, he is posing what Althusser has dismissed as 
the ideological question of classical philosophy. 
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Thus Castells' use of the terms 'real object' and 'theoretical 
object', while taken from Althusser's critique of empiricism, 
are employed in such a way that their meaning is significantly 
distorted. According to Castells, a scientific discipline is 
established by its possession of either a theoretical object 
Ca conceptual cutting up of reality)~ or a real object Ca spe-
cific· field of observation). A discipline which has neither 
a theoretical object nor a real object cannot be called a 
science~ such a discipline is urban sociology. 
Castells' underlying empiricism can be exemplified through 
a.n analysis of his examination of the theories of urbanism 
(behavioural patterns in the city) and urbanization (the process 
of city growth), in order to assess whether these theoretical 
orientations to the city possess either real or theoretical 
objects. 
Castells argues that his theoretical position does not derive 
from fidelity to principles, but from the "nature of things". 
This is an astonishing claim for a so-called Althusserian to 
make. To talk of theory stemming from the nature of things 
is to embody the empiricist conception of knowledge, in which 
to know is to abstract from the real object its essential nature, 
the possession of which by the subject is then called knowledge. 
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Knowledge is the essential nature of the real, and is contained 
in the real as one of its parts. This conception of knowledge 
contradicts Castells' own statement that "there is no evidence 
which is not constructed" (Castells and de Ipola; 1976d: 
12 4) • 
The search for the tru~ nature of the real object is used 
by Althusser as the basis for interrogating the theoretical 
status of empiricism; for when empiricism regards the essence 
as the object of knowledge, it admits that the latter is not 
the same as the real object, since it is only part of it. Thus 
Castells, by referring to· the "nature of things", employs 
the conception of the structure of the real object which 
constitutes the specific index of empiricism: "he fails to see 
that the socially constructed categories of historical 
materialism are not privey to the intrinsic 'nature' or objective 
laws of 'things'. Things have no nature or objectivity ex-
cept that conferred upon them. This is the unalterable ad-
mission that, epistemologically speaking, all 'things' are 
ideational. I.t may be worth recalling, as an intuitive 
rejoinder to Castells' argument, that the gods of Homer were 
also regarded as part of the nature of things" (McKeown~ 
1980: 31). 
In the light of the above vacillation concerning real and 
theoretical objects, the.following statement by Castells is 
particularly ironic: he points to the need to constitute a 
coherent theoretical and methodological framework which has 
'...!I 
\ ........ 
' 
6S 
resulted from the failure of each of the social sciences to 
specify its object with any precision (Castells, 1976a: SS, and 
1976b: 73). 
Castells has not managed to achieve a theoretical approach 
to the urban~ instead his work is condemned as ideological 
by the same system that he attempted to use to identify the 
presence of ideology in urban sociology. It is abundantly 
evident that Castells, far from having attained any precision 
on the speeLfication on scientific objects, has only succeeded 
in further obfuscation. 
One of the problems with Althusser's evaluation of empiricism 
is that he uses the term to cover a wide range of epistemological 
positions. Like Castells, Althusser has been criticized for 
a representation of empiricism that fails to distinguish 
between positivist and realist approaches. While they have 
some common features, and both have been developed within 
a _broadly empiricist philosophical tradition, it is essential 
to distinguish between these· two positions. 
While the positivist sets out to explain real phenomena, 
Althusser denies that the real object is the object of knowledge: 
i "Knowledge working on its 'object', then,,·does not work on 
the real object but on the peculiar raw material, which 
constitutes, 1n the strict sense of the term, its 'object' 
(of knowledge) , and which, even in the most rudimentary forms 
of knowledge, is distinct from the real object" (Althusser 
and Balibar, 1970: 43). Consequently, Althusser also rejects 
the positivist assertion that facts and phenomena are subject 
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to immediate observation. This, for Althusser, reduces knowledge 
to a mere relation of the subject's vision, a notion that 
must be replaced by the conception of knowledge as a production 
that operates in terms of its problematic: "the sighting is 
thus no longer the act of an individual subject, endowed with 
the faculty of 'vision' which he exercises either attentively 
or distractedly; the sighting is the act of its structural 
conditions, it is the relation of immanent reflection between 
the fi~ld of the problematic and its objects and its problems" 
Cibi::l.: 25). 
One of the most fundamental differences between positivism 
and Althusserianism concern the farmer's postulate that 
there are no hidden or systemic causes, and thus that statements 
Qf empirical reality constitute the logical basis of explanation. 
Althusser's rebuttal of the view is related to his rejection of 
a conception of knowledge as 'sight'. An invisible connection, 
he says, exists between the field of the visible and the field 
.·of the invisib:'.e (Ibid.: 21). It is through the operation 
of the problematic that the invisible is defined as excluded: 
"excluded from the field of visibility .•. objects and problems 
are necessarily invisible in the field of the existing theory, 
because they are not objects ·of this theory, because they are 
forbidden by it •.. the whole function of the field is not 
to see them'' (Ibid.: 26}. The positivist problematic then 
determined that it will not 'see' the hidden systemic causes 
whose existence it denies, that it will be unable to discern 
the structure of the social formation as a complex structured 
unity of distinct, relatively autonomous instances. 
Althusser explicitly rejects the realist postulate that 
scientific theories enable us to give explanations of obser-
vable phenomena and that theoretical abstractions must be 
linked to empirical controls. He refers to the question 
of how one guarantees that knowledge is true - the classical 
problem of knowledge • as ideological insofar as it is a 
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problem that had to be posed if the desired ideological solution 
was to be its solution. Althusser claims to replace this 
'problem of knowledge' with the question "by what mechanism 
does the process of knowledge, which takes place entirely in 
thought, produce the cognitive appropriation of its real object, 
which exists outside thought in the real world'' (Ibid.: 56). 
Althusser's solution is the "knowledge effect", which operates 
in terms of criteria internal to the process of knowledge. He 
~sserts (cryptically) that "the validity of a scientific 
proposition as a knowledge was ensured in a determinate scientific 
practice by the action of particular forms which ensure the 
' presence of scientificity in the production of"knowledge'' (Ibid.: 
67). It has been suggested that Althusser has not managed 
to achieve the 'inwardness' of the 'criterion of practice' 
to scientific practice~ his solution to the central problem 
of structuralist epistemology is widely regarded as a mere 
verbal solution, an attempt to cover up an underlying correspon-
dence between the order of the world and the order of thought 
CVeltmeyer, 1975~ 390). Althusser's conception of knowledge, 
it is held, does not in fact provide the separation he would 
like to achieve between his position and the realist one 
which claims that empirical controls are required for the 
proper development of theory (Keat and Urry, 1975: 135). 
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The relations posited by realism identify empirical effects 
and conditions (Ibid.~ 75), thus it acknowledges that empirical 
evidence has an independent existence, and calls for empirical 
controls in the process of knowledge production. Realism 
differs from positivism, however, in that it insists on the 
theoretical moment in science. Theoretical abstraction is 
essential for concrete phenomena do not in themselves have any 
privileged status: they are explained by causal and other 
sets of propositions (Ibid. :_ 32) . The realist rejects the 
positivist notion that a regular relationship between two 
kinds of phenomena is sufficient evidence for a causal connec-
tion. There must be some intervening mechanism which links 
them together, and it is the role of the scientist to discern 
and examine the characteristics of these mechanisms, This 
relation between evi'dence and meaning implies a denial of 
the 'verificationist' theory in positivism, which asserts 
that the meaning of any empirical statement is given by its 
actual or possible means of verification - that is, by obser-
~ational evidence. 
In realism, it is necessary to have knowledge of underlying 
mechanisms and structures, and of the manner in which they 
give rise to concrete phenomena. In describing these mechanisms 
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and structures, the realist attempts to characterize the 'nature' 
or 'essence' of these phenomena. The primary purpose of 
scientific theories is to facilitate causal explanations of 
observable phenomena, and to establish relations between 
them, making reference to the underlying structures and 
mechanisms which are inevitably a part of the causal process. 
Realism denies that theories are generated by an inductive 
procedure, in which one moves from specific observations to 
generalizations about them; and also disputes the hypothetico-
deductivist assertion that hypotheses are merely conjunctures: 
the realist recogniz_es that some form of analogicaly argument, 
from source to model, may be employed. 
The realist may acknowledge the existence of entities that 
cannot be immediately discerned. Scientific theories enable 
us to give causal explanati6ns of observable phenomena by 
their description of structures and mechanisms that cannot 
be directly observed. The confinement of a scientific theory 
to observational statements is repudiated, for the question of 
what exists must be separated from that of what we .can observe, 
or know with a high degree of certainty. 
The essential aim of positivism is to establish general 
laws which are able to explain particular events by revealing 
them ·to be examples of these laws. These laws must have the 
form of universal conditionals; must not be limited in their 
application to any circumscrib~d dom~in. of space and .. time; 
and cannot allude only to particular items (Ibid.: 10). 
Positivist empiricism holds that all knowledge can be reduced 
to atomic theorems that correspond to· discrete impressions 
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and sensory information. As propositions of empirical reality 
constitute the logical foundation of explanation, there are 
no concealed causes of empirical phenomena (McLennan, 1981: 30). 
For the positivist, to say that one occurrence causes another, 
signifies that the first precedes the second, and that whenever 
an event of the same character as the first occurs, it will 
inevitably be followed by one of the same character as the 
second. In positivism, observation is the only basis for 
scientific theorizing: a statement is only scientific if it' is 
possible to ascertain its truth or falsity by means of direct 
observation. Facts and phenomena have an objective material 
existence, thus it is possible for th.e senses to grasp them. 
(M. Glucksmann, 197,4b: 1·44) ~ · · 
There are two procedures within positivism of using evidence 
to assess theoretical adequacy. In the confirmationist approach, 
the more frequent the instances which are in accordance with 
the predictions that can be deduced from a theory, the 
more that theory is substantiated. Competing theories can be 
appraised in terms of their degree of empirical corroboratio~. 
For the falsificationist, in evaluating scientific theories 
by means of observation, we can only use the latter to fal~ 
sify, and not to verify, the former. This is associated with 
Popper's hypothetico-deductive method, in which the scientist 
does not start from observations and then induce theory from 
these; instead a theory is formulated and subsequently tested 
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by means of falsifying observations (Keat.and Urry, 1975: 15-16). 
In their discussion of positivist empiricism, Keat and Urry 
distinguish between the deductive-nomological and the induc-
ti ve-s ta tistical models of scientific explanation. In the 
former, the propositions and antecedent conditions can function 
either as a basis for explaining phenomena or for predicting 
it. Inductive-statistical positivism holds that the relation 
between premisses and conclusions is one of inductive proba-
bility instead of deductive necessity. An event is explained 
by s:howing that a statement .describing it is upheld with a 
substantial measure of inductive probability by a set of 
premisses, at least one of which is a statement of the statis~ 
tical probability that an event of one kind will be succeeded 
by, or accompanied by, an event of another kind (Ibid.: 12). 
It will be remembered that Castells' approach to empiricism 
is complicated by the fact that he does not provide a satis-
factory description of it: he confuses positivism with empiri-
cism, and fails to examine those types of empiricism that do 
not involve elementary positivist assumptions. While he 
purports to have based his rejection of it on Althusser's 
work, both his portrayal of empiricism and his alternative to 
it are far from internally coherent or consistently Althusserian. 
Those views of Castells that are influenced by Althusser 
display a strong anti-positivist stance. This can be seen in 
Castells' description of theory as a practice; the statement 
that "There is no such a thing as an ahistorical truth which 
72 
has a prior existence in the order of reality. It cannot be 
extracted, it has to be produced" (Castells and de Ipola, 1976d: 
121); and that empiricism was unable to answer questions because 
it tried to go straight to the facts and this resulted in 
this approach becoming "the prisoner of intellectual frameworks 
that had distorting effects at the level of research operations" 
(Idem, 1977a,: vii). In other areas of his texts, however, 
Castells implicitly supports the positive postulates that 
scientificity is established by direct observation, and that 
it is possible for the subject to regard facts of phenomena 
directly: he holds that "observations of concrete situations 
can help us to track down themes'' (Ibid.: 4), and states that he 
does not wish to question the importance of observation in 
sociology (Castells, 1970, cited by McKeown. 1980: 28). 
Althusser of course denies categorically that the individual 
subject is capable of theoretical observation: for him it is the 
field of the problematic which sees and defines theoretical 
objects and problems. Individuals are merely the agents for 
thought, and it is the system of theoretical production which 
"defines the roles and functions of the 'thought' of particular 
individuals, who can only 'think' the 'problems' already actually 
or potentially posed" (Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 42). This 
process is obviously quite unlike the positivist supposition 
that external reality can be apprehended by the subject, and 
that the scientificity of a theory can only be ascertained 
through direct observation. 
Logically entailed in Castells' self-proclaimed role as 
the subject 'observing' concrete reality, is the positivist 
conception of the production of knowledge as an operation of 
abstraction carried out by the subject on the real object: 
the separation of the essential kernel from the inessential 
dross of this real object. The corollaiy of this distinction 
between 'essential' and 'inessential' is located in the 
empiricism of the economistic 'Marxist' conception of the 
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social formation, in which "the theoretical (and the 'abstract') 
is surreptitiously substituted for the economy ... and the 
empirical for the non-economic" ( Iq id. : 111 ~ . Here 
the role of the essence/phenomena opposition is used to posit 
that the non-economic is a phenomenon of the economic, of which 
it is the essence. Althusser wished to replace this expressive 
totality with his =onception of ~ social formation which is 
not organized merely in terms of a single contradiction 
(between base and superstructure), but one which shows a 
complexity of contradictions between the relatively autonomous 
instances. It will be seen that Castells hopes to subscribe 
to the Althusserian view of complex contradictions (Castells, 
1976c: 167), and that of a structuralist conception of the 
complex social formation (Idem, 1977~: 2). For the reasons 
outlined above, however, Castells cannot consistently support 
positivist notions as well as the Althusserian social for-
mation, which was specifically established in opposition to 
positivism with the latter's denial of causes concealed from 
direct observation. 
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The positivist preoccupation with the establishment of 
universally applicable laws derived from observed phenomena, is 
another aspect of empiricism that is evident in Castells' 
work. For Duncan, Castells has repeated the faults in posi-
tivist Weberian work, which was marred by an incapacity to 
relate abstract to concrete without involving deterministic, 
unicausal explanations and the disproportionate fragmentation 
of real historical change (Duncan, 1981: 239). Duncan points 
out that Castells attempts to find a relationship between 
~bstract and cortcrete by referring-to particular historical 
changes which have been generalized as ever-present phenomenal 
relations. 
Castells further states that The Urban Question "aims at 
deducing theoretical tools of observation from concrete 
situations" (Castells, 1977a::. S); .and goes on to Say that ·these 
are "situations which I have .observed myself" (Ibid.). Castells 
is thereby putting himself fairly and squarely in the role 
of the subject observing concrete reality - the most fundamental 
postulate of inductive positivism and the concept most 
antithetical to Althusser. Clearly reluctant to leave any 
theoretical stone unturned, on the next page Castells places 
himself in the camp of deductive positivism by arguing that 
he wishes to reverse the procedure of deducing theoretical 
tools of observation from concrete situations, by setting 
out from theory to know situations (Ibid.: 6). Like the 
positivists, Castells is accepting that society presents 
tts~l~ accurately to the subject/observer. He is also 
clearly positivist in that he seeks to dissolve the general 
abstract into the particular concrete and vice versa (most 
positivists are satisfied with just one of these methods). 
It is thus startling that in his very next sentence, Castells 
points to the importance of theoretical work if one wishes 
to avoid empiricism, and claims that this aim is directly 
reflected in the organization of his work (Ibid.: 6). In 
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the space of five pages, Castells has gone from an Althusserian 
position, to inductive empiricism, to deductive empiricism, 
and finally back to Althusserianis~. 
As in positivist empiricism, Castells has generalized 
particular historical patterns as universal laws, buttressed 
by the use of selected historical examples. Specific forms 
are used to construct elaborate classification systems, which 
are impossible to relate to historical practice. This repli-
cation of the problems of positivism is ironic in the light 
of the anti-empiricism of Althusserian Marxism.. Duncan says 
of Castells: "he ends up doing much the same as in abstract 
empiricism, with similar results. The concepts employed, such 
as the urban question, the housing crisis, the state, are at 
once ahistorical generalizations and highly specific historically. 
The results are reminiscent of positivist 'modelling' and 
especially of Weber's ideal types. As such, they do not allow 
an adequate explanation of historical changes; rather 
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particular moments are frozen as generalities" (Duncan, 1981: 
239). 
Castells' theoretical approach does not enable a sufficient 
explanation of historical change, and does not take into 
account the fact that capitalist social formations are not 
static. This ahistoricity can be seen in his box and arrow 
diagrams (Castells 1976c: 156, 164, and 1977a: 264, 267), which 
are uable to explain process. State intervention and social 
claims are granted only a peripheral role in these diagrams, 
as is the labour process. In short, the class struggle as the 
motor of change is not included as a central explanatory 
variable. Furthermore, Castells generalizes the French housing 
system of the 1960s as typical of capitalism in general, and 
the validity of this generalization is demonstrated by case 
studies of primarily French examples. Thus, "references 
are drawn .in to support the abstracted conclusions advanced, 
rather than as conceptually informed historical research in 
their own right. When Castells does extend his treatment 
to the social-democratic capitalist countries (e.g. consideration 
of British new towns) this results in the imposition of genera-
lized categories on historical reality'' (Duncan, 1981: 240-1). 
Castells' claims about reality are based on an internal 
abstract analysis. These claims are regarded as empirical 
' tendencies which can be discerned in any particular situation. 
There is a similarity of this system to the Weberian method 
of ideal types: the production of a best possible, supposedly 
typical generalization to fit approximately as many empirical 
situations as possible. Duncan points out that this is not, 
as Castells asserts, an analysis that moves from abstract 
to concrete, it is rather one that universalizes empirical 
appearances. 
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By taking a positivist stance, Castells lays himself open 
to the most serious Marxist charge against positivis~, 
concerning its pernicious philosophical implications. As it 
accepts society in its immediate form, and positive determina-
tion as an unchallenged, functional system of relations, 
positivism reproduces in thought the fetishism of social 
relations in capitalist society. This is done by reducing 
immediate reality either by fragmentation or holistic abstrac-
tion, and seeing only its functional determination: "Reifying 
social relations as abstract laws and values as functions, 
empirico-positivism reproduces in thought the actual domination 
of men by abs~ract laws (which have become socially concrete) 
and produces a science of the positive existence of those 
laws ... it reproduces the abstract laws governing fetishized 
social relations of capitalism as a functional system, or it 
constructs models (through empiricist abstraction) divorced 
from conditions of material and social life" (Veltmeyer, 1975: 
408) 
Problems in the Althusserian System 
Castells' vacillation can, at least partially, be understood in 
terms of the fact that Althusser himself had not treated the 
separation between real and theoretical objects with complete 
consistency. While he indicates the ideological implications 
of concrete reality, and classifies it as part of the pre-
scientific aspects of Marx's early work, he later argues that 
the science of political economy studies a raw material 
provided in the last resort by the practices of real concrete 
history (Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 109-110). He argues 
that the real object known by science is not the object of 
knowledge, yet the real object is held to be the 'absolute 
reference point''' of knowledge (Althusser, 1969: 198). He 
recognizes the givenness of the complex structure of any 
concrete object, and that this structure governs both the 
development of the object and the development of the practice 
which produces the knowledge of it. 
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It has been argued that Althusser is positing a one-to-one 
correspondence between thought and reality that is simply 
assumed by him as. a matter of philosophical principle. "Having 
admitted a philosophical structure that admits nature as part 
of its 'absolute reference point', yet being unable to theorize 
nature directly himself, Althusser allows this theoretical gap 
to be filled ideologically" (Nield and Seed, 1979: 290). 
Glucksmann takes up this point, suggesting that the structure 
of the real could be the reference point for theory without 
being its object of knowledge only by presupposing some 
concealed correspondence between a theory and its object, 
between the order of the world and the nature of thought 
founded on their mutual essence as productions. The kinship 
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of thought and being is thus not to be found in the direct 
relation of theory and its object, but indirectly, between the 
categories of thought and the components of reality. If the 
logic of all types of production can be perceived through 
theoretical production, it is because Althusser is implicitly 
suggesting a kinship between them which should be apparent 
in theoretical ~roduction (A. Glucksmann, 1977: 72). 
Tristam disputes the accuracy of Althusser's ibterpretation 
of Marx's distinction between real and theoreticaliobjects: 
I 
while the interpretation is useful because it reveals the 
significance of the object of knowledge in Marx's ~ork, it 
inaccurately depicts Marx's distinction between th~se totalities 
as an absolute one. This· assertion is contradicted by Marx's 
I 
I 
view that the knowledge relation had to be accompanied by a 
I 
relation in reality, that there must be a perceptible link 
I 
' between the object of knowledge and reality, and that the 
validity of theory must be evaluated in terms of the analysis 
of concrete history (Tristam, 1975: 772). 
Another important objection to Althusser's description of 
the production of theory, is that it does not outline the 
particular .charact~r of the scientific procedures that are 
supposed to provide knowledge of the real without the real being 
a component of their raw material (Nield and Seed, 1979: 389). 
By far the most significant criticism of Althusser's 
separation of theory and reality has to do with its implications 
for the study of history. Althusser's metaphysical suspicion 
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of appearances have had incapacitating consequences for the 
application of his theoretical framework to concrete historical 
analysis: ''Althusser's concepts are de-historicized, drained 
of specificity: the categories 'economics', 'politics', 
'ideology', and so on, are quite arbitrary and abstract notions. 
Crucial concepts of Marxism ~ the state, class, power, conscious-
ness - are all absent (Ibid.: 391-2). 
In Thompson's view, by declaring that it is impossible to 
know the real, Althusser has stripped from reality its determinant 
characteristics, thus diminishing the real to theory. Against 
Althusser, Thompson argues that one should be able to assume 
that one is dealing with materials that show evidence of 
genuine historical process. He holds that while the object 
of historical knowledge is real, this does not imply that the 
historian is theoretically naive: "Of course historians (or at 
least some of them) know that facts do not speak directly, that 
you do not get answers without first asking questions, and they 
know that 'facts' have their own ideological loads"(Thompson, 
1978: 220-1). 
It is clear that the relationship of theory to reality has 
) 
considerable consequences for any critique of Althusser'·s 
work, and the political implications that follow from the ex-
clusion of concrete reality from the raw material of theoretical 
practice will be examined in greater detail in the sections 
in this thesis on the knowledge effect, theoretical guarantees, 
the autonomy of theory, and social and political change. 
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THEORY 
Theory as a Practice 
Althusser uses the word 'practice' to denote the process 
of transformation of raw material into a product: "By practice 
in general I shall mean any process of transformation effected 
by a determinate human labour, using determinate means (of 
'production') (Al thusser,.) 1969: '. 166). 
The structure of material production (in which labour 
power and means of material production are put to work in order 
to transform raw materials into socially useful products) is 
clearly the prototype for this conception of theoretical 
I 
production. He claims that production of a real object takes 
place entirely in the real and is carried out accofding to the 
real order of the real genesis, while the production 
process of the object of knowledge takes place entirely in 
knowledge, and is carried out according to its own order. 
Hence: "It is perfectly legitimate to say that the production 
of knowledge which is peculiar to theoretical practice 
constitutes a process that takes place entirely in thought, 
just as we can say, mutatis mutandis, that the process of 
economic production takes place entirely in the economy" 
(Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 42). The raw materials of 
existing concepts on which it works are abstract, and are not 
to be found in concrete reality. Its labour consists of 
describing its own scientific facts by examining the ideological 
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"facts" of an antecedent ideological mode of practice, 
using as its means of theoretical labour its own theoretical 
con~epts and method. Political practice has the raw materials 
of given social relations to produce its own type of product: 
new social relations; and ideological practice transforms the 
types of representation and perception in which the bearers/agents 
of a social formation 'live' their relations with their world. 
The primacy of practice is established for Althusser in that 
all levels of social existence are the sites of distinct 
practices, and he emphasizes that the distance between the 
various practices must on no account be negated or reduced: 
"we must recognize that there is no practice in general, but 
i 
only distinct practices ... there can be no scientific concep-
1 
tion of practice without a precise distinction bet~een the 
distinct practices'' (Ibid.: -52). Here he is proposing an 
'essence of practice' in terms of the homology of the different 
practices, as well as a dissimilarity of content in that 
individual practices have different raw materials, type and 
means of labour, and products. 
The identification of knowledge as a type of practice is 
an attempt on Althusser's part to establish a definition of 
science that would be untainted by empiricist assumptions: he 
particularly wished to eliminate the notion that scientificity 
depends on a direct relation between theory and reality, which 
in turn implies that a science is capable of examining reality 
itself. 
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In opposition to this "ideological illusion", Althusser 
asserts that a science is established only if the idea that one 
is dealing with reality is relinquished. A science never works 
on immediate essences, on givens. To support this contention, 
he quotes Marx's observation that any process of scientific 
knowledge does not start from the real concrete, but from the 
abstract (Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 190). 
Althusser's problem was to create a conception of science 
that would explain the real without attempting to bbserve it. 
His solution depends on the concept of theoretical_ practice, 
which is of pivotal importance for the structure of his 
exposition. 
Castells conforms to the Althusserian characterization of 
theory, claiming that its production requires the use of 
certain theoretical tools in order to transform, through a 
process of labour, a theoretico-ideological raw material in 
order to obtain a theoretical product (Castells 1977a: 2-3). 
He echoes this concept in his essay written with de Ipola, 
where he outlines the process of the production of knowledge as 
!'the transformation of a given raw material (scientific 
knowledge and/or prescientific representation) into a given 
product (new scientific knowledge); thus transformation would 
take place by the application of definite scientific agents 
of production using definite means of labour (concepts, 
theories, methods) in definite production conditions (both 
material and social) (Castells and de Ipola, 1976d: 113-4). 
He asks "what then defines a process of the production of 
knowledge?", and "what are the material conditions of such 
a process of production?" (Ibid.: 138). Like Althusser, 
he believes in "the possibility of a production of knowledge 
beyond the subjective grasp of a historical situation", 
rejects "those criteria which are exterior to scientific 
practice", and concludes that "our answer can only be based 
on a materialist analysis of its conditions of production" 
(Ibid.) 
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The influence of Alth~sser's conception of the production 
of knowledge as following the form of economic production is 
clearly visible in Castells' texts: the conditions of the 
,Production of knowledge, he says, "correspond esseptially to 
what one means in economic production" (Ibid.: 114), and 
claims that "knowledge is, by definition, inseparable from 
the productive system" (Ibid.). 
The Althusserian terminology that accompanies the r~w 
material~labour and means of produttion-product schema is 
employed liberally by Castells. Joining Althusser in his 
rejection of the empiricist raw material of concrete reality, 
Castells says that theoretical raw material consists of 
theory and ideology (Ibid.), and refers to the "elementary 
epistemological postulate" that any theoretical or ideological 
object of analysis must necessarily be constructed (Ibid.). 
As for the labour and means of production that are used in 
the production of the theoretical product, Castells argues 
that a genuine theory is "one bearing on the production of 
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tools of knowledge" (Idem, 1977a: 5); that we must "transform 
our understanding with the help of advanced theoretical instru-
ments" (Ibid.); and that knowledge proceeds "through the 
creation of a series of theoretical tools" (Ibid.). He also 
calls these means of theoretical production "conceptual tools" 
(Ibid.: viii), tools of intellectual work (Ibid.), "tools of 
research" (Ibid.: ix), and so on. 
Notwithstanding the use of these Althusserian phrases, 
Castells' treatment of theory as a practice is far from 
consistent. Bearing in mind that both Althusser and Castells 
have described theoretical raw material as being composed of 
theoretical and ideological concepts, it is clear that 
Castells is falling prey to empiricism when he subsequently 
claims that raw material is made up of three elements: 
''ideological representations, knowledge already acquired, (and) 
the specificity of concrete situations" (Ibid.: 3, my italics); 
and that his book aims at the theoretical transformation of 
empirical raw material (Ibid.: 5). It is interesting to note 
that he does not draw attention to the fact that this inclusion 
of concrete reality inevitably entails the idea that knowledge 
is vision, and that it occurs when the subject examines the 
object: the hallmarks of positivist empiricism. That this 
conception of the direct examination of reality by the subject 
was precisely the one that Althusser was attempting to avoid 
by depicting theory as a type of production, does not seem 
to deter Castells at all: he continues to portray theory as 
a practice (Ibid.: 74, 429), and even changes theoretical 
camps yet again by reverting to the Althusserian system 
and limiting raw material to scientific knowledge and pre-
scientific representation (Castells and de Ipola, 1976d: 
11 4) . 
I feel that these frequent inconsistencies are not the 
result of simple confusion on Castells' part, but evince 
his profound discomfort arising from the growing criticism 
concerning both the internal logic and the political impli-
cations of a theoretical practice that explicitly excludes 
any reference to concrete historical reality. 
It is thought that Althusser does not give an adequate 
justification for his definition of theory as a practice, nor 
for his assertion that each of the practices is identical to 
that of material production. While he has outlined a.model 
of .the procedure of theory, this has remained inconclusive, 
with insufficient examination of the way in which it takes 
place (Nield and Seed, 1979: 389). It is alleged that 
Althusser is using a mere analogy as the basis for the view 
that the theoretical product emerges after the processing of 
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raw materials by the means of theoretical labour (M. Glucksmann, 
1974b: 135). Glucksmann attacks the claims of this concept 
of production to explicate theory and the structure of the 
real: "The basis for the whole tripartite Althusserian architec-
ture thus arises fully armed from the simple but forced use 
of a dictionary. It 'happens' that everything is production, 
it 'happens' that every production is divided into three. 
That is how it is. This conceptual empiricism is never 
questioned in the Althusserian reflection" (A. Glucksmann, 
1977: 71). He suggests that the concept of production is the 
same as the concept of Being in traditional philosophy, which 
shifts Althusser's project from 'science' into metaphysics. 
The characterization of theory as a practice presupposes 
an implicit correspondence between theory and reality, a 
correlation which is transcendental: the kinship of thought 
and Being. is conceived between the categories of thought and 
the elements of reality. Theoretical practice can only 
achieve validity if it shares ontological conditions with the 
other productions that provide the reference point for its 
object of knowledge. This notion, Glucksmann suggests, is a 
modification of Kant's transcendental epistemology, for it 
assumes that there is a mysterious relation between the cate-
gories of thought and the elements of reality, and relies on 
a metaphysical view that these unities are transcendentally 
correlated (Ibid.: 74). 
87 
The concept of production is not confined to portraying 
all productions in terms of the tripartite demarcation of the 
'general essence of all production': 
1. It also enables a double unification of the set of 
productions. Theoretical production contains the essence 
of all productions, for through it one can perceive the 
essence of practice in general. Conversely, if material 
production in the final analysis determines the form 
of the other productions, this can be attributed to the 
material kinship of productions. 
2. In addition, it unifies these two unities in a transcen-
dental correlation, for the elementary categories ~f 
theoretical production are simultaneously the categorical 
elements of real production; the concepts of thought are 
held to be the same as the 'conditions of existence' of 
the real. 
This is referred to as part of Althusser's endeavour to 
establish a system that is displaced from the real to the 
theory of the real, a classically metaphysical displacement 
in which a 'primary' philosophy develops the first concepts 
(a priori transcendentals) that permit us to think the real 
as real. "Production - first and last thought of Althus-
serianism - is the being that is both the positing of the 
copula in the proposition ... and of the object in reality 
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That a thing is and that it is thus: the double face'tradi-
tionally represented by metaphysics as existentia et essentia" 
(Ibid.: 89). 
Thompson, takes up this point (although explic~tly from a 
humanist position), arguing that the notion of theory as a 
practice creates an "idealistic epistemological circle", in that 
it is a "self-generating conceptual universe" which asserts 
its own identity upon the phenomena of material and social 
existence. "This procedure is entirely self-confirming, self-
perpetuating and self-elaborating. Concepts constantly 
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circulate within this sealed system, and Althusser mistakes 
this repetitious introversion for a science, and claims that 
Marx's scientific procedures were of the same order" (Thompson, 
1978: 205). 
Perhaps the most serious allegation against theory as a 
practice concerns the fact that, by excluding reality from its 
raw material and denying that the individual is the subject of 
this process, Althusser is effectively preventing the possibility 
of individuals or social classes employing their experience 
in the production of theory. By stating that the relation of 
theory to the other social practices depends solely on their 
common structure, Althusser has devised a philosophy whose only 
relation beyond itself is with the sciences. For Callinicos, 
this is a position that must be rejected by Marxists, in order 
to avoid Marxism becoming a theory without any relation to life 
and the struggle of the proletariat (Callinicos, 1976: 77). 
The revolution in the schema is "entrusted to the immense 
theoretical labour of the scholar-hero, not to the supporting 
cast of millions, and must wait on the specific 'temporality' 
·of theoretical practice'' (Clarke, 1980: 37-8). According 
to others, this is precisely the bourgeois materialist 
., 
conception which Marx criticized in the third thesis on 
Feuerbach. The final result of Althusser's theoretical practice 
is that "Theory is no longer related to social reality, but 
hovers in its own asocial realm, a spectre haunting the academy. 
The concept of 'theoretical practice' represents a grotesque . 
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rationalism within Marxist theory, of the separation of mental 
from manual labour in the real world" (McDonnell and Robins, 
1980: 223). 
Castells' reluctance to accept these consequences can b~ 
seen in his statements that theoretical reformulation "requires 
a point of departure that is historically bound up with the 
working-class movement and its practice" (Castells, 1977a: 
6); that the production of knowledge must be governed by 
"social practice" (Ibid.: viii); that "there is no purely theo-
retical possibility of resolving (or superseding) the con-
tradictions that are at the base of the urban question; this 
supersession can only come from social practice, that is to 
say, from political practice" (Ibid.: 6); and that "theore-
tical work does not take place in a social void; it must be 
articulated ... with the practices observed" (Ibid.: viii). 
In the face of Castells' continued use of the concept of 
theory as a practice, these frequent interpolations do not 
amount to much, as this portrayal of theory cannot be sundered 
from its political implications. 
THEORY 
The Epistemological Break 
The epistemological break is a concept originated by 
Bachelard (1967), for whom a genuine science is not tied to 
explanations derived from direct perceptions of reality. 
The orders of perception and reality must be kept distinct, 
for abstraction founded on observation constitutes an epis-
temological impediment. Empiricist science is false, and 
cannot transcend initial experience and external appearances; 
instead of producing knowledge, it provides the illusion of 
comprehension, an illusion which can only be dispelled by a 
conclusive break with this approach. 
Althusser uses the concept of the epistemological break 
to describe the transformation of ideology into a science 
through the construction of a new problematic. He points to 
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a break that Marx made with his own 'theoretical prehistory' 
and with other philosophies of history, asserting that Marx's 
work does not form a coherent unity, for his later writings 
contained a problematic that permitted the foundation of a 
science. Prior to 1845, Marx regarded history and politics as 
the study of the essence of man, who was the subject of 
history. In this philosophical humanism, strongly influenced 
by Hegel and Feuerbach, Marx employed the ideological catego-
ries of need, alienation, theft, injustice and species being; 
assuming the existence of a universal nature which consti-
tutes the human essence, and which is an attribute of each 
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individual. After 1845, the precepts of philosophical humanism 
were denounced as ideology: a break which, for Althusser, was 
essential in the development of a scientific Marxism. The 
terms of the ideological problematic of the subject were re-
placed by concepts such as production, productive forces, 
relations of production, social formation; etc. An epistemo~ 
logical rupture separated the humanism of the young Marx from 
the writings of the mature Marx, who was able to achieve a 
scientific, structural description of economic reality. Human 
nature was no longer regarded as an abstraction inherent 
in each individual, but rather as an ensemble of social relations. 
The epistemological break thus involved a conceptual transfor-
mation of the category of the subject, a departure from the 
ideological field defined by the socio-practical interests of 
subjects. Also rejected were the previous concepts of poli-
tical economy, history and philosophy, which shared empiricist 
and idealist assumptions. 
This interpretation of Marxism is a radical departure from 
the views of the humanist Marxists such as Lukacs and Marcuse, 
who posit a continuity in Marx's work based on the concepts 
of alienation, praxis and negation. 
Castells explicitly states his adherence to Althusser's 
concept of the epistemological break in ~larx's work, as.well 
as supporting the more general use of the concept td distin-
guish between ideological and scientific modes of discourse 
(Castells and de Ipola, 1976d: 112). He defines the episte-
mological break as "the specific effect of the irruption 
into the ideological formation of a process of production of 
scientific knowledge" (Ibid.). Like Althusser, Castells 
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traces the development of this concept to Bachelard, and argues 
that division and rupture are characteristic of the contra-
dictions inherent in any epistemological intervention; Me~ 
uses this concept to posit an epistemological break between 
the ideological raw mate~ials of traditional urban sociology and 
a new, properly scientific urban sociology. 
Castells criticizes Bachelard for failing to elaborate the 
way in which obstacles to the epistemological process occµr, 
and for referring to the subjective 'stientific spirit' as 
an explanation for epistemological ruptures. These problems, 
he assures, have been overcome by Althusser, who has "given a 
new value to Bachelard's epistemology, chiefly by attempting to 
understand certain of his theses in the light of dialectical 
materialism" (Ibid.: 116). He also commends Althusser for 
distinguishing between science and ideology in terms of its 
"historico-social conditions of realization In this way 
the processes whereby epistemological obstacles are formed, 
together with the mechanisms on which the science/ideology 
split is based, began to be explained rather than simply 
described" (Ibid.) 
While Castells rejects Althusser's abstract and general 
thesis of an absolute and universal opposition between 
science and ideology, and the consequences such a distinction 
entails (Ibid.: 117), he reiterates his desire to retain 
Althusser's concept of the epistemological break (Ibid.: 
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114). As Saunders points out, the Castells and de Ipola paper 
is ambivalent towards Althusser's position, and it is not at 
all apparent how the epistemological break can be employed 
outside of a general theory of science and ideology (Saunders, 
1981a: 176). 
In Castells' study with Godard, the difficulty of 
conducting empirical work within the Althusserian episte-
mological framework became increasingly clear, and Castells 
was led to remak ruefully that "To fix a certain mode of 
theoretical analysis and to hold on to its internal logic 
and to the validity of the social laws already established 
by the general theoretical framework from which this mode of 
analysis derives is a considerable risk, or, if you like, a 
gamble on its applicability" (Castells, 1974, cited by 
Saunders, 19 81 a: 1 7 6) . 
In spite of these increasing doubts, Castells restates 
his belief in the significance of Althusser's concepts in the 
Preface to The Urban Question (written one year after the 
study with Godard), and does not at any stage call into 
question the usefulness of the concept of the epistemological 
break. 
Castells' ambivalence towards this concept, however, can 
be seen in his frequent use of the term "supersession". In 
the Glossary of For Marx (Brewster, 1969: 255), this is defined 
as a Hegelian concept popular among Marxist humanists, which 
"denotes the process of historical development by the des- .i 
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truction and retention at a higher level of an old historically 
determined situation in a new historically determined situa-
tion - e.g. socialism is the supersession of capitalism, 
Marxism is a supersession of Hegelianism" (Ibid.). Althusser 
rejects supersession as an ideological concept, declaring 
that the application of the idea of supersession in the 
development of a science and of history must be replaced by 
the concept of the epistemological break (Althusser and 
Balibar, 1970: 44, 93-7), 
Althusser, it will be remembered, emphasized that there 
was an epistemological break which separated Marx's mature 
works from Hegel's philosophy of history and the latter's 
assumption that history took place in terms of the Idea, 
which reveals its hidden truth through a ~uccessive process 
of self-alienations and self-negations. In this schema, the 
various domains of social existence express the identical 
fundamental reality. In opposition to this, Althusser argues 
that every social situation has to be conceived as a global 
structure, where the meaning and the importance of elements are 
defined by the whole in terms of structural causality. While 
Althusser maintains that science develops by an epistemological 
rupture with its ideological past, the Marxist historicists 
who were influenced by Hegel regard the development of 
knowledge as being cumulative, with past ideology being preser-
ved in a superseded form in the present (M. Glucksmann, 1974b: 
105). 
Castells criticizes the Commissariat General au Plan for 
its reliance on Hegelian supersession, claiming that it 
regarded the production of social, spatial and cultural forms 
"simply on the basis of an organic phenomenon of growth - as 
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if it were a question of a sort of upwards, linear movement of 
matter towards spirit" (Castells, 1977a: 84), and for holding 
that society develops "in an organic way, producing universal 
types" (Ibid.). The social efficacy of this ideology, he says, 
derives from its description of "the everyday problems 
experienced by people, while offering ~µ interpretation of 
them in terms of natural evolution, from which the division of 
antagonistic classes is absent" (Ibid.: 88). Lefebvre, in 
turn, is reprimanded for arguing that the historical process 
is one of sequence, and for defining human history in terms of 
the overlapping succession of three eras: the agrarian, the 
industrial and the urban: "The political city of the first 
phase gives place to the mercantile city, which is itself 
swept away by the movement of industrialization, which 
negates the city; but, at the end of the process, generalized 
urbanization, created by industry, recnnstitutes the city at 
a higher level: thus the urban supersedes the city that 
contains it in seed form" (Ibid.: 88). 
Notwithstanding the anti-Hegelian stance of his criticism 
of Lefebvre, Castells undermines the importance of the episte-
mological break by repeatedly employing. the Hegelian concept 
of supersession. Instead of the Althusserian concept of the 
epistemological break as an entirely theoretical revolution 
97 
unrelated_to external political events, Castells claims that the 
essential problem is to link "conceptual development with 
concrete historical practices in such a way as to establish 
social laws that account for the phenomena observed, while 
superseding purely formal constructions" (Ibid.: 44). "There 
is no purely theoretical possibility of superseding the 
contradictions that are at the base of the urban question", 
he says; "this supersession can come only from social practice, 
that is to say, from political practice" (Ibid.: 6). He 
acknowledges that "the social conditions for such a refor-
mulation are extremely complex", but states that "their point 
of departure is historically bound up with the working-class 
and its practice" (Ibid.). He clearly thinks that this 
convoluted argument covers all eventualities and blocks any 
criticism that might pertain to his use of Althusserian 
concepts: "This excludes all the 'avant gardist' claims of any 
'individual theory'; but it does not deny the usefulness of 
certain work of reflection, documentation and inquiry, inas-
much as such work forms part of a theoretico-practical 
practice" (Ibid.). 
In an unsurpassed feat of conceptual juggling, Castells 
forms an idiosyncratic hotchpotch of Al thusserian··and· degelian 
concepts in his statement that "the supersession of the (urban) 
discourse ... requires a theoretical analysis of the question 
of social practice it connotes ... an ideological misunder-
standing/recognition can be superseded and therefore inter-
preted, only by a theoretical analysis" (Ibid.: 2). He further 
contends that his theoretical work makes possible "a reformu-
lation of the questions posed in a perspective that should 
help us to create the conditions for their scientific 
treatment and their social supersession by means of a correct 
political practice" (Ibid.: 429). Even The Urban Question 
itself is not immune to this supersession: Castells insists 
that "My main aim is to make this book obsolete through its 
supersession in practice" (Ibid.). 
·These remarks by Castells ·are in complete opposition to 
Althusser's concept of the epistemological break, which was 
intended to eradicate this Hegelian concept of supersession. 
For Althusser, the history of reason that supersession entails 
is a linear history of continuous development, a history of 
the progressive manifestation or emergence into consciousness 
of a Reason which is completely present in its origins, and 
which history simply reveals. "We know that this type of 
history and rationality is merely the effect of the retro-
spective illusion of a given historical result which writes 
its history in the 'future anterior', and which therefore 
thinks its origin as the anticipation of its end" (Althusser 
and Balibar, 970: 44). Against this view, Althusser posits a 
history of knowledge as ''punctured by radical discontinuities 
(e.g. when a new science detaches itself from the background of 
earlier ideological formulations), profound reorganizations 
which ... inaugurate with their rupture the reign of a new 
logic, which, far from being a mere development, the 'truth' 
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or 'inversion' of the old one, literally takes its place" 
(Ibid.) . 
It is clear that Castells' use of the Hegelian notion 
of supersession carries with it the very philosophical 
assumptions that Althusser had set out to uproot from 
99 
Marxism. Once again, Castells is unable to achieve theoretical 
consistency, and has merely juxtaposed theoretical concepts 
which are mutually exclusive. 
For Fraser, Althusser's notion of the epistemological 
break requires an apology for the inadequacies of _Marx's 
major work: "Questions of the purpose of Marx's various 
modes of 'flirtation' with Hegelian formulations are concealed 
by the Master's (Althusser's) irony. Thus Marx made the 
decisive break with Hegel - but failed to map the new con-
tinent he discovere~' (Fraser, 1976: 447). Kolakowski 
dismisses as absurd Althusser's assertion that after 1845 Marx 
no longer analyzed society in the old 'ideological' categories 
of 'alienation', 'negation', 'generic human nature' etc.: 
"Indeed, the whole theory of man who objectifies but also 
alienates himself in products that afterwards govern over 
him as foreign powers, is repeated in the Grundrisse alongside 
the idea of the future return to man's generic nature and 
free universality" (Kolakowski, 1971: 117). Bottomore 
contends, against the epistemological break, that it is more 
plausible to say that Marx initially made a general delination 
of his theory, and then started a more specific study of 
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capitalist society in terms of an overall process of social 
development (Bottomore and Nisbet, 1978: 112). Althusser's 
comparison of the young Marx to the Marx, his statement that 
a certain moment the young Marx became Marx, and his question 
as to whether the young Marx was already and wholly Marx; 
are, for Kolakowski, indicative of religious thinking, and 
entail the assumption that some texts must, a priori, be 
the fountainhead of truth. That Marx during his life changed 
in some respects is exactly what happens to everybody: to 
say that his writings changed from ideological to scientific 
is not very useful because Althusser neglects to give an 
an adequate definition of ideology or science (Kolakowski, 
1971: 121). 
Geras takes up this point, arguing that the character 
of Althusser's pronouncements on the epistemological break 
are "purely programmatic ... the conditions and mechanisms 
of its occurrence are 'taken for a fact', not analyzed, though 
such an analysis is declared to be an indispensable project" 
(Geras, 1972a: 83). 
It has been alleged that the epistemological break is 
possibly too complete: "This way of theorizing the.founding 
of a science ... makes any conception of continuity through 
scientific revolutions impossible. It becomes entirely 
problematic in what sense any theoretical ideology, or 
combination of them, can be regarded as the pre-history of 
any particular science" (M. Glucksmann, 1974b: 185). As 
the epistemological break implies a change in problematics and 
theoretical objects, there is no way in which it would be 
possible for ideology to constitute the pre-history of 
1 0 1 
science, or to play a part in the development of science. It is 
impossible for a scientific problematic to supplant an ideolo-
gical problematic. as the latter involves a new object, rather 
than improved knowledge of the same object (Ibid.)~ Further-
more, Althusser's epistemological break is not confined to the 
establishment of a ne~ science, but results in the expulsion 
of scientific practice from the social formation: "Science, 
alone of all the practices of a social formation, is exempt 
from determination-in-the-last-instance by economic practice. 
This notion of what amounts to the absolute autonomy of 
science seems to justify the claim that Althusser's theory 
of scientific knowledge is in certain respects idealist'' 
(Benton, 1977: 184). 
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THEORY 
The Proble~atic 
The concept of the problematic was developed by Althusser 
to distinguish Marx's mature work from his earlier writings 
by positing a change in problematics; as well as to differen-
tiate Marx's work from other theories. Althusser regarded 
Marx's mature work as being scientific, and the concept of 
the problematic was designed to confer this status upon it; 
while simultaneously grouping the young Marx's humanism and 
related theories (particularly empiricism) in the category 
of ideology. 
The problematic is one of the most important elements 
in the entire Althusserian system, for upon it is founded 
the characterization of knowledge as a practice, the re-
lated notions of symptomatic reading and vision, the rela-
tionship between subject and object, the internal structure of 
particular sciences, the epistemological break, as well 
as the norms of scientific ¥alidity .. For Althusser, the pro-
blematic is the 'buried but active' framework which arranges 
and connects the fundamental concepts of a discourse. It 
describes the unity- of the concepts of a theoretical system: 
every theory is based on a problematic which defines its 
boundaries and potential. The concepts of a theory are 
interdependant in that each concept has to be defined in 
terms of the other concepts of the theory: to disengage a 
concept from its theoretical discourse inevitably involves 
a transformation in its meaning. 
As the conceptual ·framework of a theory, the problematic 
determines which questions are to be posed, the Eorm these 
questions must take, as well as defining internal limits on 
what is examined, by excluding objects and phenomeiia which 
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do not have necessary links with its field (Althusser and 
Balibar, 1970: 24-5) ~ 
The concept of the problematic is inextricably linked 
to that of the epistemological break, which separates 
ideology from science. The development of scientific 
knowledge is not merely a question of the detection or 
disclosure of new evidence, or of conceptual advancements: 
the transition from ideology to science takes place in terms 
of a major epistemological 'rupture' or 'transformation' -
namely, a change in problematics.· 
Althusser's concept of the problematic has been referred 
to as "the centre-piece of an anti-empiricist study of 
discourses (Therborn, 1976: 59)~ By desc~ibing the 
problematic (the process in the production of knowiedge 
. in which raw material is transformed into p'roduct). as taking 
place entirely within thought, Althusser is distinguishing 
what he believes to be the proper scientific approach ~rom 
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the empiricist 'ideology' which conflates an object outside 
knowledge (the real object) with an object that is constituted 
or represented in knowledge in the form of determinate 
tools' can be traced back to Althusser's portrayal of the 
problematic as the 'means of production' of knowledge, a 
process that entails the means of theoretical production 
acting on the raw materials of theory in order to produce a 
theoretical product. This depiction of the problematic was 
intended by Althusser to overcome the empiricist idea that 
it is the individual who acts upon the raw material of 
empirical data in the production of theory. This role 
of the problematic can be seen in Castells' writing. He 
claims to be working "in the direction of a reformulation of 
the ideological problematic" (Ibid.: 4), and says that a 
properly theoretical work is one bearing on the production of 
tools of knowledge, and not on the production of knowledge 
relative to concrete situations" (Ibid.: S). In these anti-
empiricist versions of the role of the problematic, Castells 
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is completely consistent with the Althusserian texts. It is 
thus surprising to note that in his study of Dunkerque, he 
states that proof is specific to each concrete analysis. Here, 
the role of the problematic as the 'means of production' of 
scientific thought, is being replaced by the empiricist notion 
that scientificity is to be established by referring to 
concrete reality. In spite of his earlier declaration that 
every study "must start from a clearly defined theoretical 
framework" (Idem, 1976a: 52), Castells claims that he has 
chosen ideological analyses as his starting_ point, rather 
than "aiming at the coherence and correctness of the text 
itself", or "setting out from theory" (Idem, 19771: 5). 
Althusser's conception of the problematic as a 'buried 
but active framework' which relates to each other the basic 
concepts of theoretical discourse, is nowhere to be found 
in Castells' statement that "theoretical tools are not 
validated- by their coherenc.e, but by their fruitfulness 
in the analysis of concrete situations'' (Ibid.}. Castells' 
epistemological confusion is perhaps nowhere more evident 
than in his claim that his project aims, on the one hand, at 
deducing theoretical tools (the problematic) from concrete 
situations, and on the other hand, reversing this approach 
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and setting out from theoretical tools to know situations (Ibid.) 
In terms of the conceptual system Castells has chosen, these 
two aims are entirely incompatible. It is interesting to 
note that he is here suggesting that the observation of 
concrete situations can be the source of the problematic, a 
point he repeats elsewhere: "There is production of knowledge, 
in the strict sense of the term, only in connection with the 
analysis of a concrete situation'' (Ibid.: 2-3). 
A contradiction becomes immediately apparent when one 
compares this quote with his statement that 'proper' theory 
is not produced with reference to concrete reality (Ibid. 5). 
While this contradiction has to be rejected on logical grounds, 
it evinces Castells' inability to choose between empiricism and 
the anti-empiricist stance of Althusser, By maintaining that 
reality is the object of theory, Castells is assuming the 
one-to-one correspondence between theory and reality that 
for Althusser epitomizes empiricism: "This investment of 
knowledge, conceived as a real part of the real object, in 
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the real structure of the real object, is what constitutes the 
specific problematic of the empiricist conception of know-
ledge" (Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 38). 
The Posing of Problems 
Castells' inability to decide between the Althusserian 
and empiricist modes of analysis has resulted in a. fluctuation 
of his opinion concerning the problematic's role in the 
posing of problems. Fqr Althusser, a theory may be identified 
by its structure, in the way that its problems are posed; and 
the problematic is the system of questions which determines the 
answers. "This introduces us to a fact peculiar to the very 
existence of a science: it can only pose problems on the terrain 
and within the horizon of a definite theoretical structure, its 
problematic, which constitutes its absolute determination of the 
forms in which all problems must be posed, at any given moment 
in the science" (Ibid.: 25). 
The structure of a theory, or the way in which it poses 
its problems, provides the means tb identify it as a science 
or an ideology. In empiricism, question~ are asked purely to 
give rise to the predetermined answers it has to provide. Thus, 
the questions are not genuine, they are simply the ones that 
had to be asked in order for the ideological solutions to be 
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the answers: solutions which are previously imposed by the 
practical, religious, ethical and political considerations of 
ideology. 
Entirely consistent with the Althusserian conception of 
the problematic is Castells' statement that his theoretical 
work sets out to enable "a reformulation of the questions 
posed in a perspective that should help us to create the 
conditions for their scientific treatment~' (Castells, 1977a: S). 
Similarly, Althusser's account of the empiricist 'ideological' 
method of posing questions can be discerned in Castells' remark 
that the unmasking of an ideology ''requires the development 
of each of the questions that are fused, and confused, in this 
problematic" (Ibid.: 43). 
So far so good. Yet in spite of all these statements which 
concur with the Althusserian stance on the problematic's role 
in the posing of problems, there are as many which contradict 
the spirit and letter of this characterization. Although 
Castells has condemned the fact that social concerns underlie 
the way in which ideology asks its questions, he justifies this 
approach for himself, declaring that the type of questions he 
wishes to ask emerged from and were governed by social 
practice (Ibid.: 6), and that the d~velopment of theory must 
be linked to the historical recognition·of th~_ new problems 
posed by everyday experie.nce (Ibid.: 3). 
Referring back to Althusser's criticism that empiricism's 
questions are not authentic, because they are questions that 
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were determined and prejudged by their answers; it can be seen 
that by allowing social practice, or everyday experience, 
autonomy over the posing of problems, Castells is stripping 
this function from the problematic, and undermining the episte-
mological status of theory that the concept of the problematic 
was intended to establish. As far as Althusser is concerned, 
social practice plays no part whatsoever in the development 
of theory: "We are told: practice is the touch-stone, the prac-
tice of scientific experiment! Economic, political, technical 
practice, concrete practice! Or else, to convince us of the 
'Marxist' character of the answer: social practice! ..• this 
type of pr~gmatist answer leaves us hungry as far as our 
theoretical question is concerned ... These concepts, which have 
even flourished in the works of Marxist specialists, are 
tailor-made for the ideological functions expected of them" 
(Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 57-61). Ironically, Castells has 
taken up this point himself, condemning urban sociology as 
ideological fqr defining its problems in terms of "practico-
social" interests (Castells, 1976b: 60, 62, 64-6). 
If Castells had followed his own repeated injunctions to 
make a theoretical analysis of ideological questions and to 
make the distinction between perception and theoretical con-
cepts, he never would have proposed that the first epistemological 
task consists of identifying the pro~lems experienced by people 
in their everyday practice, and only then bringing in theory 
to treat these problems with an adequate set of theoretical 
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tools (Idem, 1977a, viii). His confusion can also be seen 
in his seemingly innocuous statement that the work of scien-
tific research occurs between the questions and the answers 
(Ibid.). Anyone who employs the concept of the problematic 
should be aware that science is not merely the sandwich-
filling between pre-given questions and resultant answers; 
for the most fundamental aspect of the Althusserian system is 
that a science's status depends on the way its problematic 
sets up those very questions. If the questions dealt with 
by science were to be ideologically defined, there would be 
no way in which the work of scientific research could achieve 
the position of relative autonomy that distinguished it 
from ideology. 
Vision 
An integral component of the problematic is a theory of 
vision. For Althusser, the idea of theoretical sight and 
oversight are part of a conception of knowledge in which 
weaknesses in the system of concepts that constitute knowledge 
are attributed to a weakness of vision, thereby reducing 
knowledge itself to a simple relation of vision (Althusser 
and Balibar, 1970~ 19). The nature of the object of vision is 
reduced to the condition of a given, with knowledge being the 
vision of a given object or the reading of an established 
text. In the Althusserian system, however, sighting is not 
the act of the individual subject endowed with the faculty 
of vision: the structural condition of sighting is the relation 
b~tween the field of the problematic and its objects and 
problems. As the problematic is the determinant element 
in the process of knowledge production, the human subject 
ceases to be the subject of the proces~. 
Between sightings and oversights is an invisible under-
lying connection between the field of the visible and the 
field of the invisible. Particular problems have to be 
invisible because they are forbidden by the theory: they are 
necessarily without any necessary relation to the field of 
the visible as set out by the terms of the problematic. The 
invi~ible is not external to the visible: the limits of 
the problematic are internal; in Althusser's words, "it 
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carries its outside inside it"(Ibid.: 27). It is the proble-
matic that defines and structures the invisible as the defined 
excluded: excluded from the field of visibility by the peculiar 
structure of the field of the problematic. "The invisible is 
the theoretical problematic's non-vision of its non-objects, 
the invisible is the darkness, the blinded eye of the theo-
retical problematic's self-reflection when it scans its non-
objects, its non-problems without seeing them, in order not to 
look at them" (Ibid.: 26). 
This is quite unlike the empiricist epistemology, in which 
knowledge is believed to be immediately present in the phe-
nomena we observe, if we separate the essence from the phe-
noma by a process of abstraction. To know consists of the 
subject abstracting the essence from the real object. "The 
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empiricist conception may be thought of as a variant of the 
conception of vision, with the mere difference that transparency 
is not given from the beginning, but is separated from itself 
by the veil, the dross of impurities, of the inessential 
which steals the essence from us, and which abstraction, by 
its techniques of separation and scouring, sets aside, in 
order to give us the real presence of the pure naked essence, 
knowledge of which is then merely sight" (Ibid.: 37). 
With reference to the problematic's relation to vision, 
Castells comes down yet again on the empiricist side of the 
fence. This is evident in his statement that he aims at 
deducing theoretical tools of observation from concrete 
situations (situations that I have observed myself)" (Castells, 
1977a: 5), and desires to show "the contradictions between the 
observations at one's disposal and the ideological discourses 
that were juxtaposed with them" (Castells, 1970a:5). Caste,lls is 
thus placing himself in the role of the 'subject' possessing 
the faculty of vision, and thus capable of a direct examination 
of reality. This is an unexpected position for him to take, 
given his characterization as an "epistemological obstacle" the 
"imaginary relation" of the scientist to his or her own 
practice. Here, the idea that it is the individual scientist 
(rather than the problematic) that has a direct relation to 
his or her own discipline, is said to constitute an "intellectual 
resistance" which hinders or_ perverts the production of· scien-
tific knowledge fidem, 1976d: 115). Furthermore, in his 
critique of empiricism, Castells denounces as idealist the 
assumption that knowledge takes place between subject and 
object (Ibid.: 121), and rejects the assumption that truth 
has a prior existence in the order of reality. 
Thus, in the treatment of the problematic's role in 
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'vision' and 'non-vision', not only is Castells theoretically 
incompatible with Althusser (for whom individual observation is 
necessarily ideological), but he is also revealing a fundamental 
and unresolved tension in his own work between empiricism and 
structuralism. 
The Autonomy of Theory 
Pointing out that Marx·, in his later writings, did not 
include science in the superstructure, Althusser attempts to 
establish the autonomy of theory from the other practices in 
order for it to be distinguished from ideology, which is 
contaminated with the interests of particular classes. Theo-
retical practice is thus characterized as being separate 
from and irreducible to the superstructural instances of the 
social formation, where its status would be reduced to that 
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of an organic ideology. Althusser has rejected as empiricist 
th.e assertion that science is a su.perstructural practice, for 
this implies that the scientificity of a theory depends on 
its relation to reality. · This would confine theory to the 
confirmation of assumptions determined by external social 
criteria. 
For Althusser, in order for sciences to achieve autonomy, 
the process of the production of knowledge about the real would 
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have to take place completely in thought. To this end, 
Althusser employs the operation of theory as a practice, 
whereby knowledge is 'produced' in the same way as other 
products. Here he is not defining science as a practice in 
simply a descriptive sense, for its homology with the other 
practices is the very means with which to distinguish it 
from them. Like every type of production, theory is an 
autonomous and articulat~d practice, having its own particular 
raw material, labour and product. The raw material of 
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theoretical practice is not reality itself, and the labour 
in the process of production occurs only within thought. 
' Furthermore, the theoretical product is distinguished from the 
products of other practices in that there is never an identity 
of essence between raw material and product, for a complete 
transformation has been effected. Althusser stresses that 
while the raw material of a science may include ideology, the 
process of knowledge production allows an autonomous science 
to develop, with its own form of temporality which separates 
it from the history of ·the ideological, politico-legal and 
economic practices. Scientificity can no longer be determined 
through the use of external guarantees, for this criterion 
would be derived from practices external to the science in 
question, and would be based on a fundamental complicity 
between theory and reality. Knowledge would be seen as a 
direct relation between real and thought objects, between 
subject and object. This of course simply will not do for 
Althusser, for whom theory has to be· open to· development in 
order to attain what he refers to as a genuine cognitive 
appropriation of the real rather than a mystical reflection 
of conditions anterior to theory as do the ideologies that 
masquerade as science (Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 59). 
The question arises that if knowledge takes place entirely 
in thought, without reference to reality, how does it appro-
priate the real world? Althusser maintains that the episte-
mological task is to identify and explain the mechanisms by 
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means of which the object of knowledge cognitively appropriates 
the real concrete. He disputes that this is another form of 
the 'problem of knowledge' for it does not involve a relation--
ship between subject and object: there is no direct corres-
pondence between theory and reality, because these orders are 
not comparable. Neither is it a question of establishing the 
conditions necess~ry from the emergence 0£ specific knowledges, 
for this approach takes knowledges as already-given products, 
while Althusser is attempting to find out what is particular to 
knowledges as knowledges. For Althusser, science is not a 
process of comparing theory to the real, but has to do with the 
mechanism whereby a discourse functions as knowledge and not 
as something else. The problem of the appropriation of the 
real object by the object of knowledge represents, in fact, a 
particular case of appropriation of the real work by the 
different practices, each of which poses the problem of its 
specific 'effect'. For example, Marx studied the mechanism 
which makes the result of history's production exist as a 
society with the property of producing the 'society effect', 
which makes this result exist as a society and not as something 
else (Ibid.: 65-7). Every mode of ~ppropriation (theoretical, 
aesthetic, religious, technical, etc.) poses the problem 
of its specific 'effect', each of which is produced by a 
specific mechanism. The production of knowledge is the effect 
of the conditions of scientific production on theoretical 
objects, i.e. on systems of concepts. The mechanism of the 
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production of the knowledge effect is located in the mechanism 
which underlies the action of the forms of order in the 
scientific discourse of the proof: "The criterion of the 
'truth' of the knowledges produced by Marx's theoretical 
practice is provided by his theoretical practice itself, 
i.e. by the proof-value, by the scientific status of the 
forms which ensured the production of those knowledges" 
(Ibid.: 59). These forms are revealed as the forms bf the 
order of appearance of concepts in sci~ntific discourse, as 
a function of other forms which, without themselves being 
forms of order, are nonetheless the absent principle of the 
latter (Ibid.: 67). 
While the scientific k~owledge effect is generated by a 
problematic which is not present in the theoretical discourse 
itself but governs the order of exposition of its concepts; 
the ideological knowledge effect, as exemplified by pragmatism, 
is defined in terms of the social functions expressed within 
it. 
Althusser's explanation of the mechanism of the knowledge 
effect manifests his desire to establish the autonomy of theory: 
the ideological knowledge effect depends on the social functions 
which are dominant in it; while the mechanism of the scientific 
knowledge effect is explained by the inwardness of the 'cri-
terion of practice' to scientific practice. Furthermore, the 
forms that give knowledge its character as true knowledge are 
separate from the forms in which the knowledge was produced. 
Here Althusser is referring to the 'contemporary knowledge 
effect'; the study of society without reference to its 
genesis. This is clearly an attack on empiricist history, 
which studies the forms in which society was produced. 
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The question of how knowledge appropriates the real world 
is not to be confused with the 'problem of knowledge', which 
sees the relation between the object of knowledge and the 
.real object as a problematical one, and regards knowledge 
itself as a problem. Althusser claims that this is a false 
question generated by a false answer; whereas what is re-
quired is a problematic which will produce the real problem. 
The'effect produced by knowledge is no problem the re~l 
problem is understanding the nature of the mechanism which 
produces it. The classical problem of knowledge, however, 
depends on external, a priori guarantees, or on a philoso-
phical consciousness. It presupposes that the objects whose 
theoretical history it tells are really knowledges~ "It 
treats the knowledge as a fact whose transformations and 
variations it studies as so many effects of the structure of 
the theoretical practice which produces them, as so many 
products which happen to be knowledge - without ever reflec-
ting the fact that these products are not just any products 
but.precisely knowledges. A theory of the history of 
the production of knowledge therefore does not take into 
account what I propose to call the 'knowledge effect', which 
is the peculiarity of those special products which are 
knowledges." (Ibid.: 61-2). 
Althusser's notions of the autonomy of theory and the 
mechanism of the knowledge effect pave the way for his coup 
1 1 9 
de grice: dialectical materialism. His portrayal of the 
interrelationship between dialectical materialism and historical 
materialism is extremely complex. The latter, it is held, has 
the other practices of the social formation as its object 
(or raw material), thus these practices are subsumed by 
historical materialism, and the theory of these levels is 
accommodated within the social formation. "But the theory 
of dialectical materialism or science has a different status 
and is regarded as distinct from the social formation ... in 
this way a distinction is made between the four practices: three 
of them exist within the social formation, while the fourth 
(theoretical practice) is independent of it" (M. Glucksmann, 
1974b: 121). 
As the theory of theoretical activity, dialectical materia-
lism is a metatheory explaining theory or science. It is the 
theory of theory, and stands above it. Althusser distinguishes 
between historical materialism (the science of history); and 
dialectical matetialism, which is an epistemology of the 
doctrines of science, the theory of practice in general, 
and as such has an existence independent of individual 
sciences. 
Althusser attributes particularly grandiose powers to dia-
lectical materialism: as the theory of practice in general, it 
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is responsible for transforming the "concrete activity of men" 
into "scientific truths". (Althusser, 1969: 168). It is 
essential for the proper development of historical materialism 
in that it identifies the latter's weak points, poses its 
problems, gives it valid concepts, and prevents it from being 
invaded by ideology (Geras, 1972a: 59-60). For Althusser, 
dialectical materialism establishes principles of method 
pertinent to all sciences and practices: through it is 
expressed "the essence of practice in general, and through it 
the essence of the transformations, of the 'development' of 
things in general" (Althusser, 1969: 168). 
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Taking into account Castells' explicit adherence to the 
Althusserian protrayal of theoretical practice (Castells 
and de Ipola, 1976d: 113-4), one would anticipate the con-
comitant assertion that theory does not require the validation 
of social history, for this would constitute an external 
guarantee, a "mystical reflection of conditions anterior 
to theory" (Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 59). Althusser's 
model of the production of theory has as its fundamental 
principle the absolute exclusion of any socio-political 
components in the theoretical raw material, labour or product. 
Castells concurs: "we have dismissed as irrelevant those 
criteria which are exterior to scientific practice and which 
seek to describe its content" (Castells and de Ipola, 1976d: 
138). He defines idealism as the belief that there is such 
a thing as an ahistorical truth which has a prior existence 
in the order of reality (Ihid.: 121); while ideology is 
characterized by the claim that there are no scientific 
laws, only explanations which are always contingent, and 
by the criterion of truth as a reference to ~ocial practice 
conceived as a free and deliberate action performed by 
human beings (Ibid.: 132). He further emphasizes that 
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the "epistemological distinction between everyday perception 
and theoretical concepts is more necessary than ever'' (Idem, 
1977a: 439). 
Castells sums up his position on guarantees, maintaining 
that "There are no methodologically justified general norms 
which guarantee scie~tificity ... Those criteria which are 
exterior to the scientific practice have been dismissed" 
(Idem, 1976d: 138). He also contends that, in opposition to 
the theses proposed by empiricism, theory is a means of 
production of scientific facts, thus there is no possibility 
of "subordinating it to the evidence without destroying the 
various stages and the elementary principles of scientific 
facts" (Idem, 197.?a: 432). This denial that there are general 
exterior criteria of scientificity is entirely in consonance 
with Althusser's insistence that knowledge has no extra-
scientific guarantees, no general epistemological protocols 
and no supra-scientific forms of proof external to the parti-
cular science. 
Similarly, Castells complies with the Althusserian notion 
that each of the practices possess their own specific effects: 
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any situation, he says, "is made up of systems of practices, 
defined by their position in the structure, but whose secon-
dary effects express a relative autonomy, capable of redefining 
the situation beyond their structural charge" (Ibid.). 
Althusser's description of the role of dialectical materia-
lism is accepted by Castells, who defines its function as 
the ••exercising of vigilance in the operations of scientifi-
. city - the aim of this vigilance being to render ineffective 
the epistemological obstacles which hinder the production of 
knowledge'' (Castells and de Ipola, 1976d: 113). In this 
sentence alone, Castells implicitly subscribes to the separa-
tion between dialectical and historical materialism, acknow-
ledging the farmer's privileged epistemological position in 
the determination of the difference between science and 
ideology; and recognizes the process of knowledge as a process 
of production - all definitive traits of Althusserian philo-
sophy. 
As in many other areas, however, Castells no sooner 
swears fealty to Althusser, than he changes sides. He 
repeatedly undermines the conception of theory as an autono-
mous practice outside of the social formation by stating that 
"All intellectual work is highly dependent, whether one 
wishes or not, on the social context in which it is produced" 
(Ibid.) .. Research, he says, cannot proceed in the abstract 
(Castells, 1977a: vii), for progress in theoretical practice 
depends in the last resort on social conditions (Ibid.: 8)·. 
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He denies the role of dialectical mat~rialism in the 
posing of historical materialism's problems, which, he asserts, 
are defined by social and political practice (Ibid.: 2), after 
having castigated Wright Mills for arguing that scientific 
practice should hinge upon "the history of political facts 
and the important problems of the modern world'' (Castells and 
de I~ola, 1976di 135). 
In these and many other instances, Castells evinces his 
inability to accept Althusser's conception of theory as 
autonomous from the concrete reality of the other practices 
of the social ·formation. Indeed; Saunders comments that 
Castells' notion of reality "has no reference in Althusser's 
philosophy of scientific practice. Indeed, despite his 
protestations to the contrary, it is apparent that the whole 
thrust of Castells' critique ... is premised upon an episte-
mology that Althusser himself rejects'' (Saunders, 1981a: 
172). Ironically, it is Castells himself who inadvertently 
' 
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describes the central theme of his predicament: 11 qne must 
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choose between, on the one hand, the idea of a 'G~eat Theory' 
(even a Marxist one) ... and, on the oiher hand, ih~ proposi-
tion of a theoretical work that produces concepts :and their 
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historical relations within a process of discovery of the laws 
of society" (Castells, 1977a: 438). 
His frequent shifts between contradictory epistemologies 
show that Castells has been unwilling to make this choice; and 
he seems to be unaware of the fact that irt this respect his 
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between those concepts (Hindess, 1977a: 206). 
While Althusser analyses sciences in terms of their 
concepts and the relations between them, empiricist formula~ 
tions, he says, are to be taken at face value and read as an 
index of the ideological nature of the process of production 
of the discourse. It is evident that this difference in the 
mode of treatment of theoretical discourses can be upheld 
only if the difference between science and theoretical ideology 
is known from the outset (Ibid.: 207) . This variation in 
analytical treatment, as well as the requirement of an a 
priori separation between science and ideology, puts Althusser 
in the indefensible situation in which predetermined conclu-
sions determine the treatment of theoretical discou~ses. 
Althusser's characterization of the scientific problematic 
~urther fails to distinguish Marxist science from other social 
sciences. Althusser has had to refer to substantive evidence 
when trying to show what it is about Marxism that vindicate~ 
its right to scientific status. On entirely methodological 
grounds, this prevents him from contesting those social 
scientific theories, that are not narrowly empiricist (Keat 
and Urry, 1975: 134). 
Another objection to the problematic concerns its 
relationship to its raw material. If the raw material is 
ideological, it is difficult to comprehend how the problematic 
can evaluate its ideological impurities: the raw materials are 
merely taken as established; and no measure of internal 
treatment by the problematic "can make silk purses out of 
these sows' ears" (Thompson, 1978: 36). 
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While Althusser identifies sci~ntific practice as being 
specific and irreducible, he has also attributed these 
qualities to the other practices, so this does not explain why 
the theory of theoretical practice is located outside of the 
social formation: "obviously it is impossible to determine 
the limits and effectivity of one practice on others inde-
pendent of the investigation of particular social formations, 
since there is no predetermined relationship between them 
except determinance by the economy in the last instance" 
(M. Glucksmann, 1974b: 122). 
In its role as "the theory of practice in general", dialec-
tical materialism has an existence independent of particular 
sciences and practices. This depiction is 'substantiated' by 
a reference to the operation of the mathematical and physical 
sciences: "No mathematician in the world waits until physics 
has verified a theorem to declare it proved, although whole 
areas of mathematics are applied in physics: the truth of 
his theorem is a hundred per cent provided by criteria 
purely internal to the practice of mathematical proof'' (Althu-
sser and Bailibar: 1970: 59). 
Althusser has replaced the Marxist system which uncovers 
in nature the same dialectical laws that occur in society, with 
an alternative in which the theory of n~ture -and the theory df 
society are combined only in terms of epistemology: "There 
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are no longer two theories that find the same laws in 'reality' 
but a single theoretical activity subject to laws of its 
own whose generality can be traced in every domain" (A. Glucks-
man, 1977: 71). 
Quite apart from the fact that it is, by his own admission, 
unreasonable to equate sciences with different objects; by 
stating that the scientific problematic is able to produce 
its own facts by self-validating protocols without reference 
to external verification, Althusser is describing a process 
which incorrectly employs mathematical and logical protoco1s 
of proof. Even if Marxism's scientificity could be be estab~;· 
lished once and for all, this would only establish the epis-
temology of one particular science. Marxism's scientific 
status does not inevitably explain other types of theoretical 
practice: Althusser has therefore been unable to support his 
assertion that dialectical materialism is a general theory 
(A. Glucksmann, 1977: 73). His refusal to acknowledge the 
distinction between Marxism and the natural scienc~s has 
another serious implication for the status of sciences: 
"Considered independently of the other instances in the 
social formation, and of the class interests inscribed 
therein, they are all indifferently valid knowledges. Althus-
ser's silence about the difference is thus part of a deeper 
silence: an idealist silence about science's mode of depen-
dence in the social formation (Geras, 1972a: 83). 
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The concept of the knowledge effect has also come under 
fire. Althusser's desire to separate the society effect (the 
real product of the ensemble of productions) from the knowledge 
effect (the theoretical product of the ensemble of productions), 
is clearly related to his conception of production. With 
regard to the society effect it is material production which 
determines the mode of production; while the knowledge effect 
is to be understood through theoretical production, in terms 
of which the essence of all production is to be understood. 
Here, the articulation of production is responsible for both 
the order of knowledge and the order of the real: this, 
according to Glucksmann, is- a tr~nscendental correlation which 
presupposes a secret correspondence between a theory and its 
·object (A. Glucksmann, 1977: 74). Veltmeyer suggests that 
the knowledge effect is a "mere verbal solution" to the central 
problem of structuralist thought: "The 'mechanism' of the 
'knowledge effect' betrays a 'silence' on an effective pre-
supposition: an underlying correspondence or homology between 
the order of the world and the nature of thought ... the 
homology between thoug~t and reality is simply that it just 
happens to be so" (Veltmeyer, 1975: 389-90). 
By stating that the validity of a scientific proposition 
as a knowledge was ensured by the knowledge effect - the 
action of forms which establish the presence of scientificity 
in the production of knowledge, Althusser is merely pronoun-
cing that science is science when it has the form of scien-
tificity (Kolakowski, 1971: 114). For Glucksmann, the 
·problem of the knowledge effect, or what distinguishes 
science from other forms of discourse, leads Althusser to 
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ask a question that he is unable to answer, and which remains 
"'in suspense' at the level of epistemological generality 
at which it was posed" (A .. Glucksmann, 1977: 73). 
Althusser has defined ideological philosophy as the 
search for epistemological guarantees, and counters that 
science does not exist in general, as each science possesses 
its own criteria of validity. For Callinicos, Althusser's 
claim ·1 that there is no general criterion of scientifici ty, 
and that the "radical inwardness" of theoretical practice 
provides the criterion of scientific validity, does not 
provide the solution to the problem of scientificity. "The 
only difference between the analysis of the knowledge effect 
provided by the theory of theoretical prattice and the 
general criterion of scientificity that Althusser argues we 
must reject as ideological is that in the case of the former 
we are offered the promise, if not the reality, of a causal 
analysis of the foundations of science. But in essence the 
theory of theoretical practice is a theory of the difference 
between science and ideology. Since it is responsible for 
establishing scientificity as such, the theory must involve 
a general criterion of scientificity'' (Callinicos, 1976: 76). 
It is thus alleged that Althusser has been unable to avoid 
the problematic of "bourgeois" epistemology by employing the 
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distinction between science and ideology, between truth and 
falsehood. 
It is not only on epistemological grounds that Althusser's 
concept of theory has been challenged. The most significant 
argument against this schema is that, by placing theoretical 
practice outside of the social formation, Althusser has 
severed Marxist philosophy from its social context (McLennan, 
Molina and Peter, 1981: 98), and has ther~by rendered the 
working class unable to participate in the development of theory. 
The repercussions of this stance are evidently pivotal for 
Marxism, and the implications of Althusser's position in this 
regard will be elaborated in the chapter ''Ideology, Social 
Classes and the Role of the Individual''. 
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HISTORICIST HUMANISM 
Historicist humanism was essentially a reaction against 
the Marxism of the Second International, which was pervaded 
by mechanicism and economism. It was thought that socialism 
would inevitably replace capitalism, and this 'natural 
necessity' culminated in fatalism and passivity. In 1914, 
however, Marxists were obliged to align themselves either with 
their own capitalist states or with the international worker's 
movement. ''It was clear that the mechanistic treatment of 
Marxism by Kautsky and others had served to transform it into 
a rhetorical mask for their reformist practice in the face of 
capitalism's greatest crises. It was therefore necessary to 
think the political crisis in philosophy and to effect the 
necessary reinterpretation of Marxism which could both capture 
its critical and scientific character and account for the 
role which ideological and political factors play in deter-
mining whether a crisis can become a revolution" (Callinicos, 
1976: 16). 
The rejection of the tenets of the Second International 
led to.a return to Hegelian philosophy, which gave rise to the 
view that a theory is only valid if it fulfills the require-
ments of a particular class at a particular time: "The sciences 
do not derive their epistemological status from the construc-
tion of theories in order to explain reality but from their 
role in the formation of the world views of particular social 
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classes" (Ibid.: 18). 
Humanism conceives of action as the result of individual 
will and consciousness. Its fundamental principle is that 
man is the centre of the universe and of knowledge. Humanism's 
primary philosophical constructs - human nature, freedom as the 
essence of man, and the harmony of man with nature - are 
pres~riptive as well as descriptive expressions, expressions 
of a will, and as such reflect an ideal as well as a real 
relation between man and nature. Being ideal, .this is also 
an imaginary relation with reality and thus, for Althusser, 
ideology (Smith, 1980: 60). As humanism tries to disclose 
human essence, it confuses the real object with the object 
of knowledge, ~alling prey to the presuppositions of empiri-
cism. Althusser rejects this philosophical anthropology, 
claiming that after the epistemological break, Marx developed 
a theoretical anti-humanism, based on his discontinuity with 
Hegel (Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 119). The suggestion that 
Marx never departed from his earlier Hegelian humanism is 
regarded by Althusser as a denial of the significance of 
Marx's subsequent development of a scientific Marxist theory. 
Hegel 
Hegel's conception of the totality is that it is an 
expressive one, in which each part expresses the others as 
well as the overall totality. It possesses a circular unity 
of equivalent components whose type of articulation is 
determined by their interiorization in the Idea, while 
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social realities are phenomena or exteriorizations of the 
Idea. In this conception of the social whole, there is a 
contradiction between essence and phenomena; unlike the 
Marxist totality, which is a complex unity of separate levels 
which are relatively autonomous of each other. 
In Hegels' view of history, each era has elements which 
are unified in a totality. History proceeds inexorably 
towards an inevitable conclusion: the rising of the Absolute 
to self-consciousness (Hegel, 1956: 82). This is quite 
different from the Marxist iiew of history, which is not the 
expression of a spiritual essence, but a process whose 
development results from the distinct levels composing it: 
"it is only on the basis of the irreducible distinctness of 
the parts of the whole that relations of determination, causal 
relations, rather than intimations of the Absolute, can be 
established" (Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 41). 
Hegel regarded the world as a totality based upon an 
identification bf the known object and the knowing subject. 
For him the world was a secondary symptom, a mere side effect 
of the Absolute Idea, which was realized in the dialectical 
process in which th~ Notion appeared' in thought, became 
alienated from itself in the static world of nature, and 
finally became conscious of itself in human history. The 
identification of subject and object occurs when the philo-
sopher becomes aware that the world issues from the Idea, 
and this could only happen once history is completed. In 
the Hegelian formulation of the privileged present, con-
sciousness and science meet, enabling the totality to be 
discerned in an essential section: "we have, in traversing 
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the past ... only to do with what is present; for philosophy, 
as occupying itself with the True, has to do with the eter-
nally present. Nothing in the past is lost to it, for the 
Idea is ever present; Spirit is immortal; with it there is 
no past, no future, but an essential now. This necessarily 
implies that the present form of Spirit comprehends within 
it all earlier steps" (Hegel, 1956: .82). The essential 
section reflects the continuous development of the Idea, with 
the study of history involving the periodization of moments 
of the Idea. As time is homogeneous, the present is history, 
and it is possible at any time to discern the ensemble of 
components comprising the totality. If all the elements of 
the totality always coexist simultaneously, it is possible to 
make any essential section of history in which all the elements 
will be shown. This contemporaneity is part of a concept 
of unity which prevents any element from achieving a role 
dominance of over the others. 
For Hegel, speculative knowledge concerning·the Absolute 
Idea is the most exalted form of reason. If thought remains 
limited to scientific and common-sense views of phenomenal 
reality, it is prevented from knowledge of the spiritual 
reality, and is further unable to apprehend the essence which 
it is simply an appearance of true reality, and.can only be 
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understood through a knowledge of that of which they are 
the 'appearances'. "The realm of the finite perceptible, 
material world, which is the object of 'understanding' 
with its categories, and traditional logical principles, has 
no true independent being" (Benton, 1977: 143). The world 
is fundamentally contradictory: its essence, its reality, is 
located outside it, in its negation. Only by replacing the 
idea of the non-contradiction by the dialectical principle of 
the unity of contradictions in some higher totality, can the 
restricted nature of scientific thought be overcome. 
Hegel regarded dialectical logic and the depiction of 
the Absolute Idea as the result of the historical growth of 
religion and philosophy. Dialectical logic is a historical 
process in which the Absolute Idea achieves self-knowledge, 
recognizing the final spiritual unity of things as 'elements' 
of itself: "it may be said of Universal History, that it is 
the exhibition of Spirit in the process of working out the 
.. 
knowledge of that .which it is potentially. And as the germ 
bears in itself the whole nature of the tree, and the taste 
and form of its fruits, so do the first traces of Spirit 
virtually contain the whole of that Histort' (Hegel, 1956: 
18). Any developmental process, including the historical 
process, takes place according to a succession of stages: 
"The principles of the successive phases of Spirit that ani-
mate the Nations in a necessitated gradation, are themselves 
only steps in the development of the one Universal Spirit, 
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which through them elevates and completes itself to a self-
comprehending totality" (Ibid. : 8 2) . 
Althusser's Opposition to Hegelian Marxism 
Against Hegel, Althusser insists that the concept of 
history can be given content only by defini~g historical time 
as a specific form of existence of a social totality with 
structural levels of diffeient temporalities in relations of 
correspondence and non-correspondence. Different levels 
of the totality are thus considered to have their own time-
scales related to their relative autonomy, and may be related 
to each other in different ways at different moments. The 
relationship between one social formation and the one that 
follows it is to be understood in terms of displacement rather 
than the gradual unfolding of an innate developmental 
potential (Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 106, 132). 
Each element has its own history and time scale, and the 
resultant structure must be viewed as a more or less conjunc-
I 
tural unity of different and separate histories. There is no 
general time base or general conception of time which can 
comprehend this structural history. Marx's structuralist 
theory of history is based on a new conception of the social 
totality, which breaks with the Hegelian conception of the 
totality in its spatial and temporal expression. Whereas 
the Hegelian totality is a unity expressing a simple essence 
v 
immanent within its phenomena; Althusser's conception of 
the totality is that of a decentered structure in dominance: 
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society is a complex whole that possesses the articulated 
unity of a structure in dominance (Ibid.: 108). Since the 
Hegelian conception of historical time reflects its 
characterization of the structure of the social whole, 
totalities in the historical process are simply successive 
expressions of the successive moments of the unfolding of the 
potentialities of the Idea, in a linear time contiuum. 
Althusser replaces the ideology of simple time and simple 
hi~tory with the notion of complex differential historical 
time as a function of the complexity (overdetermination) of 
the social formation. Hegel's continuous and homogeneous 
historical time was distinguished from Marx's conception of 
historical time as a specifically determined, complex 
structural unity. 
The Hegelian Marxist approach can be exemplified by 
Lukacs (1923), who was primarily concerned with the relation 
between consciousness and reality. This in turn depended on 
the epistemological problem of· the relation between a science 
and realtiy, as well as the relation between theory and 
practice. The latter question dealt with the problem of how 
Marxists move from a scientific analysis of capitalism to a 
position of mass proletarian support. The inability of the 
Western European working class to establish a revolutionary 
perspective made it apparent that a revolutionary consciousness 
did not simply develop spontaneously, but had to be actively 
created. 
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Lukacs developed a conception of Marxism as a philosophy 
of praxis, believing that the Hegelian concepts such as 
alienation, essence, praxis and negation were central to all 
of Marx's writings. Man was seen as a self-creating being 
arising out of the dialectic between labour and the natural 
world. For Lukacs, the basic contradiction of capitalism 
is the extent to which the bourgeoisie can impose upon parti-
cular aspects of society a structure which is rational and 
therefore amenable to control, and its ability to control the 
system as a whole. Society is seen-as an aggregation of 
discrete things, bound together by the relations of the 
market rather than by any sort of conscious control. This 
reified structure both masks and reflects the real social 
relations underlying it. False consciousness was produced in 
the life practices of capitalist society, especially exchange 
relations and commodity feti~hism. "Human beings come to see 
their relations with other people and people as such, as 
.-
instruments to ends which become harder and harder to identify. 
In addition, the sources of knowledge, as well as the reasons 
and causes of activities become mystified by a veil of thing-
like 'objective forces' ... The difference between the working 
class and the bourgeoisie, in this regard, is that the latter 
benefits from this mystification and the former suffers from 
it" (Ibid., cited by Eyerman, 1981: 49-50). 
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In contrast to Althusser's notion of relative autonomy, 
in Lukacs' formulation the superstructures correspond 
exactly to the base. This direct correspondence allows for 
only one principal contradiction, that between the bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat; whereas for Althusser~ the concept of 
relative autonomy permits a variety of contradictions which 
may be unrelated to class. Theory is distinct from class 
consciousness or political practice: there is thus no 
objective thought in either individuals or classes . 
. In Lukacs' schema, Marxism is an ideology rather than a 
scientific social theory. Theory is class consciousness, for 
it develops out of the proletariat's spontaneous behaviour. 
Marxism's validity is not established by scientific protocol, 
for it arises out of a class position: "Marxism expresses 
proletarian consciousness, and proletarian consciousness 
is correct because the proletariat is the subject of history, 
and therefore in a position to grasp theoretically the 
totality of society just as it grasps it practically and trans-
forms it" (M. Glucksmann, 1974b: 131). 
Althusser finds this position untenable in that it reduces 
theoretical practice by assimilating it to the other practices, 
subsuming them all under historical practice. Theor'etical 
practice would thus be stripped of its autonomy by being 
conflated with 'real history'. This historicist collapse of 
theory into history is,~~ccording to Althusser, a 'leftist' 
notion which permits political spontaneity while class 
conflict becomes the mearis of explaining and evaluating 
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the content and history of science. Marxism could no longer 
be regarded as a science, but merely as the product of 
subjective experience. There would no longer be any distinc-
tion between historical and dialectical materialism, and no 
basis for the entirety of Marxist philosophy (Althusser and 
Balibar, 1970: 136). 
Against this, Althusser insists that the criterion of class 
cannot account for the relatively autonomous history of science. 
For Althusser, Marxist theory is produced by a distinct 
theoretical practice: concepts and categories are developed to 
produce a knowledge of the real, rather than merely to express 
it. Thus, rather than being circumscribed by a relation of 
direct expression, Marxist theory is a product of thought. 
In effect, Althusser is resisting the reduction of science 
to ideology, for this would render science unable to achieve 
objectivity. He contends that the process by means of which 
conceptions of the world are formed reflect the character 
and requirements of the particular relations of production in 
which people are placed; rather than the decisions of indivi-
duals, whose activity is defined and constrained by the fact 
that they are simply part of a combination of agents and 
objects in a structure of relations, places and functions 
(Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 41-2). 
In historicism, historical practice (praxis) is regarded 
as the general practice which subsumes all the other, including 
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theoretical practice. Science is thus deprived of its 
autonomy and is assimilated to 'real history', and therefore 
results from the political and ideological practice of the 
masses. In rejecting this formulation, Althusser employs the 
concept of structural causality, in which each practice is a 
structure determining the combination of its elements, with 
individuals being the supports of this structure (Ibid.: 
186-8). In this schema, science does not require validation 
by any particular group or historical era. 
For Althusser, there is no 'problem of the individual in 
history', for there ar~ different forms of historical exis-
tence of individuality; as the supports or agents of the 
particular mode of production, individuals are given their 
positions through the mechanisms that reproduce the social 
formation. He criticizes history and humanism for seeing 
philosophy as the product of the activity and experience of 
the masses, of politico-economic praxis, for this would mean 
that philosophers would play only a subsidiary role in a 
'commonsense' philosophy that has been established without 
them. 
Criticisms of Althusser's Position 
In Althusser's analy~is of a social formation, he dis-
tinguishes between subjective experience and objective 
knowledge, but he does not give any indication of how it is 
possible for them to be combined in political activity. 
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While political practice is separate from theoretical and 
ideological practice, it must integrate them with each other 
and with the objective contradictions. His claim that theo-
retical practice and political practice are distinct but inter-
related is valueless in the absence of an explanation of 
how they combine in political situations. This connection 
appears to be contingent upon conscious volition, and is 
thus voluntaristic in that it implies that consciousness is 
the cardinal element altering a revolutionary situation into 
a revolution proper. "Thus we return to the same problem: 
everything and al.I action ultimately seems to occur at the 
political level, both the fusion of contradictions, and of 
practices; and in the absence of a more adequate discussion 
of politics, this engenders an extreme form of voluntarism, 
since consciousness is not determined by class, and an over-
, 
emphasis on the political arena as the sole locus of activity'' 
(M. Glucksmann, 1974b: 134). This inaugurates a political 
instrumentalism in which the only efficacious struggle is 
that against the mode of production, and fails to take 
cognisance of the significance of struggles in other arenas. 
Althusser's controversial notion of levels motoring 
around in history at different speeds has been rejected by 
many who remain unconvinced of its validity, and who distrust 
its theoretical consequence. Thompson refuses to admit that 
one can posit the 'specific dependence' of levels on each 
other and then proclaim the relative independence of their 
histories. He suggests that the implication of allocating 
different times and histories to the various levels of the 
social formation is simply an ideological 'Marxist' 
legitimation for persisting with the well-known academic 
procedures of isolation which disintegrate the ability of 
historical materialism to comprehend the historical process 
(Thompson, 1979: 94). For Anderson, however, Thompson's 
critique on this issue lacks depth and subtlety, for it 
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takes as given Marx's conception of the mode of production, 
and does not see the necessity of subjecting it to analysis. 
This leads Thompson to ignore the gain of the notion of 
differential time for historians. 
Anderson takes issue with Althusser by denying that there 
is anything in the least ideological in the concept that 
time as a chronology is one homogeneous continuum; for 
historical ·t-emporali ties, however differential, are always 
controvertable. into chronological time, which remains 
. 
identical (Anderson, 1980: 75). In this sense, he concurs 
with Thompson, who states that while historians may write 
a history of the parts of the whole, the real object is still 
an undivided whole: the human past is not a collection of 
di~tinct histories, but a combined sum of human behaviour 
(Thompson, 1978: 40). 
Castells and Historicist Humanism 
Castells' opposition to the Hegelian conception of history 
as taking place through an evolutionary succession of stages 
is evident in his rejection of urbanistic theories of the 
structuring of urban space. The urban question as it has 
been formulated by these theories, he says, has confused 
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the problematic of spatial forms, that which has to do with 
the process of the reproduction of labour power, and that of 
the cultural specificity of 'modern' society (Castells, 
1977a: 124). With regard to the production of knowledge, 
these ideological urbanistic theories assign a particular form 
of the reproduction of labou~ power to the 'culture' of 
society in general, and depict the latter as caused by the 
process of increasing complexification of its territorial 
setting. In this way, the dominant culture distorts the 
character of classes by making them appear as though part 
of an almost essential evolution (Ibid.: 430). Castells 
argues that in o~der to discover the articulation of spatial 
forms in the social structure, it is necessary to "break up 
the globality of this urban society understood as a true 
culmination of history in modernity ... 'urban culture', as 
it is presented, is neither a concept nor a theory. It is 
a myth since it recounts, ideologically, the history of the 
human species'.' (Ibid.: 83, my italics). Theories of urban 
culture have tried to explain the production of social, 
spatial and cultural forms, simply on the basis of an organic 
phenomenon of growth "as if it were a question of matter 
upwards, linear movement of matter towards spirit" (Ibid.: 
84) • 
These theses on urban society avoid the examination of 
ideological forms in terms of social contradictions and 
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class division. Society is held to be a unity, developing 
organically, producing universal types. This ideology inter-
prets everyday problems by "offering an interpretation of 
them in terms of natural evolution, from which fhe~division~into 
antagonistic classes is absent" (Ibid.: 84-5). The most 
well-known version of this approach to the city is the 
Chicago School, which set out to describe urbanism as a 
particular cultural system. It held that spatial form 
produced social relations, and issumed that the p~ysical 
characteristics of human settlements were responsible for 
cultural behaviour. Urbanization was portrayed as an inevi-
table consequence of human evolution, and it was .further 
argued that urbanization would invariably result in specific 
social effects. This depiction of urban history was clearly 
~onvenient to the.dominant classes, in that it restricted 
analysis to spatial, technical and biological information, 
which deflected the focus from social realities. Furthermore, 
the 'Western' urban form was held up as the cultural proto-
type, and all other countries were assessed in terms of their 
degree of correspondence to this model (Idem, 1977b: 62-3). 
Castells regards Weber as exemplifying the historicist 
position, and describes his theories in the following way. 
For Weber, it was possible to acquire knowledge through the 
examination of historical realities rather than concepts. 
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Laws were always regarded as relative to the particular 
society. As the observer lS a part of what he or she is 
observing, he or she will be unable to achieve the objectivity 
necessary to analyze the foundation of that society. Weber 
therefore isolated a concrete his~orical phenomenon and gave 
it significance by imputing certain causes to certain effects 
within a system of historically given social relations. To 
this end, Weber employed the method of the 'ideal type', 
which is conceived of as 'concrete reality' in that it 
originates from something that exists. His analysis, accor-
ding to Castells, consists of the imputation of certain 
historical content to an observed reality by way of its 
degree of proximity to the ideal type which is used as a 
reference. 
Castells u~es Wright Mills to sum up the humanist stance, 
and analyzes the latter's attempt to study the meaning of 
historical reality for human individuals: "Our aim is to 
define that reality and those meanings: it is in relation to 
these definitions that we must formulate the problems of the 
social sciences. Such a programme_demands that we should seek 
to attain an entirely relative understanding of the social 
structures which exist and have existed in the history of 
the world (C. Wright Mills, 2959, cited by Castells and de 
Ipola, 1976d: 131). Castells dismisses Mills' suggestion 
that the course of scientific practice should be determined 
by individuals, political realities and contemporary problems. 
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This view, he says, does not enable the operation of theore-
tical practice as the transformation of raw material into 
theoretical products, and as such constitutes an epistemolo-
gical obstacle which excludes any theoretical examination of 
social phenomena. 
Against historicism, Castells argues that it has "no 
scie·ntific laws, only explanations which are always contin-
gent" (Castells and de Ipola, 1976d" 132), and rejects it 
as "empiricist" in that it attempted a direct analysis of 
concrete reality through a pi6cess of abstraction. Castells 
furiher warns that any Marxist alliances with the humanist 
trend cannot be based on ideological ambiguity; and that it 
is essential to investigate the "demarcation of humanist 
metaphysics and the consequences of such metaphysics" (Ibid.: 
136). Marxist humanism is, for Castells, unable to break 
free from the imposition of the dominant ideology; like 
historicism, it cannot accommodate the concept of the produc-
tion of knowledge through theoretical practice; and it is 
furthermore unable to establish structural and conjunctural 
laws (Ibid.) 
Castells thus takes up Althusser's anti-historicist 
humanist position by stating that "The concrete consequence 
of the historicist humanist view of scientific practice 
restricts the latter to mere descriptive chronicle and 
historical relativism. This has two effects: (1) On the 
theoretical level, it causes a constant oscillation between 
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subjectivism and scientism. (2) On the political level 
(since we have no laws of the production of conjunctural and 
structural laws), one ends up having no theoretical tools 
which are capable of orientating a transformation in histo-
rically determined social situations" (Ibid.: 138). 
Castells is not content to censure mainstream urban 
theories for these.tendencies: he is determined to expose 
and rout them even when in "'Marxist' disguise" (Ibid.: 117). 
His primary target in this regard is L~febvre, whose work 
Castells attempts to demolish with all the Althusserian 
means at his disposal. For Lefebvre, any theoretical system 
that functions to maintain the current order of social 
relations, the reproduction of the relations of production, 
is defined as ideological; Marxism is not ideological in 
that it expedites revolutionary struggles. Lefebvre is not 
trying to establish the scientificity of Marxism as a science 
that can distinguish between 'truth' and 'falsehood': all 
theory, he suggests, is a mixture of truth and error, and 
there is no sharp distinction between science and ideology, 
truth and falsity (Saunders, 1981a: 152). Lefebvre thus 
differs from Castells in that the latter has tried, albeit 
inconsistently, to formulate a conception of science that 
corresponds with the Althusserian notion of a theoretical 
practice with metatheoretical capabilities. Lefebvre, on the 
other hand, argues that Marxism is a political theory of 
socialist practice rather than a science; it is in this 
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context that Lefebvre calls himself a "utopian" and tries to 
establish a depiction of the urban that will further sub-
versive actions against capitalism. He disputes the claims 
of urban theory to be a specific objective science, and 
categorizes it as ideological in that it does not recognize 
the fundamentally political character of space, and supports 
the status quo by depoliticising the question of space and its 
use (Ibid.: 151-3). Lefebvre conceives of the historical 
process as one of dialectical sequence, in which eras 
follow each other according to the procedure of Hegelian 
supersession. In this e~olutionary process, there are two 
primary stages: the first is the subordination of agriculture 
to industry, while the second is the subordination of 
industry to urbanization. Urban revolution is regarded as 
"the ensemble of transformations undergone by contemporary 
society, in order to pass from tie_ petiod in which questions 
of growth and industrialization predominate, to the period 
in wh-ich the urban problematic will decisively triumph" 
(Lefebvre, 1970a: 88, cited by Castells, 1977a: 88). For 
Castells, this involves an idea of the urban as the axis of 
social development, and is Hegelian in that it represents the 
cultural summit of social development, and as such implies that 
history proceeds towards an inevitable conclusion (Castells, 
1977a: 88). In this view, the urban, the new era of mankind, 
promises deliverance from the constraints of earlier 
historical stages (Ibid.); thus Castells remarks that the 
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term 'urban' is not innocent, as it implies the hypothesis of 
the production of social content by a "transhistorical" form 
(Ibid.: 89). 
Castells further rejects Lefebvre's argument that space 
is constructed by social individuals: this is said to be 
a humanist historicist stance which "indicated that space, like 
the whole of society, is the ever-original work of that 
freedom of creation that is the attribute of Man, and the spon-
taneous expression of his desire. It is only by accepting 
this absolute of Lefebvrian humanism (a matter of philosophy 
or religion) that the analysis might be pursued in this 
direction: it would always be dependent on its metaphysical 
foundation" (Ibid.: 92). Castells asserts that Lefebvre 
has substituted social determination with human volition and 
the ideology of social existence. 
Castells' repudiation of thi~ approach is clearly based 
on Althusser's critique of historicist humanism. Castells' 
claim that Lefebvre should not have set out from 'men' but 
from their social and technological relations of production, 
has its origin in Althusser's statement that ''In the reduction of 
all knowledge to historical social relations a second under-
hand reduction can be introduced, by treating the relations 
of production as mere human relations" (Althusser and 
Balibar, 1970: 139). Again, following Althusser, Castells 
says that he wishes to show the realization of a structural 
law within a social process, the structural determination of 
1 51 
the relations between actors, rather than relying on social 
practice to furnish the criteria of scientific validation. In 
dialectical materialism, Castells insists, the 'criterion of 
practice' refers to a materialist problematic of the production 
of knowledge: "There is no concern here for moral justification, 
as is the case with the historicist humanist conception (in 
which) history ... is merely the meaningful linking of 
human actions which always involve 'free choice' and are 
therefore 'unpredictable' (Castells and de Ipola, 1976d: 138). 
Castells maintains that the relationship between the urban 
system and the system of actors is the specific expression of 
the relationships between the vari~us global systems of the 
particular society (Castells, 1976b: 83), and says that human 
individuals, or "agents", and classes of these agents, are 
only the supports of these structural relationships (Idem, 
1976c: 150). 
It can, however, be seen that Castells has taken up a 
position that is in sharp contrast to his view of individuals 
as bearers of the social formation when he states that theory 
is insufficient when one wishes to understand the urban 
question, for it has to be combined with political practice: 
"The social conditions for the emergence of such a reformulation 
are extremely complex, but, in any case, one may be sure that 
they require a point of departure that is historically 
bound up with the working class and its practice'' (Idem, 
1977a: 6). This position directly contradicts Castells' 
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earlier Althusserian stance: he states that "any theoretical 
justification must be articulated in terms of a political 
standpoint (Castells and de Ipola, 1976d: 139); that only if 
one starts from a "proletarian position" can science 
achieve any validity (Ibid.: 140); and that "The frame of 
reference of a materialist epistemological intervention is the 
fusion of Marxist theory and the working class movement" 
(Ibid.: 118). 
According to the Althusserian approach, by assimilating 
theory and practice, Castells is denying science its auto-
nomy, he is reducing it to concrete history and the ideolo-
gical practice of the masses. Historical practice is sub-
suming theoretical practice, and Castells comes in line for 
his own a.ttack on humanist subjectivism, "even in its 
'Marxist' disguise" (Ibid.: 117). 
Castells' changes in epistemological position in the 
area of historicist humanism can perhaps be attributed to a 
reluctance to follow Althusserianism through to its final 
denial of the possibility of social practice contributing to 
the formulation of a scientific practice. Althusser's 
characterization of individual and class consciousness as 
ideological is regarded by many of his critics as the most 
unpalatable aspect of his entire schema. Their arguments 
against his stance will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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IDEOLOGY, sociAL CLASSES AND THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
Althusser argues that {d~ology is characterized by its 
mystified structure rather than its political implica_tions. 
It prov!des a mystical reflection of conditions a~terior to 
. 
theory, instead of achieving a genuine congitive appro~riatio~ 
of the real. 
In Althusser's structuralism, J the analysis of ,the subject's 
to the understa~ding of consciousriess does not contribute 
I 
society. He takes up the.position of 'theoretical'. anti-
humanism': the conception that it is possible to study struc-
tures without taking into account the ability of :lndividuals 
to make subjective decisions, thereby eliminating that element · 
of consciousnesi which is generally regarded as g9rmane to 
revolutionary Marxism.(Garaudy, 1977: 205). I 
The individual nature of ~xperience leads Alt~usser to 
classify it as an illus~on, as opposed to the c6n~eptual 
transformations accomplish~d by scienc~. Individ~als ~imply 
} 
respond mechanically to objective structural cond~tions, and 
. ! 
class consciousness must be rejected as a historidist con-
. . . . t . 
cept and replaced by a concept of ideology which ~s distinct 
from the levels of theory and politics. 
Ideologies cannot be conceived simply as ideas about .the 
world, but must be seeQ rather ~~ a kind of 'lived relation~ 
ship' with it.: 11 .In ideoloE;y men do indeed·. express'· not the 
relation between them anci. their conditions of exis.tence, but 
the way they live the relation between them and their real· 
! 
conditions of exis~en~e. In ideology the real ~e~ation is 
I 
' l 
I 
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people are the bearers of particular functions concerning the 
reproduction of the relations of production. The structure 
of the capitalist mode of production is reproduced in a 
process whose requirements determine the subjective aspirations 
of the individual as agent/bearer: it is in this way that the 
relations of production become the subjects of the historical 
process as a support of this system of production. The role 
of the individual is defined through the mechanisms which 
reproduce the social formation - the structure of the rela-
tions of production. It is these relations which oust 
'real people' from their role as constitutive subjects of 
the historical process: individuals do not participate in this 
process other than by embodying it. 
Although particular ideologies may change through history, 
ideology in general remains ever-present. Even in communist 
society, ideology would be essential as the means whereby 
individuals live their everyday lives, since reality will 
never become apparent to them: "People 'live' their ideologies 
as the Cartesian 'saw' or did not see - if-he was not 
looking at it - the moon two hundred paces away; not at all 
as a form of consciousness, but as an object of their 'world' -
as their 'world~ itself" (Althusser, 1969: 233). Althusser 
thus rejects those theories that place 'man' in a pivotal 
position by assuming that the human individual plays an 
important role in the development of theory: these theories 
employ ideologically constituted concepts as their 
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analytical foundation, and in so doing they prevent authentic 
explanations from being discovered. 
Criticisms of Althusser's Position 
Seidler argues that Althusser's rationalist critique of 
human nature leaves one with a flat alternative: either human 
nature exists as a definite set of qualities, or else it is 
historically determined (Seidler, 1980: 118). Layder too 
disputes that there are only two possible epistemological 
positions with regard to the role of individuals: that they 
are either bearers; or they constitute a genetic principle 
of the levels of the social whole, causing the social for-
mation to be what it is. Both of these stances are based on 
epistemological and ontological confusions and do not ade-
quately distinguish between levels of analysis. It is 
possible to refer to individuals within wider parameters than 
merely their functions as agents of economic determinations, 
without reverting to the reductionist position which incorrect-
ly holds that individual motivation is the basic mechanism 
underlying the operation or genesis of social structures 
(Layder, 1979: 118). Thompson takes up this point, claiming 
that Althusser offers us a false choice between determination 
by individual volition, or total structural determination. 
He finds the latter alternative particularly unpalatable: 
"we are structured by social relations, spoken by pregiven 
linguistic structures, thought by ideologies, dreamed by 
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myths, gendered by patriarchal sexual norms, bonded by 
affective obligations, cultured by mentalites, and acted by 
history's script. None of these ideas is, in origin, absurd, 
and some rest upon substantial additions to knowledge. But all 
slip, at a certain point, from sense to absurdity, and, in 
their sum, all arrive at a common terminus of unfreedom" 
(Thompson, 1978: 153). 
Keat and Urry dispute that the study of the historical proces~ 
should confine itself to the social relations of political, 
ideological and material practice. While they agree that 
there are parts to play within the state and the ideological 
superstructure, they question whether it can be said that 
the role of the individual is entirely defined and distri-
buted by political and ideological social relations of 
production. Althusser's structuralism has l~d him to 
generalize from the analysis of material production t,o the 
analy_sis of other practices: "Instead of seeing Marx as 
involved in the study of the causal impact of the social 
relations of material production, Althusser wishes to identify 
isomorphic structures of social relations of material, 
political and ideological production" (Keat and Urry, 1975: 
137). Subjective interpretations and experiences are not 
allowed for in this version of structural analysis. While 
structural aspects do have a degree of influence on human 
behaviour, Althusser does not allow for the possibility that 
this behaviour may possess its own effect on the social 
structure. 
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Thompson argues that people are able to use their own 
experiences to convert objective determinations into subjec-
tive initiatives, and achieve their historical significance 
in the transformation of structure into process. While 
certain conditions are constant, people perceive conflicting 
interests, and establish .class consciousness in such a way 
that they form their own classes. For Thompson, general 
experiences may lead to the replacement of previous conceptual 
system by new problematics, and he censures Althusser's 
epistemology for not taking into account this imperative 
presentation of knowledge. While not necessarily autonomous, 
people experience their situations and relationships, relate 
this experience to their consciousness and culture, and then 
act upon situations. 
Althusser's conception of the individual as a support 
agent implies a role of the intellectual that, in spite of 
their theoretical divergences, his detractors find particu-
'larly untenable. For Fraser, Althusser's Marxism makes the 
proletariat the object of Marxism and Marxism the object of 
Althusserianism. This paramount role of theory has been 
developed by excluding the masses, which has resulted in the 
production of a socialism in which the class that makes 
the revolution becomes merely the "support" or "object" 
(Fraser, 1976: 442). There are obviously immense political 
consequences involved in Althusser's replacement of class 
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consciousness by a distinction between the masses who are unable 
to transcend ideology, and the intellectuals who possess 
knowledge. The intellectual is thereby accorded a privileged 
position from which to lead and control the directionless 
masses, and Althusser is establishing the dominance of mental 
labour over manual labour (Geras, 1972b: 302, and Clarke, 
1980: 16, 75). 
While the consciousness of the workers and that of the 
I 
scientist does not always coincide, this is not t~e complete 
rupture that Althusser posits in his attempt to d~fine the 
specificity of theoretical practice. As has been pointed 
out by Thompson, knowledges have been and still are formed 
outside of academic procedures. This knowledge has enabled 
people to "till the fields, to construct houses, to support 
intricate social organizations, and even on occasion to 
challenge effectively the conclusions of academic thought" 
(Thompson, 1979: 8). Althusse~ian Marxism, however, wohld have 
one believe that it is only possible to comprehend the con-
tradictions of capitalist society by remaining detached: ~'we 
prove our seriousness through being ready to abstract our-
selves from our lived experience, conforming to notions of 
'rigour 1 and 'objectivity', which gives us a sense that 
we've got 'knowledge' while other simply have experience" 
(Seidler, 1980: 140). 
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Althusser thus ignores the fact that structures are not 
static, but are socially constructed: it is as important to 
analyze the nature of this construction as it is to study 
how the structures determine patterns. of human~action. People 
are not simply the products of a mode of production, they are 
human subjects constantly transforming themselves in their 
confrontation with real conditions. Althusser's external and 
mechanical characterization of the capitalist mode of produc-
tion results in the portrayal of people who cannot participate 
in social change. For Marx the subjects of struggle are 
organized in social classes. The goal of political activity 
is to bring class power under conscious direction so that 
class interests and political goals are served. If this is 
the case, then this action and its actors must be thedrized, 
rather than invoked in rhetoric in service of a theory in 
which they have no place (Lovell, 1980: 242). 
Castells and Ideology, Social Classes and Individuals 
Castells emphatically states his acceptance of the 
Althusserian conception of individuals as bearers of the social 
structure .. ''What is at issue, in fact, is whether studying 
the production of social structures is equivalent to analyzing 
their origin in the action of subjects crystallized in insti-
tutions ... To identify the production of forms with their 
origin in action presupposes acceptance of the notion of actor 
subjects, constructing their history in terms of their own 
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values and aims and leading, through a cooling process, to 
society, seen as containing struggles and conflicts between 
opposites. This requires that one take as starting point 
actors and combinations of actors, and thus that one accept 
the existence of primary essences, not deduced from social 
structures ... The theoretical issue is this: historical 
actrirs founding society through their action, or support 
agents expressing particular combinations of the social 
structure through their practice. We will take for granted 
that the first approach belongs to the philosophy of history, 
and that only the second is capable of founding a science of 
society" (Castells, .1976b: 77-8). In opting for the second 
approach, Castells is of necessity dismissing any possibility 
that the actor/individual constructs history in terms of 
his or her own abilities; and rejects out of hand the exis-
tence of 'human nature' as an independent, effective 
'primary essence'. 
Throughout his texts, Castells reiterates this Althusserian 
portrayal of the individual as agent or bearer of the social 
structure. The action of people, Castells says, is determined 
by their specific location in the social structure: "New 
effects proceed not from the consciousness of men,:.but:from 
the specificity of the combinations of their practices, and 
this specificity is determined by the state of the structure" 
(Idem, 1977a: 125). Agents, whose most obvious expression is 
in social classes, "are only the supports of structural 
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relations. The relations between the social classes of a 
particular society are the effect on social relations of the 
complex combination of modes of production articulated within 
it" (Idem, 1976c: 150). He refers to the structural deter-
mination of the relations between agents: "Our aim is to show 
the reali-zation of a structural law or set of laws" (Ibid.: 
151). Furthermore, progress in theoretical practice, he 
insists, can never be the result of an individual or class: 
"It is from the constant resumption and rectification by 
different 'theoretical subjects' defining themselves in 
relation to a diversity of situations that new ways may 
/ 
emerge, within the. limits of the historical situation of the 
production of knowledge" (Idem, 1977a: 435, my italics). 
Castells also applies this notion of agents/bearers in his 
analysis of the urban: he claims that in the ~xamination 
of every concrete practice it is essential to take into 
account "the necessary insertion of urban actors in the 
system of economic, political and ideological places of the 
social structure'' (Idem, 1976c: 160), and to make reference 
to places and not individuals (Ibid.: 163). 
It has been seen that Althusser rejects the argument 
that ideology involves the distortion of reality through 
ideas, since this would be to accept that knowledge is the 
product of the consciousness of human subjects (idealism), 
or that reality is reflected in some way in our human ideas 
about it (empiricism). Because the real relations in which 
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individuals exist cannot themselves be directly known, indi-
viduals relate to their world by means of an imaginary 
relation (Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 37-9, 54-5). 
Althusser has emphatically repudiated the pragmatist 
notion that scientific truth is to be treated by the practical 
consequences of belief. Marxist theory is not to be seen as 
a chance hypothesis whose verification is provided by the 
political practice of history. "Proof by repetition for 
hundreds or thousands of years: this 'repetition' has 
produced, for example, 'truths' such as the resurrection 
of Christ, the V{rginity of Mary, all the 'truths' of religion, 
all the prejudices of human 'spontaneity', i.e. from the most 
to the least respectable!" (Ibid.: 57). 
Castells closely follows Althusser by denying that the 
criterion of scientific verification depends on social prac-
tice: "What social practice or activity are we talking about? 
If we are referring to the condensed expression of social 
practice, i.e. political practice, what do we mean by saying 
that such a criterion cannot be applied to the results 
achieved by this practice in the short term. But what time-
limi t should we set then? And who is to judge? The momentary 
victory (sometimes several decades) of fascism in some 
countries does not mean that w~ should consider its criminal 
theories as proven correct" (Castells and de Ipola, 1976d: 
136). Again, Castells criticizes the belief that the criterion 
of truth is ·a reference to practice conceived of as a ''free 
165 
and deliberate action performed by human beings'~ (Ibid.). 
In his application of the Althusserian conception of 
ideology to the discipline of urban sociology, Castells 
contends that it is not a science, but an ideological arti-
fact: "That is, its existence is justified less by the effects 
of the knowledge it produces than by its ideological impact on 
social relations" (Castells, 1977b: 61). He disputes the 
very right of this area of study to refer to itself as 
'urban', arguing that there is nothing relevant to the cities 
that cannot also be seen in the countryside: "Of course, we 
may call 'modern' society an 'urban' society, but this caprice 
of terminology is not without its consequences, both theo-
retical and ideological'' (Ibid.). Th~ term 'urban', he 
says, denotes a particular social organization of space 
which features the concentration of people and their activi-
ties. We study this space as an area of sociology because 
we endow it with specific social characteristics. Castells 
remarks that to look at space as contributing to social 
activity is rather lik~ considering "the mineralogical 
structure of the ,la~d upon which a school is built as influen-
cing its pedagogical system" (Ibid.) It is this so-called 
'natural association' between space and society that urban 
sociology concerns itself with, and it is upon the accuracy 
of this assumption that the validity of urban sociology must 
be assessed. Castells examines the Chicago School's attempt 
to define urbanism as a cultural system produced by spatial 
qualities such as density, size and heterogeneity. He 
rejects this supposition on the grounds that it is based on 
a spurious correlation: "If we control for the 'social' 
variables, spatial variables produce different effects, 
depending on the circumstances'' (Ibid.: 63). 
The influence of the Althusserian focus on structural 
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rather than individual determination, can be seen in Castells' 
rejection of that branch of urban sociology that seeks to 
examine social integration and the adaptation of rural 
migrants to urban culture. For Castells, these studies are 
to be dismissed because they concentrate on "the network 
of strategies among actors" (Ibid.: 64), and have thus failed 
to account for urban characteristics in terms of their general 
determinations - the economic, political and ideological 
instances of the social totality: "one cannot analyze a 
social or political process independently from its struc-
tural context and from the web of structural interests which 
determine it" (Ibid.: 65). 
It is also in Althusserian terms that Castells repudiates 
the urban managerialist literature: "this perspective ... 
rests entirely on an ideological base, for it is based on a 
metaphysical postulate ... that ultimately one must place the 
accent on the freedom of man who remains, whatever his 
situation, an autonomous agent capable of negotiating his 
co-operation" (Idem, 1977a: 250). Against this, Castells 
maintains that it is the particular social relations into 
which people enter which gives space a form, a function 
and a social signification: "It is a question, then, of 
establishing the structural and conjunctural laws that 
govern the existence and transformation (of space), and 
the specificity of its articulation with the other elements 
of a historical reality (Ibid.: 115). 
Althusser has made it clear that the subject-object 
unity has not only been employed by bourgeois theorists; it 
has "flourished nearly everywhere, even in the works of 
Marxist specialists" (Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 58). 
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He insists that this "ideological myth" should be eradicated: 
"Even when this dichotomy is the servant of a revolutionary 
vision which exalts the worker's cause, their labour, their 
sufferings, their struggles and their experience in the 
undifferentiated proclamation of the primacy of practice, 
it still remains ideological" (Ibid.: 59). 
Following Althusser's lead, Castells turns his attention 
to fellow Marxists, seeking to repudiate them in the terms 
outlined above. Lefebvre is rejected for indicating that 
people have the freedom to create space. For Castells, 
Lefebvre hereby affirms the spontaneity of social action and 
the dependence of space upon it, refusing to see space as 
the expression of general social determinations, and using 
people as a starting point, instead of the social and 
technological relations of production and domination (Castells, 
1977a: 93). 
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Against the "Utopie" group who saw urban problems 
solely in terms of class relations and political struggle, 
Castells argues that they have not embarked on "the long 
road of theoretical mediations to be traversed" (Ibid.), and 
suggests that they should have analyzed the capitalist 
mode of production through the development of appropriate 
theoretical tools, which would locate the basic components 
of the social structure in a prior theoretical context. 
Only in this way, he says, can one interpret social practices, 
and decipher this "supposed 'autonomy' of 'actors' (Ibid.: 
251}. 
As can be expected, these ideas can be seen in the system 
that Castells sets up as an alternative to both traditional 
urhan sociology and the Marxist urban theories that place 
individual action at the centre of their discourses. Castells 
emphasizes the Leninist argument that a social movement 
aimed at qualitative transformation cannot be expected to 
develop spontaneously, but is rather dependent upori organi-
zation from the outside. Working class experience has to be 
explained in terms of Marxist theory before it can provide 
a basis for radical and effective action: "The role of 
organization is fundamental, for, although the support-
agcnts make possible the constitution of combinations between 
the structural elements, it is the organization that is the 
locus or fusion of articulation with the other social prac-
tices. When there is no organization, urban contradictions 
169 
are expressed either in a refracted way, through other prac-
tices, or in a 'wild' way, a pure contradiction devoid of 
any structural horizon" (Ibid.: 271-2). 
Criticisms of Castells' Position 
Castells is here suggesting that, given the correct 
leadership, those engaged in urban struggles can be led to 
'discover' common class interests. This argument lies at 
the heart of his assumption that urban struggles can help forge 
a popular alliance of anti-monopoly forces (Saunders, 1979: 118). 
Castells' critics, however, dispute that a common political 
situation in the urban system is sufficient to overcome 
traditional class divisions at the economic level. It is 
said that Castells has neglected the issue of individual 
consciousness: "The issues at stake and social base affected 
are said to be determined by structural contradictions, and 
the social force appears from the social base at the wave 
of a magic wand and of organization" (Ibid.: 119). 
ln a criticism that is reminiscent of those made against 
the Althusserian system, it is held that the theoretical 
ellision of practices with structural levels in Castells' 
work is responsible for a strained relationship between 
deterministic and voluntaristic explanations of political 
practice (Ibid.). 
Saunders points out that Castells has amended his 
epistemological position extensively, primarily as a result 
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of his attempt to apply ~he Althusserian approach in empiri-
cal research. This led him to reconsider his earlier con-
ceptions of science and its relation to ideology: "this 
reconceptualization has the effect of undermining any attempt 
at maintaining such a distinction and thus throws into ques-
tion earlier critique of alte~native theories, yet Castells 
has continued to refer to such theories as ideological 
despite his rejection of the very epistemology that sustained 
this critique'' (Saunders, 1979: 120). 
Another serious criticism must be applied to the fact that, 
throughout his work, Castells fails to give a consistently 
Althusserian account of ideology and the position of indi-
viduals and social classes. He contradicts Althusser so 
frequently that one has to concur with Saunders: "There is 
certainly room for debate over whether Castells ... was 
ever Althusserian in the first place" (Idem, 1981a: 160). 
Castells links theoretical practice the the practice of 
individuals in precisely the manner that Althusser denounced. 
He says that any theoretical justification would have to be 
articulated in terms of a political standpoint: "The principal 
condition for the production of a theoretical justification 
of this type is the adoption of a political position'' (Castells 
and de Ipola, 1976d: 139); and that "Only if one starts 
from a proletarian position can historical materialism come 
forward as the science which plays the chief role in our 
conjuncture'' (Ibid.: 140). Theory, he argues, has not been 
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able to make any important discoveries without a "direct 
link with the political conjuncture of the class-struggle" 
(Ibid.: 141). Theoretical practice "is determined by the 
differing forces of the classes which are in struggle" 
(Ibid.). He insists that "any social science that is not a 
new metaphysics must establish for itself ... a relation 
with reality'' (Castells, 1977a: viii); and that theoretical 
work "does not take place in a social void; it must be arti-
culated with the other practices (Ibid.: 441). It is a 
question, he claims, "of ensuring in a parallel way, the 
development of certain concepts and the intelligibility 
of these concepts in relation to everyday experience' 
(Ibid., my italics.). 
It is clear that Castells is unable to follow the Althus-
serian logic through to the final implications of the separa-
tion between theory and reality. While he flies in the 
face of Althusser's description of theory, Castells is also 
assuming, along with the empiricists, that science shows 
us the real while ideology distorts it. This assumption is 
made explicit in Castells' definition of ideology, which is 
"a proposition which, being false in relation to the object 
considered is a symptom of another reality. It tends objec-
tively to produce a misreading of reality, thus serving the 
interests which determine it'' (Idem, 1970, cited by McKeown, 
1980: 31). For McKeown, the crude correspond~nce the~ry of 
truth implied by this notion of ideology is not only untenable, 
but is entirely inconsistent with Castells' alleged rejec-
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tion of empiricism: "It is untenable because a misreading of 
reality is as epistemologically senseless as is the empiricist 
notion of pure fact" (McKeown, 1980: 31). 
If it is Marxism's political efficacy that determines its 
scientificity, the Althusserian considerations of science are 
necessarily excluded. Even if one accepts Castells' a~ser­
tion that theory depicts reality while ideology distorts it, 
his subsequent (Althusserian) definition of historical 
materialism as "the revolutionary ideology of the workers" 
(Castells and de Ipola, 1976d: 119), would mean that historical 
materialism distorts reality, and hence is not scientific. 
When Castells sets out to identify a new real object 
(the coincidence of units of collective consumption with 
spatial units), he has first to ~ssume that this can be 
identified unproblematically through observation before he can 
show how it can be studied by means of his theoretical object. 
For Saunders, both his critique of urban theory and the 
reformulation of it are based on the argument that there must 
be a correspondence between some aspect of reality termed 
'urban' and the theory that relates to it. "Castells, in 
other words, has effectively re-introduced the knowing 
subject/object of knowledge dichotomy that Althusser sought 
to reject" (Saunders, 1981a: 173). 
By connecting theory and socio-historical practice, 
Castells comes in line for Althusser's criticisms of empiri-
cism and historicist humanism. Castells assumes a contem-
poraneity of the various practices which makes possible a 
reading in essential section: "This unleashes a logically 
necessary chain reaction which tends to reduce and flatten 
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out the Marxist totality into a variation of the Hegelian 
totality" (Althusser and Balibar, 1970: 132). For Althusser, 
this collapse of science into history reduces the theoretical 
object of the science of history to real history, and confuses 
the object of knowledge with the real object. "This collapse 
is nothing but a collapse into empiricist ideology, with 
the roles in the presentation played by philosophy and real 
history" (Ibid .. : 134). 
Castells follows historicism.in ~educing_all_practice 
to experimental practice in general, and then assimilating this 
'mother-practice' to political practice. In this way, 'real' 
historical practice is thought to generate all the other 
practices; dialectical materialism is subsumed by historical 
materialism, and Marxist philosophy is deprived of its rank as 
an autonomous discipline, having been reduced to a mere 
"historical methodology" (Ibid.: 136). Castells' views on 
'praxis', then, are exactly those which Althusser revile4: 
"we are told: :practice is the touchstone, the practice of 
scientific experiment! Economic, political, technical prac-
tice, concrete practice. Or else, to convince us of the 
'Marxist' character of the answer, social practice!" (lb id. : 
56) • 
It should be pointed out that, in recent years, Althusser 
has embarked on an extensive re-examination of ideology, and 
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the political role of the class struggle. However, as 
these formulations (Althusser, 1971, 1974, 1976) were 
published some time after The Urban Question, Castells did 
not employ them, so I have limited myself here to an 
examination of those Althusserian texts employed by Castells. 
It has been seen that Althusser's portrayal of individual 
and class consciousness as ideological is undoubtedly the 
most heavily disputed aspect of his entir~ oeuvre. It is 
thus in this area ·that one can best examine the epistemological 
shifts and internal contradictions of Castells' position, which 
are often in direct response to the growing controversiality 
of his mentor's tenets. As it is, Castells' compromises 
have led him be be impaled on both horns of the dilemma. 
Obviously, the ideal solution would have been for him to 
develop an original approach to the urban that would not have 
succumbed to either the Althusserian epistemological weaknesses 
or the assumptions of empiricism. In the light of his 
failure to do so, one is left with the impression that it 
would have been a lesser evil had Castells chosen one 
position, rather than attempting to straddle two mutually 
exclusive ones and giving an inadequate and inconclusive 
account of each. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis, it will be remembered, set out to identify 
those aspects of Castells' work which are based on Althusser's 
writings, and to determine whether Castells manages to 
achieve scientificity in Althusserian terms. In order to 
ascertain possible reasons for Castells' evident departures 
from the Althusserian system, the criticisms of Althusser's 
stance from a wide variety of theoretical positions were 
examined. 
One of the most controversial aspects of Althusser's 
interpretation of Marx is his contention that an 'episte-
mological brea~' occurred between Marx's early humanist 
writing up to 1845, and his later "scientific" work. 
Althusser argues that after the break, Marx relinquished all 
types of humanism ~nd idealism, founding a new theory of 
history on concepts such as the social formation, productive 
forces, relations of production, superstructures and ideology. 
Up until the break, Marx allegedly subscribed to the notion 
of a universal human essence: this, according to Althusser, 
implied an empiricism of the subject and an idealism of the 
essence. He rejects empiricism because it suggests that 
knowledge is obtained by a process of abstraction carried out 
by the subject on the real object; while idealism is dismissed 
because it reverses this problematic and claims that reality 
is no more than the properties of the subject. 
Althusser maintains that Marx's break with Hegel was far 
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more substantial than a mere inversion of Hegel's dialectic, 
for this would have led Marx to confine the theory of 
historical change to the development of the economic forces 
and relations of production and the essential contradiction 
between them. 
Althusser disputes the Marxist version of the Hegelian 
expressive totality, which holds that contradictions occur 
in all levels of the social formation simultaneously, due 
to the principal contradiction located in the economic base. 
For Althusser, in order to explain historical change, it is 
necessary to take into account the development of secondary 
contradictions within the superstructure of political and 
ideological relations, which develop to some extent inde-
pendently of economic relations, and create their own effects 
within the system as a whole. Althusser distinguishes between 
relations of dominance and relations of determination, and 
subscribes to the concept of 'determination in the last 
instance' by the economy, in which the economic base will 
always determine which domain of that system will be 
dominant and play the central role in determining the 
hierarchical order or articulation of all other parts of the 
whole. 
Althusser's rejection of Hegelian Marxism led him to 
take up an anti-historicist position, in which he opposes the 
view that modes of production replace each other according to 
the gradual evolutionary unfolding of innate properties. 
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Each element of the social formation has its own history, 
and history in general represents a discontinuous succession 
of modes of production. Implied in this approach to history 
is the rejection of any pivotal historical role to individuals 
or classes as self-constituted historical subjects. 
Another fundamental element of Althusserian Marxism is its 
characterization of theory as a type of production, with its 
own particular raw material, labour and product. In this way, 
Althusser hopes to establish a 'relative autonomy' of theory, 
and thus free it from the empiricist notion that scienti-
ficity is dependent on the immediate relation between theory 
and reality. By describing theory as a relatively autonomous 
practice, separate from and irreducible to the superstructural 
instances of the social formation, Althusser is also seeking 
to differentiate it from ideology, which is subordinated to 
interests other than those of knowledge. 
The supposed autonomy of theory was hotly debated, and 
this influenced Castells' subsequent attempts to amend his 
epistemological standpoint. Althusser's depiction of theory 
as a separate practice involved a complete rejection of the 
idea of praxis as a criterion of theoretical validity. In 
response to this position, it has been argued that Althusser 
has ignored the significance of politics in the production 
of knowledge, and has made it impossible for theoretical 
answers to emerge from the practice of the class struggle. 
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One of the most explicitly acknowledged aspects of 
Althusser's work employed by Castells was the farmer's 
conception of the social totality as a complex structured 
unity of distihct, relatively autonomous instances with 
separate types of development. This version of the totality 
forms the basis of the Althusserian epistemology, and its 
implications are extensive and fiercely co~tested. Castells 
directly applies this concept in his formulation bf the 
urban system, which, he says, is simply a specification of the 
general rules of the social formation. He thus argues that 
space can be ·analyzed in terms of the structural laws that 
determine its existence and transformation, and the speci-
ficity of its articulation with the other elements of his-
torical reality. The relative autonomy which Althusser 
holds to exist between the levels of the social formation, 
was employed by Castells to dispute Wirth's assumption that 
spatial forms have absolute autonomy in the production of 
urban social existence; as well as that branch of urban 
sociology which posits that spatial forms have no influence 
whatever on the urban way of life. For Castells, while 
the mode of production does have an influence on the social 
content of spatial forms, the latter possess a degree of 
autonomy, which results in .their ability to exercise 'speci-
ficity I • 
Initially, Althusser 1 s distinction between theory and 
reality is upheld by Castells, who defines the raw material of 
theoretical practice as consisting of theory and ideology, 
not concrete reality as specified by positivist empiricism. 
Those views of Castells that are influenced by Althusser 
display a strong anti-positivist stance, hence Castells' 
statement that there is no such thing as an ahistorical 
truth which exists in the order of reality. He further 
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uses the real object - theoretical object schema to assess 
the scientificity of urban sociology: according to Castells, 
a discipline can be said to be scientific if it possesses 
either a real or a theoretical object. Urban sociology, he 
says, has neither, and thus cannot be termed a science. 
Castells suggests that units of collective consumption 
coincide with spatial units, and can thus constitute a 
scientifically valid area of study. 
Closely related to Althusser's distinction between theory 
and reality is his insist~nce that theory·i§ a form of pro-
duction in which the theoretical product is obtained by the 
transformation of theoretical and ideological raw materials 
through a process of theoretical labour. This approach is 
taken up by Castells, who claims that the production of 
knowledge corresponds exactly to economic production, and 
defines this process according to the Althusserian descrip-
tion of theoretical production. Castells also employs 
Althusser's concept of the epistemological break, which 
portrays the transformation of ideology into a science as 
dependent on the construction of· a new problematic. This 
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system is the basis for Castells' assertion that the ideolo-
gical raw materials of traditional urban sociology could 
constitute part of the raw material of a new scientific urban 
sociology, due to the fact that they could undergo a quali-
tative transformation through the operation of a scientific 
problematic. The problematic, as the means of theoretical 
labour, constitutes the conceptual framework of science, and 
distinguishes it from ideology. The influence of the concept 
of the problematic can be seen in Castells' work, especially 
in his description of it as a machine for producing theories. 
The problematic as a system which determines the problems that 
a theory will be able to pose, is in evidence in Castells' 
stated intention to replace the questions posed by ideology 
with scientific ones, determined by the problematic. 
Althusser's rejection of the empiricist idea that know-
ledge consists of a relation of vision of a given object by 
a subject endowed with the faculty of vision, has been 
taken up by Castells, who denies that knowledge takes place 
between subject and object. For Althusser, theory is 
separate from the superstructural instances of the social 
formation, and therefore does not require the validation of 
external guarantees such as social history. Castells, too, 
claims that any criteria external to scientific practice 
have been dismissed as irrelevant. 
Turning to Althusser's rejection of the twin Hegelian 
'evils' of humanism and historicism, one finds Castells 
··~ 
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following Althusser by denouncing the idea that urban society 
can be understood as the culmination of history, and Castells 
thus denies that the production of spatial forms takes place 
according to the Hegelian conception of history as proceeding 
inexorably towards an inevitable conclusion. The view of 
urbanization as an inescapable consequence of human evolution, 
. Castells asserts, suits the dominant classes in that it 
deflects the focus from social realities, and holds up the 
Western urban form as a cultural prototype. Castells utilizes 
Althusser's rejection of historici3t humanism in his 
critique of Weber, Wright Mills, and especially Lefebvre's 
Marxist version of these trends. Both humanism and historicism, 
Castells warns, are unable to accommodate the concept of the 
production of knowledge through theoretical practice, and 
are therefore prevented from establishing structural and 
conjunctural laws. 
Influenced by Althusser, Castells maintains that indi-
vidual action is structurally determined: human agents and 
social classes are only the supports of structural relations. 
Rather than examining individual consciousness, Castells says 
that his aim is to show the realization of structural laws, 
and insists that theoretical progress is never the result of 
individual or class action. Althusser's depiction of 
ideology as a 'lived relation' with the world, rather 
than simply a false representation of it, is exemplified by 
Castells' statement that ideological relations are those 
through which individuals live their relation to the real 
world. 
182 
While there is much evidence of Althusserianism in 
Castells' work, on closer inspection one finds that he deviates 
from this system in every major respect. In his application 
of the Althusserian social totality to the urban system, 
Castells concentrates on the 'pure' capitalist mode of pro-
duction, ignoring Althusser's insistence that any social 
formation contains a variety of different modes of production 
in complex combination. This separation of the capitalist 
mode of production from its structural context renders 
Castells' system unable to gras~ the complexity of real events. 
Following Poulantzas, Castells hopes that the concept of 
relative autonomy will provide the means of incorporating 
the idea of effective class struggle into the essentially 
static Althusserian formulatton of the social totality. 
Castells uses the notion of relative autonomy to develop a 
conception of the state as system regulator, capable of making 
concessions to the dominated classes on the one hand, while 
simultaneously undermining the long term unity of these 
classes on the other. Urban planning is defined as the 
state's relatively autonomous intervention in the realm of 
consumption; while urban social movements are defined as 
the conjuncture of class relations resulting in a qualita-
tively new effect. Relative autonomy is also held to exist 
between the levels of the structure and the corresponding 
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practices, for the latter are capable of creating new system 
effects in terms of how they articulate contradictions. 
Castells' conception of relative autonomy not only is in-
compatible with Althusser's structuralist interpretation 
of class practices, but it cannot explain the dynamics of 
urban transformation: he does not relate his structural 
analysis of urban planning policies to his analysis of 
practices in the form of urban social movements, for the 
social contradictions which define the class struggle are 
not exterior to the structural logic. 
Notwithstanding Althusser's forceful attack on the idea 
that concrete reality is part of the raw material of theore-
tical practice, Castells claims that a discipline is scientific 
if it possesses either a theoretical object or a real object. 
Castells' suggestion that units of collective consumption 
coincide and can be identified with spatial units implies 
that there is an underlying correspondence between them that 
can be identified by observation, and is thus, in Althusser's 
terms, narrowly empiricist. Castells' distinction between 
theory and reality is inconsistently applied throughout his 
work, and it has been suggested that his position is far 
closer to crude positivist empiricism than to Althusserianism. 
Castells frequently asserts that he ·has employed the 
Althusserian conception of theory as a practice, separate 
from the other practices of the social formation. However, 
the unpalatable consequences of an autonomous theory led 
him to dilute this depiction by including concrete reality 
as part of the raw material of theory, and by judging the 
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theoretical product with reference to historical and politi-
cal practice - both expressly prohibited by Althusser. By 
making these modifications, the Althusserian portrayal of 
theoretical practice loses all meaning. Althusser intends 
the epistemological break to separate Marx's mature work 
from his early writings, which were influenced by the Hege-
lian philosophy of history. As with concrete history, 
Althusser argues that the history of knowledge is charac-
terized by radical discontinuities and ruptures which inau-
gurate the reign of a new logic that does not develop from 
the old logic, but takes its place. ·Castells departs from 
this conception by employing the Hegelian concept of 
supersession, and denies the possibility of the episte-
mological break in favour of a link between conceptual 
development and concrete historical practices. Castells' 
use of the notion of supersession carries with it the very 
philosophical assumptions that Althusser wished to eradicate 
from Marxism. Once again, Castells is unable to achieve 
theoretical consistency, and has merely juxtaposed theore-
tical concepts which are mutually exclusive. 
Althusser's depiction of the problematic as the internal 
structure of theories, is the basis for his characterization 
of knowledge as a practice, for it is the process in the 
production of knowledge in which raw material is transformed 
I 
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into product. Given that it is held to take place entirely 
within thought, it is surprising to note that Castells replaces 
the role of the problematic as the 'means of production' of 
scientific thought, with the empiricist idea that scienti-
ficity is to be established by referring to concrete reality. 
While for Althusser the problematic is the system of 
questions which determines the answers a theory-can pose, 
Castells deviates from this by stating that the development 
of theory must be tied to the problems posed by everyday 
experience. By allowing social practice the power to deter-
mine theoretical questions, Castells is stripping t~is func-
tion from the problematic, and undermining the epistemological 
status of theory that the problematic was designed to confer. 
Castells is also contradicting himself, for he has con-
demned urban sociology as ideological for defining its prob-
lems in terms of practico-social interests. 
Althusser replaces the empiricist conception of vision as 
occurring between subject and object, with a structural 
condition of sighting, which is the relation between the 
field of the problematic and its objects and problems. Once 
again Castells comes down on the empiricist side of the fence, 
for he states that he aims at deducing theoretical tools of 
observation from concrete situations that he has observed. 
Thus, in the treatment of the problematic's role in 'vision' 
and 'non-vision', not only is Castells theoretically 
incompatible with Althusser (for whom individual observation 
is necessarily ideological), but he is also revealing a 
a fundamental and unresolved tension in his work between 
empiricism and structuralism. 
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Castells is also unable to accept Althusser's portrayal 
of theory as autonomous from the concrete reality of the 
other practices of the social formation. He undermines this 
conception by stating that intellectual work is contin-
gent upon the social context in which it is produced, and 
that progress in theoretical practice depends in the last 
resort on social conditions. He further claims that scien-
tific practice depends on the history of political facts and 
the significant problems of modern society. 
Castells' opposition to Hegelian Marxism is evident in 
his rejection of urbanistic theories of the structuring of 
urban space and theories of urban culture which have tried to 
explain the production of social forms on the basis of the 
Hegelian view of history. Following Althusser, Castells 
denies that space is the ever-original work of spontaneous 
initiative, and argues that one should not set out from 
people but from their social and technological relations of 
production. Castells nevertheless frequently contradicts 
this Althusserian stance. In his subsequent assimilation 
of theory and practice, Castells shows his reluctance to 
stay with the Althusserian approach through to its final 
denial of the possibility of social practice contributing 
to the formulation of scientific practice. Against 
historicist humanism, Castells maintains that the relationship 
between the urban system and the system of actors is the 
specific expression of the relationships between the 
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various global systems of the particular social formation, and 
says that individuals and classes are only the supports of 
structural relationships. 
Castells regards urban sociology as an ideological arti-
fact, justified less by the effects of its knowledge than by 
its ideological impact on social relations. The focus of 
urban sociology on individual strategies has neglected to 
account for the structural determination of urban charac-
teristics. Marxist theoretician Lefebvre is rejected for 
indicating that individuals have the freedom to create 
space, and for failing to see that space is the expression 
of general social determinations. Castells' problem in 
the application of the Althusserian approach to historicist 
humanism only intensify in his discussion of ideology and 
its political implications for the role of individuals and 
classes. While Althusser has clearly classified human 
experience as ideological, and ideology as an inherent 
feature of any social formation (as opposed to merely 
a false representation of reality), Castells is clearly 
reluctant to adhere to Althusser's conclusion that indi-
viduals simply respond mechanically to objective structural 
conditions. His aim to identify a new real object of urban 
sociology as the coincidence of units of collective consump-
tion with spatial units implicitly assumes that this can be 
identified unproblematically through observation, and 
therefore re-introduces the knowing subject/object of 
knowledge dichotomy that Althusser rejects. 
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In Castells' connection of theory to socio-historical 
practice, he reduces Marxism to real history, and Marxist 
philosophy thereby loses the status of an autonomous 
discipline. He further links theoretical practice to indi-
vidual and class practice in a distinctly unAlthusserian 
manner, stating that the principal condition for the produc-
tion of theory is the adoption of a political position, and 
that theoretical practice is determined by the class struggle. 
In the preceding ways, it can be seen that Castells' 
theoretical allegiance to Althusser is far from consistent, 
as he has significantly modified every aspect of Althusserian 
epistemology. Not only does he frequently neglect to iden-
tify his departures from this theoretical system, but he 
fails to acknowledge that his theoretical 'alterations' are 
in fact distortions which are in direct opposition to 
Althusser's intentions. It is for this reason that I 
contend that Castells wavers between contradictory episte-
mologies, and suggest that if he wishes to retain anthro-
polotical, humanistic and empiricist assumptions, he will 
have to dispense with far more of the Althusserian position 
than he appears willing to. As his work stands, he contra-
dicts himself if he regards himself an Althusserian. 
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